# HUMAN HABITAT

DONALD JENNER



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To My Parents

Ernest J. Jenner

and

Myrtle S. Jenner

Who Were Always Supportive
Even When Mystified

# **Table of Contents**

Preface	iv
FOREWORD	7
INTRODUCTION	29
"URBAN MATERIAL"	49
AGENCIES OF URBAN CHANGE	88
THE PURPOSE OF CITIES	125
CITY CATEGORIES	172
AFTERWORD: Modern Cities	204

# **Preface**

Prefatory notes are places where an author can "'fess up" about what's going on in the book.

In this case, a couple things came together. First, there was the experience of living in different kinds of places over the years, and discovering that it was when living in cities that one had a chance to see people function in more—interesting? human?—ways. Say if you will, there's a certain something about cities that you don't find elsewhere....

Then there was a proximate cause: A long time ago, I encountered a well-meaning report by a group of—well, urban activists, of a kind. It did not seem to me they'd really understood what was happening in cities; it was not so much that they were wrong, as that they had let preconceptions as to what should be, determine what they saw as problems, and what the best solutions to such problems were. I made the mistake of summarizing my views, and there was a provocative reaction. That's always a good spur.

Finally, there has been this growing conviction that things are changing in society and the larger world of human endeavor. The old uncriticized assumptions, in which all of us were trained, simply don't work well anymore. A substantial body of scholarly opinion—to which I subscribe—holds that there is a fundamental change in the works. A new ontological paradigm is perhaps developing. There are analogues to other periods of sharp epochal shifts in the past.

Taken together, that suggested the merits of looking at cities carefully once again—something that hasn't really been done for a couple thousand years. In fact, since the categories and characteristics of the *civitas* have been assigned to the nation-state—something that happened early in the modern period, about the middle of the 17th century—it hasn't really been possible.

What follows is a kind of archæology—done my way. It is deliberately old-fashioned. For example, I have deliberately adopted a model of causality that is pre-modern. The study also aims at uncovering fundamental elements of what seems to me the most truly human way of coming together in society—living in cities.

At the same time, the study suggests some possible developments from that foundation, which express the fundamentals in ways consistent with a new paradigm, whatever that may turn out to be. However dramatic the rupture this "epochal shift" is, there is still probably another perspective in which a continuity with human traditions is evident. I am looking for both the rupture and the continuity.

The study is, therefore, the report of observations—those of far better and more significant scholars, as well as those of the author—and the summary of what has been said about the late-modern city. The hope is to understand some of the possibilities for a "post-modern" city—admittedly, a loaded term.

What is most surprising to me is the durability of this study. Most of the preliminary work was carried out in the period from 1978 to 1980. Parts of what is here, were published in journal articles almost a decade ago.

More recent events of the early 90's led me to think about these observations in a new way. As I read the manuscript through again, I found that I still hewed to the same line, even though more than a decade had passed, and my own thinking about other things had diverged substantially in many ways from its original course.

So, in this "complete version," quite a bit remains unchanged from the original insight. That is both good and bad; there are some very rough spots in the argument which deserve greater polish—and very likely, more puissant thinking. Most of the changes have been made to the latter part

of the book, where I return to more theoretical observation in an attempt to synthesize the matter of, especially, the second and third chapters.

The study has been greatly aided by the comments of friends and colleagues over the years. Some have read the manuscript, and others have engaged in dialogue on the subject and its ancillary parts. Most notable among these have been Dr. Joseph Doherty, whose thoughtful guidance stretches back to the days when I studied with him in Heidelberg. No less significant have been comments and encouragement from Dr. Wu Kuang-ming of the University of Wisconsin, and Dr. Marie Thérèse Eckhard, professor *emerita* of history at Pratt Institute. Dr. Charles Sherover, of Hunter College, was for some years my teacher, as well as a friend, and much of what I understand of political thought and its way of developing, I owe directly to conversation and (occasionally heated) debate with him.

One of the "ultimate causes" of this study, and the revision presently in hand, is a couple of conversations with clergy of the Episcopal Church: The Rev. Harry Nevels, last vicar and first rector of St. Augustine's Church on the Lower East Side of New York was kind enough to express an interest in the project at its inception; his insight into the changing ethnicity of his parish was especially instructive. The Rev. Canon Lloyd Casson, D.D., who has been active in urban ministry at many levels, and is one of the more powerful thinkers of that denomination's move to address problems at the end of the Modern epoch, was both willing to listen to basic notions from the earlier version and gently shift some of them to the form they take in this work. His tact was no less valuable than his criticism.

The usual stipulation, that the errors in the work are the author's and no one else's, is obviously appropriate here.

Donald Jenner New York City

# **FOREWORD**

I

The failure of cities is an intellectual one. It is brought about by the failure of intellectuals to generate a viable concept of the modern city and a modern region. Attempts are made to deflect attention from this bald fact by laying the blame on politics, on the lack of money, on any cause but the root one. Of course, all these things play their role in the total process, but until there is generated a vivid and impelling concept of what we are fundamentally driving at, the other factors cannot play their role in the total process.<sup>1</sup>

Edmund Bacon summarizes the problem inherent in with all modern discussions of cities. Without some concept of what may be called, for lack of a more apt expression, "civicity," the actuality of the city seems doomed to remain obscure, and all attempts to resolve the manifold human problems arising in the urban context will prove stillborn.

Bacon is also correct in his assertion of the attempt to deflect attention from this deficiency by shifting focus to what are really post-conceptual issues.<sup>2</sup> He is not alone in noting this deflection; what he alleges of the discussion of cities is only part of a larger problem running throughout the application of social science to practical difficulties.<sup>3</sup>

To some extent, this dual failure results from the obsolescence of that movement in social thought culminating in 19th century liberalism, surviving, but failing to aptly address problems of the human, political domain apparent in the 20th century. Leo Strauss characterized this failure of liberalism:

<sup>1</sup> E. N. Bacon, 'Urban Process,' in Meyerson, The Conscience of the City: New York (Braziller), 1970.

<sup>2</sup> E. g., the citation of Studinski in Gordon, Sick Cities: Baltimore (Penguin), 1965.

<sup>3</sup> Something of the same inability at a national level seems to provoke Arendt in Crises of the Republic: New York, 1972); cf. p. 37 passim.

Liberalism negated the political; by doing so, liberalism did not banish the political from the world but only concealed it. Liberalism brought about that politics is carried on by means of antipolitical speech. Liberalism has ... killed understanding of the political and sincerity regarding the political.<sup>4</sup>

Modern social science, in turn, is the creature of the old liberalism. It is, in a very real sense, the inquiry demanded by the "operators" of the reforming Western European states, as to the feasibility of change, just as the modern physical sciences are the vehicles of modern technological advance. In obscuring the political, or perhaps, its acceptance of the claim of the hiddenness of the political in other, more certain data, by the burgeoning social sciences, liberalism was committed to the interpretation of human affairs in a manner an earlier age would have deemed foreign to its nature. The subsequent adoption of a nominally mechanistic, naturalistic mode of explanation of social concerns, and (most especially for this inquiry) of civic and urban operation, obscured in a fatal way the city as the symbol of human political existence.<sup>5</sup>

This is not new. After all, in the political writings of Plato and Aristotle, the material basis of society, the obvious and easily described component of social development is discussed at some length. Aristotle is quick to claim political society's existence is durable by virtue of its conducing to living well. A significant part of his discussion of the state is of the mechanism whereby life itself, in the most materialist terms, is possible. These aspects of the  $\pi o \lambda \iota \varsigma$ , it may be assumed, were of concern to each of the elements of Aristotle's audience—would-be philosophers, scions of prominent families intending a political career, and those simply seeking to be good citizens. This materialistic foundation of human society remains significant, though to a varying degree, in later accounts. The problem is always the practical one, how is life itself possible, and answer to this is "economic." But it appears correct to say that both for classical antiquity and late antiquity, and for the Middle Ages, the materialistic account of human society, or an account merely of the most productive of "political"

<sup>4</sup> Leo Strauss's appendix in Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*: New Brunswick (Rutgers), 1976; p. 82 The obfuscation of the political, first a concealing of the political domain, is carried out necessarily by a liberal social science through its attendant social technology. One may question Strauss's implication that this does not finally kill the political.

 $<sup>\,\,^5</sup>$  The term 'symbol' is used as Kant defines it in the  $\it Critique$  of  $\it Judgment$  (New York [Hafner, 1951), p. 197.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, Politics, esp. books I and II.

manipulations, was by itself insufficient. Understanding of human society needed something more.

Notions of individual interest, developing greater influence at the beginning of the modern period, and be seen as a means of focussing upon the readily identified, quantitatively treated, material, to exclusion of something less readily defined. Finally, in the latter half of the 19th century, two major thinkers, Mill and Marx (or at least, Marxists...), develop mechanistic, materialistic modes of explanation of social affairs which deliberately seek to eliminate conceived excesses of *merely* political accounts. Mill simply separated the laws of production in the political-economic sphere, laws which could be dealt with quantitatively, as he believed, from the merely qualitative opinions governing distribution. Marx made labor, a "material human activity," the observable basis of a material account of society in which politics disappeared.

This shift in emphasis from consideration of the variable, seemingly spontaneous events in society and the relations of its members to a demand for the seemingly invariable, incapable of addressing questions of the human political domain of which the city is the symbol (in several senses), has always been the object of criticism from within that establishment. Hannah Arendt, surely one of the standard-bearers of this critical element. summed up that criticism in the following terms, that "the conditions of human existence—life itself, natality, and mortality, worldliness, plurality and the earth [factors mesurable statistically in ratios—can never 'explain' what we are or answer the question of who we are for the simple reason that they never condition us absolutely." <sup>10</sup> If these material conditions of human existence itself are not adequate to the explanation of who we are, or by extension, what we do, the somewhat more remote material structures of the social environment—partly artifact, yet mutatis mutandis more intimately related to nature—will be, however illustrative, equally inadequate in the final analysis.

It appears, if the city is the archetypical human environment and, simultaneously, human creation, and it is, moreover, the symbol of that uniquely human sort of activity which is called politics, it will be necessary to inquire after that which is hidden in the standard social-scientific accounts of cities (and at the same time pointed to by these accounts, by making the observer sensitive to what is lacking or hidden by them)—

<sup>7</sup> Cf: Descartes, Discourse on the Method, paragraph 4.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: New York (S&S), 1967; p. 118ff.

<sup>9</sup> Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago (U. Chicago), 1958; note p. 183

<sup>10</sup> ibid. p. 11

descriptions of the matter from which they are constructed, and of the mechanistic agencies of change within them—if the object of a definitive theory of the city is to be fulfilled. Such a study seems to me a wholly appropriate entry into fundamental questions of human being and action.

II

# A

Materialism has been a seductive point of view for the inquiry into the social and political dimension of human existence from the beginning of Western thought. It is equally true that the present version of that materialism, and the liberalism with which it is connected—and reciprocally, by which it is furthered—is a distinctively modern, post-16th century phenomenon. Though the currents, trends and ideas which produced this uniquely modern way of thinking had been developing from the end of the 14th century, it is conventional to regard the proposal of his method by Descartes and the subsequent developments of the point of view that method enshrined as the moment in which modernity is born. If the notion of politics and political community is hidden by the social-scientific perspective built upon the modern, post-Cartesian point of view, what is it in the Cartesian systems which allows for the disappearance of something so essentially human?

It is not so much the formulation of new philosophical propositions which Descartes claims as his contribution;<sup>12</sup> rather, it is the method he advances as a surety for such propositions as he accepts that secured Descartes' place. This method represented the culmination of late Scholastic experience (in which Descartes was steeped) and the essence of the experience of Descartes' own generation. This absolute heart of the new philosophy starts in and ever returns to a thoroughgoing doubt, of any proposition which is not completely clear and evident. That which is most suspicious—if not for Descartes, then at least for the Cartesians—is the sensory datum.<sup>13</sup> Regardless of its rectitude, the received opinion developing from Descartes' insight is that one's own ideas are relatively clear, and can be carefully distinguished. One's sensory impressions, however, are

<sup>11~</sup> Dr. Harold Donohue (in private conversation) suggests a well-developed rejection of teleology obtained in the later Epicurean schools.

<sup>12</sup> Cf: Discourse, part 1

<sup>13</sup>Arendt, Between Past & Future, New York (Viking) 1961; p. 55.

frequently unclear, and more frequently still, in distinct. Hasty judgments from such data are the preëminent form of error.  $^{\rm 14}$ 

A concomitant of this opinion is the devaluation of what is expounded by others, or conveyed to one as the position of another person. Communication of such opinions is in the first instance through the outer senses, through hearing and, to a lesser extent, seeing the other expound his views. If the communication of the senses is suspect, then understanding of what the other has to say is also suspect ("Have I heard correctly?"). This suspicion is only partly relieved in the event I can verify from my own inner experience that which I understand the other to be claiming as valid and true. There remains the question, of course, whether what is verified in this inner experience is indeed the same as what was meant by the This suspicion of the sensory datum, and thus of the opinions of others, is also a suspicion of the independent reality of the "outer" world. It is my inner sensations, and more especially, reflection upon it, and understanding arising from it, which is ultimately "real," under the implications of Cartesian philosophy.<sup>15</sup> Take that line, and the condition of the possibility of politics is void.

The turn-within is not unusual in the development of thinking. In the West, it has been a powerful element in Christian thought nominally originating with Augustine of Hippo, having roots in the late Stoa, and a species of fruition in the neo-Platonism of Plotinus, with its new understanding of the ego. Similar idealisms develop in other cultures; there is some reason to believe that 16th and 17th century reports of neo-Confucian idealism were influential in early modern development of that line in the West. 16 Such a turn within changes the way in which history is understood. The observing person, contemplating the actions of others, and the possibility of both reaction and original action of his own, is set off from the meaning of the complex of social activity which, ordered and explained temporally, constitutes both the history of the society and the history (or perhaps better, the historical context) of the individual. historical context, under this mutation, is no longer obvious, requiring a merely chronological exposition. It is now obscure, requiring painstaking interpretation. As Gadamer has suggested, 17 something now is deemed

<sup>14</sup>It is, perhaps, perplexing that the most "empirical" and analytic thinking of the early 20th century, insisting on a rejection of British idealism in particular and idealism in general, were nevertheless dominated by idealist notions. E. g., Wittgenstein's world is composed of "facts."

<sup>15</sup>Arendt, Between Past & Future, p. 53.

<sup>16</sup>See Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese Past: Stanford, 1973; passim, esp chapter IV.

<sup>17</sup>H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method: New York (Seabury), 1975; p. 81 passim.

meaningful precisely because its meaning is not clear. *Vita contemplativa*, not *vita activa*, is the most completely human way of being.

In this coming-to-be-obscure of the historical life of a society, politics—the *vita activa*—is rendered, not so much obsolete as confusing. The citizen, as a member of a body-politic, or a political actor, requires a clear understanding of the society in which he lives, an understanding that is in the first instance historical. This understanding must be clear and present to him at all times when he is called to function in the civic domain. But this history is not present to him except as something obscure, i. e., in a fashion which does not serve his immediate need to act decisively. All the citizen has is a suspect impression which may be a lie, derived from sensory observation, or reported by another. In fact, his reason may not be sufficient to discern the fallacious character of the impression which he has.<sup>18</sup>

Briefly, the problem stacks up like this: Scepticism as to the reliability of the senses leads to doubt about the natural world about one, but also about the discourse one has with others about the human social domain in which one lives.

Concomitant with this is the doubt of the tradition which one inherits in the history of that social domain, which is also subject to transmission in various ways from "outside." The modern social-scientific establishment embodies this dilemma; its inability to adumbrate a concept of the modern city may be baldly put as the inability of the social scientist to distinguish the "true" from the "false" in the domain of human action proper (such a distinction not being at all quantifiable either directly or even as a ratio finally—it is not a value). In fact, it is not too much to say that the social scientist is not necessarily aware that there is a real distinction to be made; in this he is simply standing at the end of the end of the modern age. For the perception of qualities which are, though qualitative, objectively (or at least, intersubjectively) true, there is substituted the subjectively valued, which may be ranked. As subjective, the normative utility of such valuation is properly deemed dubious. Thus the social scientist and the political operator he serves are compelled to adopt a new definition of politics.

<sup>18</sup>Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 6f

<sup>19</sup>The most evident substantiation of this is the relative ascendancy of verifiability, coherence, and to a lesser extent, pragmatic criteria of truth over the older demand for objective correspondence. Cf: Pepper, World Hypotheses (U. Cal.); definitions of "data" and "danda."

В

This is neither new nor controversial. On the contrary, this redefinition of politics is the heart of the problem addressed by Hannah Arendt in *Crises of the Republic*. A major theme running through this volume of essays is a critique of the modern insistence to find "a priori," purely rational justifications for the predetermined solutions of nominally political problems. In "Lying in Politics," she offers a compelling image of the activity of the new political operator in the context of the Viet Nam conflict:

They [political public-relations experts were obviously different from the ordinary image-makers. Their distinction lies in that they were problem-solvers as well. Hence they were not just intelligent, but prided themselves on being 'rational,' and they were to a rather frightening degree above 'sentimentality' and in love with 'theory,' the world of sheer mental effort. They were eager to find formulas, preferably expressed in pseudomathematical language, that would unify the most disparate phenomena with which reality presented them; that is, they were eager to discover *laws* by which to explain and predict political and historical facts as though they were as necessary and thus as reliable as the physicists once believed natural phenomena to be.<sup>20</sup>

Two important observations, explanatory of politics construed through social science, are offered in this passage. First, there is the new conjunction of image-making and problem-solving; politics, as Arendt so aptly has is, comes to be seen as public relations. To be sure, the image of the political situation has inevitably been important to the political actor, especially in the case where he had to justify his act. The ancient importance of rhetoric as the political tool par excellence is adequate confirmation of this. But the creation of the image in such a case takes place after the decision has been taken; it is justification; reason is a posteriori, in the most direct sense. Now, in modern politics, image itself becomes a prior problem; a political decision is taken with a view to the image which will be presented. The modern equivalent of the rhetor's skill is a manipulation of this image, the illusion to be conveyed by the constituent's senses. Thus the problem-solving process is seen in terms of the need to predict citizens'

<sup>20</sup>Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 11

<sup>21</sup> ibid., p. 10

 $<sup>22 {\</sup>rm This}$  opinion enjoyed wide acceptance through the 16th century; Shakespeare's political characters are masterful rhetors, e. g..

possible reactions to any given, nominally political, action. The world is, in a sense, engendered, or "manufactured" to specification.

This leads, secondly, to a comparison with the actual politics of an earlier age. The ancient politician, having taken a decision (solved a problem) and faced with the need to justify that action (*preserve* an image) needed a a lively sense of the truth of the case, as well as an awareness of the several possible perspectives which might obtain within his own proper body- politic. His problem of a posteriori justification was one of demonstrating that the perspective operative in his decision was at once the most perfectly correspondent to the reality, and the least impious. It seems while the modern practice is designed to forestall debate, the ancient practice could only be furthered in debate.

The parallel development to the conjunction noted above has been the substitute of research for action. In the search for general laws of the political domain, arcane underlying general causes with some universal character are sought, to the exclusion of the obvious, immediate problem which is evident to all. An interesting peripheral concern has been an everwaxing discussion of the nature of an immediate relation of theory and practice. Such *immediacy* is explicitly denied in earlier authors, such as Kant (as a modern example);<sup>23</sup> that there was some mediation also seems implicit in the doctrines of both Greek and Roman commentators (such a mediation being, presumably, the virtue of the politician). In any event, as Arendt notes, to neglect the obvious political problem "means that the problem will not even be properly defined."<sup>24</sup> One is tempted to ascribe this simply to a mistaken understanding of the causal nexus.

Problems of social scientific methodology are germain to this inquiry only insofar as the conflict over method is symptomatic of the fundamental inadequacy of the social sciences as presently constituted to address the question of what a city is. Regardless of the "ideological" strain of methodological theorizing, it is a *predictive*, law-like structure which is sought. Such a demand for a more or less rigid determinism is most obvious in a "naturalistic" approach to the social sciences. But even more phenomenologically informed inquiry into social reality, while avoiding the positive error of social-scientific naturalism, seems to strive for an "organized knowledge" which can serve as a certain guide to decision-making. Insofar as the latter approach must take cognizance of the obvious, evident

<sup>23</sup>Cf: Critique of Pure Reason, B824f

<sup>24</sup>Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 73

<sup>25</sup>Morgenbesser, in Emmet & MacIntyre, Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis: N. Y. (Macmillan), 1970; pp. 23, 28 passim.

circumstances of social pheno-mena, it is more adequate than the merely naturalistic perspective (modelled as it is on an outdated positivistic natural science<sup>27</sup>). On the other hand, when such a phenomenology leans toward the supervention of the obvious, the criticisms of naturalism seem equally applicable.

The shift in perspective which has produced the foregoing state of affairs is very much to the point. The Cartesian variant on the "turn within," coming to be the ground of method in subsequent thinkers, obscured "objective" reality, shifting the emphasis among criteria of truthfulness from correspondence between object and proposition, to more *interior* sorts of confirmation—coherence, notably, but also verifiability and material practicality. This shift is not even a mistake in any strong sense; the resultant facilitation of observation of the world from a universal perspective proved extremely productive. But as science, including social science,<sup>26</sup> has striven to become increasingly universal in perspective, the limited earthly concerns, the obvious defining characteristics of the human domain, are lost in the cosmic processes which are imposed as explanatory schemata upon the world. The result at times seems almost a revivified astrology.<sup>29</sup>

Indeed, the modern concept of process itself—a point upon which Descartes is insistent, in view of his emphasis on efficient causality, <sup>30</sup>—changes the character of social scientific inquiry in a definitive way. <sup>31</sup> The only process available to the social scientist has been the material process of accumulation, interpreted in various ways for various purposes. This process, in Arendt's expression, "was understood as a natural process and more specifically in the image of the life process itself." <sup>32</sup> Within such a

<sup>26</sup>Schütz in Emmet & MacIntyre, *ibid.* p. 5f; points of agreement with naturalistic social science are set out on p. 3.

<sup>27</sup>Legitimate, if the implicit social-scientific claim to unification with natural science in some sort of methodological common field is accepted, at least as an heuristic.

<sup>28</sup>See e. g., Ayer's comments on sociology in *Language, Truth & Logic*,; compare Popper's (equally obsolete) discussion in various places, and attempts to apply these approaches in Hempel's *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* and criticisms in Hübner's *Kritik der Wissenschaftlichen Vernunft*.

<sup>29</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 268.

<sup>30</sup> Principles of Philosophy XXVIII

<sup>31</sup> In the first place, it may create a paradox, in which a static point is sought in a purely temporal, hence ever-changing process. Kant's remark (CPR, A381) that "time has nothing abiding," is pertinent. To seek in temporally determined process for an absolutely unshakable foundation would be an inquiry doomed from the start. Since there is something of such a search in modern social science, it has already failed.

<sup>32</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 105. A case can be made that the notion of process was imported into the physical sciences from this historical perspective. Cf: *ibid.*, p. 296f, also

framework of understanding, though, it is no longer possible to look at the being of an object. More to the point in the present inquiry, the city as the hypotyposis or symbol of a fundamental human activity, politics, is fatally obscured. The activity of citizens in an historically determined moment is lost in the desire to account for the generation of that moment, or more often, the generation of the place, in some sort of "materialized" history. This shift, in the particular case of cities, can be characterized as an emphasis upon the merely urban (having to do with the place in which certain people live, certain transactions take place, a location, in a word, resulting from certain processes, some of which are deemed virtually automatic), to the exclusion of political or civic actions by a body of citizens confronted by a need to make a decision. The evidence of this shift is legion.33 It would be wrong to assert all social scientists have succumbed to this, as I believe, erroneous perspective. But even where a criticism of the naturalistic account is evident, it is not wholly abandoned. In any received account of the modern city, the specifically civic is lost in the merely urban.34

The city comes to be seen, in this materialistic, naturalistic perspective, as a social order, "a system coördinating the behavior of many persons within a community." The actions of citizens together—which constitute the fundamental difference between *civitas* and *urbs* in the ancient understanding of the city—are difficult to fix; it is more productive of something reducible to an explanation, to study the material structure. Such a structure is not obvious; thus it is necessary to define an ideal structure *a priori* and "retrofit" it upon the actual political body.

It is not that this perspective is altogether wrong. In ac-counting for the purely material element of the city, the definitely *urban* aspect, social scientific inquiries have amassed a significant body of data and advanced a number of different systems of coherent explanations, each of which sheds light upon what happens in urban situations. This has been amply shown in the succeeding chapters. Indeed, some of these theories seem to have a limited predictive value. However, it is equally true that these theories have been proven unevenly adequate, both as complete explanations of all phenomena, and as *regularly* predictive of coördinated actions of some

Between Past & Future, p. 57.

<sup>33</sup> Inter alia Arendt, Between Past & Future, esp. pp 58f, 102; also Helmer and Eddington, Urbanman: The Psychology of Urban Survival: NY (Macmillan), 1973, where social psychology reduces as citizen to a species of equipment.

<sup>34</sup> A good example will be found in Park & Burgess,  $\it The~City~(Chicago~[U.~Chicago,~1967), p.~1$ 

<sup>35</sup> Scott Greer, The Emerging City: New York (Free Press), 1962; p. 66

bodies of citizens. Political actions and dependent phenomena occur in a fashion which frequently seem spontaneous, vitiating the social-scientific discovery of apparent regularities. The frequent failure of social-scientific inquiry to provide certain grounds, which implicitly (as a science) it claims to do, would appear to justify another line of inquiry, tangential to the social-scientific, into the non-material, specifically civic, aspect of the city.

# Ш

# A

*Process* is the explanatory schema frequently employed in social-scientific accounts of society; some of this appears in the later discussion of functionalist social science. Two kinds of process are asserted, usually exclusive of one another: either historical development or the internal interaction of a social system's elements is posited as a kind of principle.

The former mode of explanation by process is useful in the event one wishes to make a strictly causal account of the human social sphere, agreeable in manner to similar explanatory models in the natural sciences. Under this assumption, in the event a particular cause-effect relationship is established, it seems feasible to predict from similar causes similar effects. The practical limits to such a causal explanation are, of course, the detail with which the complex of causes "producing" a particular effect can be known, and the degree of similarity between two sets of causes for which an analogous relationship is claimed. These limits are acknowledged by the advocates of such an explanatory device. The inadequacy of historical judgment to extra-human, strictly natural circumstances is not acknowledged.

Strictly "naturalistic" causal explanation of society rests upon the not altogether deniable assumption that human society *is* natural. Compelling as this assumption is, there exists an antinomy, that human beings create their own society, and reform it from time to time. History provides a number of examples of this kind of deliberate creative or re-creative act of individual or collective will to alter societies, which are incompatible with the claim that society is wholly determined naturalistically. If the antinomy is assumed, *viz.* that human society creates itself, then the social scientist will prefer to examine the internal functional structure of society, as has

<sup>36</sup> Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation: New York (Free Press); passim. On the other hand, there is also the problem of the contingency of any historical argument; such arguments are empirical merely.

been indicated in earlier remarks. It is asserted that necessary alterations to a given social fabric to accomplish some desired movement from an arbitrary originary "point zero" can be discovered in this structure. It would seem at first that this is a teleological perspective. However the  $\tau\epsilon\lambda$ o $\varsigma$  treated of under this perspective does not seem to have the conscious, "autarchous" character of the  $\tau\epsilon\lambda$ o $\varsigma$  of classical teleology. The more contemporary expression, "teleonomy," in which a purpose is understood as an efficient cause (presumably, in that it is a motivation inherent in the actor, hence actual and possible, rather than a conceived purpose, thus merely potential), seems more appropriate.<sup>37</sup> This is an enduring principle of explanation, so understood. As "progress," process is the most typical of liberal notions. Progress becomes the lens through which society is viewed, and it is amenable to measurement in material terms.

What is lost in both these notions of progress is a sense of variety, on the one hand, and of the appropriate, on the other. If this progress is seen as being "in the direction of organized and assured freedom," then it is easy to overlook differences in social structures and see all kinds of social institutions as tending toward the same grand purpose. But since one rather absolute goal is posited as the purpose of all these social (and especially, governmental) institutions, necessarily, any goal advanced which is not subsidiary to this absolute goal of greater freedom will be looked upon as reactionary. Such reactionary goals are the object of official repression.

There is a more serious problem with the definition of the absolute goal of progress as freedom. Some non-material definition would be subject to a large degree of interpretive variation. Hence the tendency is to define freedom in economic and technological terms. That is, to be free is to have enough of specified basic goods which technology can produce through large- scale (and ever-increasing) production. That some elements in society might seek to impose limits upon the economic-technological notion of progress can provoke a technological advocate to exclaim:

Indeed, the central danger facing humankind lies... in the subordination of technology to the values of earlier historical eras and its exploitation by those who do not un-

<sup>37</sup> This term is adopted by Piaget, inter alia, for precisely the reason suggested. However, other writers, e. g., von Wright, not only have no qualms about the term "teleology, but claim succession to the "Aristotelian" teleology for their doctrine. This seems justified, if Kant's discussion of teleological judgment is adapted to modern structuralism.

<sup>38</sup> I. e., what is done for the sake of progress may violate communal norms.

<sup>39</sup> Lord Acton, cited in Arendt, Between Past & Future, p. 96 ibid.

derstand its implications and consequences but seek only their own selfish personal or group purposes.<sup>40</sup>

Process, in order to be comprehensible as an explanatory principle, seems to require being imposed upon the human social domain in the form of an absolute notion of progress. It may be defined, as above, in economic and technological terms, or it may be "retrofitted" to a more naturalistic explanation: It might be argued that greater populations living in smaller (both relatively and absolutely-through population expansion and progressive urbanization) territories, served as the principle cause of the growth of ever more sophisticated production. The net result appears the same; the grand process and its goal, accepted as the explanation of the human social domain, comes to be the tool of the new politician. politician, as we noticed above, is concerned with justifying his actions a priori. Process comes to be the principle of such justification; actions which accord with process, seen as progress, are proper, and the opposition from any quarter to such progress can be called anything from counterproductive to treasonable. The body-politic is material to be ordered in the most perfect fashion conducive to the attainment of process, understood as progress. Since the body-politic is composed of people, and this redefinition is a materialistic one, human being is now material to be organized. Terms such as "human resources," "manpower development," and the like, government policies favoring certain kinds of population growth, training programs, and social services over others are ample evidence of this development of manipulation of the human social domain and the people constituting it, on the one hand, and of the character of this manipulation "from above," on the other.41

B

Practically, this manipulation cannot be accomplished without some view as to what is happening within the society itself. This is necessary for two reasons: In the first place, the manipulation is justified on he grounds of keeping society as a whole on the "main track" toward the adumbrated goal as *the* social purpose. In the second place (more pragmatically), short of an absolute and largely unworkable sort of tyranny, a government's legitimate authority rests to some extent upon the view its subjects entertain of its efficacy in addressing obvious and immediate problems. Government responds most actively to those demands which are most forcefully and unavoidably pressed. Hannah Arendt, discussing changes in

<sup>40</sup> Victor Ferkiss, Technological Man: NY (NAL), 1969; p. 35f.

<sup>41</sup> Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 188 (note)

the university community (whose officers are clearly "establishment" persons), describes this responsiveness succinctly:

It seems that the academic establishment, in its tendency to yield more to Negro demands, even if they are clearly silly and outrageous, than to disinterested and usually highly moral claims of white rebels, feels more comfortable when confronted with interests plus violence than when it is a matter of nonviolent "participatory democracy." The yielding of university authorities to black demands has often been explained by the "guilt feeling" of the white community; I think it is more likely that faculty as well as administrations and boards of trustees are half-consciously aware of the obvious truth of a conclusion of the official *Report on Violence in America*: "Force and violence are likely to be successful techniques of social control and persuasion when they have had wide popular support."

To this must be added the indications from earlier discoveries, that "wide popular support" is a relative notion. A small absolute number in a limited territory—even a statistically insignificant number—can effect its will. It has been suggested that one or two hundred thousand people, loudly demonstrating their support for some action demanded of city government in New York, can effectively compel the city to take some step which is not widely supported among the remaining five or six million citizens.<sup>43</sup>

Manipulation of this sort is an omnipresent fact of modern society, subject to limitations indicated elsewhere. Manipulators—elected officials, bureaucrats, or persons consulted in the policy formation process—are themselves subject to manipulation from below. But this latter sort of manipulation works only when perceived as threatening, or as "violent." Such violence, it can be argued, arises from a degree of frustration, though

<sup>42</sup> Hannah Arendt, On Violence: NY (HarBrace), 1969; p. 19. A more—commonplace?—expression of this developed in a private conversation, with a young curate from Jacksonville, Florida. This curate asserted that the most important factor in the maintenance of Latino civic rights in his area was the fact that many of these Cuban-descended residents were armed to the teeth. If you will, his opinion was that good government, like revolution, grows from the barrel of a gun.

<sup>43</sup> Civil service unions, representing a quarter-million New York City employees, have discovered the truth of this; they use their influence, seemingly unjustified by their numbers. The sensitivity of their positions is only partial explanation for the degree to which they compel city hall.

that argument is suspect given the complexity of the "violent" people and the groups they form. Perhaps it is more accurate to say violence erupts (suggesting thereby spontaneity) claiming the purpose of redressing an obvious problem, and to admit "deep" causes are at best obscure.

Concomitant with this insistence on the violence of modern manipulation is recognition of the relative inefficacy of what would seem to be preferred means in the manipulation of bodies- politic from above. The "hidden persuaders" of advertising and public relations experts seen to have proven increasingly ineffective as vehicles of political manipulation. The sheer omnipresence of these manipulative media—television foremost among them—has produced in the body of people increasingly exposed to their blandishments a sophistication in critically evaluating some of the perspectives purveyed.<sup>44</sup>

This is not to say attitudes present in a given society, or desires developing within it, are not concretized and even potentiated through these media. But it often seems more the case that media personalities—frequently accused of informing public opinion, often in biased fashion—are merely giving expression to a common perspective. This is surely not manipulative; the actually manipulative, the attempt to "sell," in a manner akin to the selling of a breakfast cereal, an establishment opinion, is necessarily only manipulative insofar as the position being advanced is foreign to the group subjected to the manipulative effort. This latter kind of manipulation seems of merely limited efficacy. Therefore the political manipulator is compelled to fall back upon more traditional means of manipulation—physical coercion, torture, deliberately misleading the body-politic through adjustments of information and education, etc.. These violent methods—parallel to those employed "from below" have obvious and historically demonstrated drawbacks.

It would seem this is the case, at this point in the study:

- 1. There is a body of data on cities deriving from socialscientific inquiry; to this is attached a complex of interpretations. [This will be the subject of summary discussion in chapters two and three.]
- 2. These interpretations embody certain assumptions which have a history. That history has been mentioned in

<sup>44</sup> Arendt, On Violence, p. 28

this forward and will be the subject of expansion in the next sections.

3. The most primitive assumption in the social-scientific study of cities is one of *process* interpreted as *progress*. This is not merely an hermeneutic assumption, but a normative one, linking speculative inquiry with morality.

The development within liberal circles of a notion of progress, manifesting in the social sciences as a principle of process, is of limited usefulness. As a strictly explanatory theory, process can prove illuminating in the inquiry into some aspects of the social domain. But as a principle of political practice, or a criterion by which political actions are assessed, process is productive of a kind of manipulation which is non-, if not actually counterproductive. The kind of manipulation which the liberal political operator attempts in order to keep the society he operates (from a distance, as it were, in accordance with the posture of objectivity consistent with the modern scientific viewpoint) on the proper track toward the specified goal, characterized as a carrot-and-stick method, 45 has proven ineffective. The resultant fall-back into traditional manipulative means seems, both on historical and nominally logical grounds, likely to prove at least equally counterproductive.46 Practically speaking, one is compelled to examine the (possibly unpalatable) alternatives, which are political bodies in which the a priori justification of action, and the manipulation of the body-politic thereby at least tacitly advocated, are avoided.

#### IV

It seems to me the social sciences, as presently constituted, do not serve in the sort of inquiry now indicated. This need not be a reflection upon some putative inadequacy of social science as received. Their basic assumptions, characterized above, have produced a great deal of data of material import for this inquiry. But the subject is infinitely complex, and it would appear that the fundamental assumptions of the social sciences do not readily comprehend that complexity.

#### A

Josiah Royce describes the complexity of human society in terms of tension, of "strained situations," and argues that it is in such social tension that one comes to observe himself as distinct from others with whom one is

<sup>45</sup> Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 8

<sup>46</sup> Arendt, Between Past & Future, p. 103

in contact.<sup>47</sup> Such social tension arises from the stress engendered by the unpredictability of another's actions in specific "crisis" circumstances. In reality, that is, the response of any given person to a social nexus in which a decision is demanded depends to a large extent upon how that nexus is judged.

The judgment, in turn, depends upon who is making the judgment, and the whole complex of previous events and decisions taken which constitutes his personal history. Such a personal history is necessarily unique to some extent, and precisely to that extent the response of any given person or group will be unique. The contrast between the response one individual expects he would make, and his perception of how another has responded has a dual effect. The first individual comes to understand his difference from the other as necessary, at the same time discovering a communal identity which makes the comparison possible. As part of this identity/difference discovery, he becomes aware of his own complex of inculcated habits of conduct, plans, ideals and willfulness. His response to the action of the other is expressed in a judgment of the form, "I would have done otherwise," or perhaps "It could not have been done otherwise." Social science seems to deal clumsily with this sort of uniqueness and spontaneity in human judgment and action; it may be a problem parallel to the insistence of a species of historicity to the noumenal noted above.

There must be sufficient similarity among the members of a social body to allow of coördinated actions. While some kind of seemingly phylogenetic motivation may be assumed in standard social-scientific analyses of individual activity, it is still conventional to assume as well that coördinated action arises through volition, and that a common will in turn comes about through deliberation in which the manifold judgments of persons in community are reconciled. In deliberation, ever so slight divergent personal histories manifest; surely, the larger the number of persons, or indeed, of groups, the greater the complexity and the more involved the reconciliation.

Max Weber makes a strong case that this complexity is fundamental in understanding the differences in various kinds of urban culture. He argues that Western urbanites (at least, in the Mediterranean basin) enjoyed a peculiar freedom not present in typically Asian urbanities. He attributes this to the absence of "social formations" preventing fusion into more or less homogeneous status groups.<sup>48</sup> That is, Western civic society lacks at least one level of mediation between society and government—a dubious

<sup>47</sup> Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1968; p. 111.

<sup>48</sup> Max Weber, The City: NY (Macmillan), 1958; p. 97.

view, given concepts such as ethnicity and like factionalism (the currently accepted term for which is "pluralism"). However, the presence of such mediating groups, with various degrees of shared personal histories, seems in his opinion to have prevented the emergence of a common civic perspective. Moreover, in places where the city was of less importance (in Weber's view), the evolution beyond such mediating groups was also of less significance.

While Weber's formulation is itself suspect (there is a suspicion of ethnocentricity appropriate to any line of thinking founded in Hegelian idealism, I believe), it does seem the case that successive breakdowns in primaeval kinship groupings in the ancient cities of the Mediterranean basin was a prerequisite to the full-blown emergence of civic consciousness. This consciousness was regularly expressed in some sort of deliberative assembly, itself evolved seemingly from pre-civic institutions, in which common opinion was forged from a complex of private views. The evolution of tribal into national assemblies (as in the case of the ancient German *Thing*, in some views), and eventually modern civic councils and magisterial diets, is not dissimilar.<sup>49</sup>

To this tendency toward deliberative formation of common opinions, there is a regularly occurring counter-tendency, in which even those communities normally practicing some sort of deliberation restrict the roles of some people in such deliberation. Not all persons present to the community are in the community. Such people are not among the "saved," or are not "citizens," or are otherwise debilitated. One example of this sort of restriction is to be found in the ancient  $\pi o \lambda \iota \varsigma$  as Aristotle presents it in the Politics; ocertainly the Christian notion of the community saved by acceptance of a particular conception of God, or alternatively, by a selective operation of God's grace, is another.

The difficulty of moving into the *terra incognita* of a theory about cities beyond that vouchsafed by the received doctrines of the social sciences is therefore increased. Not only will such a theory have to account for the way in which deliberation takes place in the city, but it will have to take

<sup>49</sup> While it would be a mistake to maintain an original connection between these two different kinds of deliberative assemblies, it certainly seems that the forma awareness of the ancient model modified the tradition of the latter Germanic survival. There appears to be less evidence commonly available about possible cognate non-Western parallels.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 81; Aristotle maintains that the form of the constitution determines the qualifications for the citizen (*Politics* 1278a1-40).

<sup>51</sup> Royce, op. cit., p. 77f. The centrality of religion in defining a culture seems unquestionable, so much so that it becomes the heart of such theories of history as that of Toynbee.

into account restrictive qualifications for participation in that deliberation. Any number of qualifications seem possible, and it is a relevant question how much of the determination is necessary, and how much an accident of culture. One would expect that a community with more inclusive criteria for participation in the deliberative process would have greater difficulty in founding a consensus, and thus have a more restricted field of approved action than a community in which a smaller number of divergent opinions needed to be reconciled.

The enormous complexity of the human social domain, and the lack of ready definition in the law-like regularities of that domain, is fairly well accepted. Morgenbesser, for instance, suggests: "The problem is not whether the social sciences *can* contain laws but whether they can contain enough laws *or* theories to enable them to be used for certain tasks." Eliade, from within the social sciences, simply eliminates the accounts of some kinds of development in human perspectives and communal understanding; typically, the social scientific account of human society is limited in a way calculated to avoid the complexity.

On the other hand, when an attempt is made to extend the social scientific apparatus beyond its limits for handling complexity of the kinds noted above, the result is far from uniform. There may be an even closer alliance between the social scientist and the political operator which results in such an attempted extension, in which process is seen as utterly objective and necessary. The social scientist becomes, under such a scenario an advocate of process and implicit goal; he is called to step beyond simple inquiry into human society. <sup>55</sup> But those outside the alliance, disenfranchised by it, come to perceive "that 'the Establishment' is out of its mind." <sup>56</sup>

Thus it seems there is a complexity involved in moving beyond the kinds of explanation afforded of cities by social science; this complexity is such that the social scientific apparatus cannot effectively address it. In the event it does transgress the limits of its method, moving from observation and description into the realm of action, it is coöpted. This is not consistent with the need for objectivity. Moreover, there is some reason to

<sup>52</sup> There certainly is a reciprocity between the generation of restrictions on citizenship and the changing shape of the community defined by the restrictions....

<sup>53</sup> Morgenbesser, in Emmet & MacIntyre, op. cit., p. 25; the fact that the weaker sort of propositions (from the perspective of an analytic philosophers, anyway), the theory, is admitted as appropriate to the social sciences, is significant.

<sup>54</sup> Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: NY (HarBrace), 1959; p. 50f

<sup>55</sup> Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 17f

<sup>56</sup> McNaughton, cited in Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 28.

believe the doctrine the social scientist turned social technologist will be called upon to advocate is inadequate to the realm of action.

# V

It will be apparent that there is a perceptible difficulty in the social scientific discussion of communities in general and cities in particular. This difficulty is historical, having to do with assumptions built into the social sciences, which actually antedate their formation. They are methodological, having to do with limits imposed by those assumptions upon the social sciences. Such difficulties can actually preclude consideration of the city as a discreet entity in the way this study intends: "The utility of the legal-social definition of the city is at an end....The city has no separate existence and therefore no interest for the social scientist." This is not a universally held opinion, but that it should have any credence at all is disturbing, especially in view of waxing urbanization world-wide. "See the social scientist of the social scientist."

In any event, the assumptions which are operative in most social scientific doctrines—most especially what I believe to be the fundamental doctrine, of process—are inadequate to the project of understanding the city as this project aims to understand it. The actual political event is obscured; its uniqueness is submerged in the functional whole when process acquires "a monopoly of universality and significance." This kind of theorizing, as was suggested above, does not ally itself with practice; it supplants practice.

Focus on structure, a focus prominent for as much as a century. <sup>60</sup> is intricately linked with liberalism. As "progress," process has a history going back to the origins of modern thought. With the waxing of liberal political theory, politics itself disappeared. That is, the notion of deliberative reconciliation of many opinions, founding action by bodies politic was lost in the imposition by political operators of *a priori*-justified activities grounded in a social technology based on process. But suppose the thesis of

<sup>57</sup> Greer, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>58</sup> It also seems the recent shift toward greater interest in cities among social scientists has been prompted by the availability of grant money for such studies, not a serious recognition of the city *qua* hypotyposis of the human social domain. A casual remark by Professor Rayna Rapp of The New School suggests this fact, added to increasing circumscription of foreign fields of anthropological inquiry, has provoked the development of American urban anthropology.

<sup>59</sup> Arendt, Between Past & Future, p. 64

<sup>60</sup> Royce, op. cit., p. 82; Royce cites with approval the opinion of Wundt, whose inquiry into common consciousness and common will might be seen as important forerunners of modern structuralist thinking of various sorts.

this inquiry is correct, that the concept of process founding modern social science and technology is inadequate to the reality of the human social domain: Then it would seem on the one hand no regularly predictive and explanatory theory should be expected. Moreover, the technology so founded, relying on persuasion by "hidden means," consistent with a functionalist understanding of society, will fail to engender widespread acceptance of *a priori*-justified activities of political operators. Violence within the body politic as a norm of policy-making activity would be an expected alternative, and the flourishing of such violence suggests the correctness of the thesis. This failure of the evident ground of liberal political action, and the concomitant failure of liberalism leaves room for the kind of inquiry, aimed beyond and supplementing social scientific doctrines of the human social domain, toward which this study is directed.<sup>61</sup>

The next step, then, in this inquiry into cities, is to set up some kind of general theory of political community more plausibly adequate to the reality of cities. It will leave a number of problems unresolved, since I am constitutionally limited to a determinedly Western approach to the problem.

The basic assumption will be the possible existence of common opinion, reached in deliberation. This is an old notion in Western political theory, and seems to have cognate forms in some non-Western cultures. This assumption rests on the belief that something specifically human is at work in deliberation; common opinion and the deliberation through which it is formed takes place in language, a human attribute, and deed. It is a god-like attribute, in ancient opinion, an evidence of human excellence. Through such an assumption, it is possible to make the city show itself, from within itself.

In short, this is *not* another book on urban problems. It is an exercise in critical thinking, examining how cities present themselves (both

<sup>61</sup> Inspired by numerous "minority opnion" political thinkers, e. g., Leo Strauss in Schmitt,  $op.\ cit.$ , p. 82.

<sup>62</sup> Arendt's location of the origin of the political "image" in the family (*Human Condition*, p. 39f), suggests the relationship to other notions of social, political obligation similarly based in the family. Where Weber makes of this intermediate structure a hindrance to the formation of an homogeneous deliberative body, the traditional viewpoint of this as politically foundational makes it a necessary—at least, historically—mediation. Cf: *The Human Condition*, p. 23f and note, p. 23.

 $<sup>63\ \</sup>text{Presumably},\ parole,\ \text{not}\ langue;\ \text{it}$  is common speech which is political. And what society lacks common speech?

<sup>64</sup> Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 19; cf: Kirk & Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*: London (CUP) 1957 et. seq.; p. 213. #254.

<sup>67</sup> Eric Vogelin, The New Science of Politics: Chicago (U. Chicago) 1952; p. 27.

synchronically and diachronically, in uncritical social scientific and other scholarly materials, for the most part). From this examination, a categorical structure emerges which answers the question, how are cities possible? Such a possibility may or may not be actual; that, and the degree to which some places are actually cities, and whether they can remain so, is a very different question. I essay a couple general comments on that in the Afterword—that is, outside the work itself.

# INTRODUCTION

When humankind emerges into history, it is already a city-dwelling species. Certainly, at the dawn of history most men didn't live in cities; most were either part of some nomadic group, or living in simple villages. Of these people, very little evidence remains. What does remain does not constitute historical evidence but is, rather, archaeological evidence. While various sorts of artifacts are to be found of non-urban peoples, and this does constitute a species of "hard data," it gives no insight into the complex of judgments made by these people of their own experience of their world. Neither does it show how other peoples, encountering the first group, judged or were judged by the pre-historic community. Of such primitive, pre-historic peoples, it does not seem correct to say we understand them in any real way. All that exists is a best conjecture, however brilliant.

Of people living in cities a wholly different situation obtains, in many cases.<sup>2</sup> Even where the city itself has disappeared, records of its existence and even of its character survive in the archives of its contemporary civilizations. In some cases the archaeological "hard data" for such cities includes the contents of that civilization's equivalent of libraries. Collections of written works, insofar as they go beyond mere records of commercial transactions<sup>3</sup> and include literature and governmental records (which are, of necessity, always highly interpretive of situations, as well as descriptive), present a people in their own light, and thus express a humanity absent from other, merely archaeological accounts.

<sup>1</sup> To better understand what I mean by history, please see my remarks in "Hermeneutic philosophy: History as the Singular Ground of Thought," in *COGITO*, June, 1983, p. 90 passim.

<sup>2&</sup>quot;In some cases," because there are some city cultures which have completely disappeared from historical view. The Indus Valley, e. g., produced a rich and powerful trading community, with a sophisticated city-based civilization. It was wiped from memory, it seems. The archaeology of this culture, absent a tradition of its history, is barren indeed. The inclination, when confronted with that kind of civilization, is to pour through such ancient literature as survives—Vedas, Upanishads—for hints of what might have survived the general disappearance. It is rank speculation, and the frustration of a disappeared city culture is significant, perhaps, of the centrality of cities to human being.

 $<sup>3\</sup>mathrm{Not}$  that such transactions are interesting, so much as that the picture they present of a civilization is only partial.

# Introduction

What does it mean, that emergence into historical development is something attached to the emergence of cities? First, the kinds of things properly called "historical evidence" are associated with cities. When uncitified nomads adopt some of the specifically "historical" modes of preserving their culture, it is with techniques learned from contact with city cultures.<sup>4</sup> Even so, the attempts of these nomads are unsystematic; the "storage facilities" for archival material and the like which cities afford are lacking for the nomad.

It is only of cultures which have transmitted their own judgments of the world, their history, to their descendents and successors, that we predicate "civilization." The term itself is suggestive: To be civilized is to be, in the first instance, civil, to have the character of citizen. And to be a citizen is to be the citizen of some specific city or other exactly similar bodypolitic.<sup>5</sup> It is this being-political aspect of human being which produces the durable character of human life which is essential to what we denominate "civilization." But it is puzzling: Why do citizens systematize their judgments into what we call "history?" Why do they make a special virtue of a regular manner of transmitting those judgments? What are the linkages between dwelling in cities (as opposed to more rudimentary social enclaves), a special concern for history, and being civilized?

Common sense offers proximate answers to these questions. A bodypolitic, as political, needs some mechanism whereby the acts of some citizens may be readily assessed by the rest of the body of citizenry, a body which is in all probability large, and in all probability dynamic in several senses. A more or less objective record of the common tradition—that which is called "history," of course—fills that need in a way which a simpler oral record will not. First, it is more readily shared with less chance of variation. Second, it is more stable within any given human time-frame—over a period of generations, perhaps. These demands are

<sup>4</sup> As for example the Arab nomads adopted the mode of Arabian cities' record keeping to record their experiences of the desert.

<sup>5</sup>The "citizen of the world" is, of course, no citizen at all—he has no place—and is suspect for just that reason.

<sup>6</sup> It is interesting to notice two unrelated data in this context: (1) The development of a system of of writing in China which is neutral vis-a-vis speech, so that it not truly possible to speak of a written Chinese language, having reference to the characters (cf. DeFrancis, Beginning Chinese: New Haven (Yale), 1973; p. xxi, "Language and Writing"). This results, apparently, in an almost absolute transmitability of ancient texts, so that a modern Chinese can read an ancient text with only minimal familiarity with variant calligraphy and literary convention. The texts themselves are remarkably stable, as scholarly comparisons of the recently discoverd Ma Wang Tui copies of Lao Tzu with modern received editions demonstrate.

not, seemingly, operative in the relatively less complex world of the peasant village or nomadic tribe. Such a social enclave is small enough to be served by one or a few old "rememberers of the past;" the exigencies of the group's corporate life do not demand a long and accurate recollection in most areas (i. e., of events not likely to repeat themselves on an annual basis. Not only is there a coincidence between being-historical and being-citydwellers, but a veritable correlation based on needs not operative in sub-civic enclaves.

Much of that to which one refers as "human" is caught up in what history is understood to be. For if history is a complex of judgments (which is suggested in the etymology of "history"), and Humankind is defined from one perspective as " $\lambda$ o $\gamma$ o $\nu$ e $\chi$ o $\nu$ ," which means to possess the conceptualized result of judgment, among other things, then it is as historicizing being, in part, that this being or group of beings accedes to "humanity." Living in cities, which seems the precondition of the full emergence of this judgmental character which is of the essence of humanity, is a requirement of Man's nature, and its fulfillment, as Aristotle noted so long ago.

All people make judgments and collect them in a species of history. Presumably human beings have always done so. But it seems that non-citydwellers do not have so thoroughgoing an historical complex (they do not require it) nor is it so durable as that of citydwellers (who knows anything of the Hyksos except what those utterly urbane ancients, the Egyptians, tell us?). It is simply that the meaning of rationality—the most

<sup>(2)</sup> It appears in more sophisticated oral traditions, what is transmitted is couched in an archaic, stabilized, formalized tongue, e. g., Sanskrit or Pali. The effect is of a school boy learning his Latin—the quotations will stay with him forever. But such a technique appears necessarily elitist.

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This applies in the Western philosophical tradition; how true this might be in non-Western traditions of thought is a matter open to inquiry.

 $<sup>8\</sup>mbox{This}$  would appear to agree with Aristotle's second argument for the existence of the city as natural: Politics 1253a 10ff.

# Introduction

characteristic aspect of human being—is fulfilled only in the context of the city.

I

#### A

So, how does it stand with cities? What can be said about them?

To put the thesis strongly, to be concerned with human being is to have a necessary concern with cities. Cities are the unique kind of place in which human beings *propter se* can realize that which is specifically human. This being so, the complex of puzzles with which one is confronted waxes terrifically. Certainly the most basic of these is how cities came to be (as was suggested above) and what they are, anyway. This question has been pervasive from classical antiquity forward, in the Western tradition; it is a burning issue for Weber, as it is for Aristotle. In fact, given the vast corpus of literature on cities, which is regularly expanding, it may be a more vital question today than it was in times past when cities were more obviously the common locus of specifically human existence. One lengthy compendium suggests:

It is becoming increasingly more difficult to talk and write about 'the city.' Max Weber and Louis Wirth could catalogue the city's qualities as opposed to rurality and describe the people and life to be found there. But in the latter half of the twentieth century it is nearly impossible to analyze the city as place; the indeterminacy of this urban area befuddles all careful qualification and quantification, of its form, style, and inhabitants.<sup>9</sup>

There is a sense of the editor's frustration evident in these lines; the usual social-scientific tools are inadequate to their task, finally. Previous social-scientific inquiries were satisfied with mere description of the difference between the city and the country, though clearly this was never sufficient. Such a description could only produce a picture of the specifically urban component of cities—the "material" appearance of that complex which is a city—without revealing the strictly civic core which founds that appearance. However, the author of the above-cited remark does not

<sup>9</sup>H. W. Eldredge,  $Taming\ Megalopolis$ : Garden City (Doubleday), 1967; I, p. 3. This remark is truly wonderful; it at once displays the problem, and the reason the solution for the problem cannot be found.

supplant the admittedly limited approach he describes with something more adequate. The tools he favors in the social-scientific description of the city are mere variants on the descriptive methods (however he may change his terms, now calling them quantification and qualification) which were used in perhaps less recondite manner by his predecessors. If his task seems more difficult, then it may be that it is not the excessive fluidity of the topic, but some originary inadequacy of the tools of social-scientific inquiry itself to the project at hand. That this may be so, that the assumptions and methods of the investigation brought to bear upon the question of how it stands with cities and how it came to be just so, might very well be inadequate, has certainly occurred to other investigators. Scott Greer, for example, boldly states the problem:

With respect to the metropolis, then, we may ask: What kind of metaphors dominate our intellectual discourse? What images stand for the totality and are, for practical purposes, 'theories of the city?' 10

In putting the problem of the very origin of cities (for to ask how we approach the city in thought is to ask of its historical, factual, interpretational origin), Greer clearly indicates the need to penetrate the common, uncritical assumptions which operate in the usual social-scientific investigations into cities. This is a dual criticism, of method and of result. Subsidiary issues attach themselves to this general criticism: From a number of perspectives, it is obvious that the city "embodies the real nature of human nature [sic]," that it "is an expression of mankind in general and specifically of the social relations generated by territory." But this observation (with which I agree, though thinking it in itself insufficient) does not allow the author to conclude as he does: "The city is not an artifact or a residual arrangement."12 It would be, surely, not inconsistent for the city to be very much an artificial product of human ingenuity, and still be entirely natural. As such, the city would simply be an expression of mankind's natural propensity for making things; the city would still be more than the outcome of human territorial propinguity. Here the real issue is to what extent the city is simply an artifact, and not also the creator of human being as civilized. This question may admit of no resolution, but

<sup>10</sup>Scott Greer, The Emerging City: New York (Free Press), 1962; p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> Janowitz's introduction in Robert E. Park & Ernest W. Burgess,  $\it The~City$ : Chicago (U. Chicago), 1967; p. ix.

<sup>12</sup>ibid.

# Introduction

the study of the interplay of forces such a study brings to the surface should prove productive in illustrating the city as an entity.

There is surely no lack of opinion about cities and their essence. It may be that there are too many opinions, each set forth in different contexts, many for purposes other than the explication of the city itself.<sup>13</sup> The matter is made more complex by the realization that the non-Western world cannot be ignored any longer. On the one hand, the non-Western world has many city-based cultures which are as old (in some places perhaps more enduring, if not actually older) than those of the West. On the other hand, many non-Western areas are now developing new city-based societies, either for the first time or after such a long period of non-urban cultural ascendancy that what is created has no possible connection with city-based cultures of the remote past.<sup>14</sup> A number of new perspectives enter the lists.

At the same time as a vast number of (often mutually exclusive) opinions have been developing, it is interesting that the special place of the city in Western civilization<sup>15</sup> has been increasingly eroded in modernity. Historically this erosion seems linked to the emergence of the modern state, so that from the time of Machiavelli the attributes of the relatively independent cities of the Middle Ages rapidly came to be associated with the larger, nominally national entities. By the middle of the 17th century, it is possible for Hobbes to apply the word for city as a body of citizens (civitas, as opposed to the term for the physical place of the city, urbs) to the new kind of state.<sup>16</sup>

With this erosion, it has been necessary to formulate new ways of addressing urban problems. Rather than the city being largely independent

<sup>13</sup> Greer catalogues these opinions; op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>14</sup>The perception is a common one; e. g., cf: Eldredge, op. cit., p. 14. The interpretations offered of the perception are far from uniform of satisfactory, however.

<sup>15</sup> The priority of the city itself is another problem, quite interesting and demanding attention, but beyond the scope of this essay. Propriety demands cognizance be taken of the varying status of the city, especially in cultures where the city is a by-product rather than an intended goal.

<sup>16</sup>Hobbes, Leviathan: New York (Macmillan), 1962; p. 132. I am assuming that Hobbes is not the least interested in city-states, but of course in the problems presented by the Commonwealth which had supplanted the Kingdom. Hobbes was a puissant "Greeker"—his Thucydides is still in print and well received—and as such would be quite aware of the theory of the city-state. Both his own studies and the influence of classical literature in his society as a whole would encourage him to adapt this theoretical base to the new situation. This was even more the case for such writers as Bodin or Machiavelli (the latter living in a city-state in process of becoming the Grand Duchy of Tuscany).

—equally the case in classical antiquity and the Middle Ages<sup>17</sup>—it is now merely an administrative unit to be rationalized into a larger system of similar units. In some cases, the city is identified both conceptually and geographically with the next larger unit in the hierarchy; San Francisco offers an example of this. On the other hand, the city of Los Angeles is not entirely identical with the county of Los Angeles; dozens of small enclaves within the county and administratively distinct from the city of Los Angeles have been incorporated over the years. This poses an administrative problem since such enclaves, nominally cities, are unable to provide basic civic services but must rely on the county for them. This sort of situation provokes public-administration experts to adumbrate criteria, based upon public-services considerations, for the definition of a city. <sup>18</sup> But such criteria are always merely urban criteria.

Finally, of course, there is the simple territorial expansion of urbanity. In the past, cities have been well-defined spatially and conceptually. Spatially, the *urbs* was limited by sacred walls; conceptually, the *civitas* was defined by the criteria of citizenship. <sup>19</sup> Each of these limiting factors has tended to disappear with the redefinition of the city as a merely local administrative unit. On the one hand, urban space has been extended by higher-echelon legislative fiat, in response to the pressure of local civic groups and politicians gauging possibilities of future growth. <sup>20</sup>

On the other hand, the actual criteria for the exercise of "citizen's rights" and prerogatives in the city has nothing to do with identification with the city, or even residence in it. For example, the executive committee of a corporation based in Chicago or Ivrea (vis-a-vis cities, of course, national location is no measure of foreigness) can directly influence the acts of New York's or London's administration. In fact, it appears to some thinkers that city problems have disappeared, *propter se*. In the place of cities, there now emerges the "urban area," or the "metropolitan area," or simply the "megalopolis." It has certain local administrations whose independence of action is necessarily circumscribed by the existence of higher-echelon administrative exigencies. Its economic activity is unified to a

<sup>17</sup>The imperial Roman provincial administration was municipal, and this carried over to some extent into post-Roman times; cf: Pirenne, *A History of Europe*. Mediaeval cities also regularly sought and received unusual degrees of freedom.

<sup>18</sup>E. g., cf: M. Gordon, Sick Cities: Baltimore (Penguin), 1965; p. 355

<sup>19</sup>E. g., the enormous concern for a satisfactory definition of a citizen is obvious in the relevant works of Aristotle & Plato. It becomes a theological matter for Augustine.

<sup>20</sup>As one example, Oklahoma City.

<sup>21</sup>M. Meyerson (ed.), The Conscience of the City: New York, (Braziller), 1970; p. 2.

#### Introduction

greater or lesser extent by the modern transport facilities typically associated with a developed urban area.  $^{22}$ 

There is, then, in the context of the very first questions of cities, viz., the questions of their origin and being, a complex of difficulties affecting progress toward a solution. This complex may be summarized as two-fold: First there is the "loss" of a clear sense of what a city is, evidenced in the plethora of opinions on the subject and the disappearance of the city in the larger political entity. Second, there is the explicitly or implicitly admitted inadequacy of social-scientific methodology to provide a description of cities, an inadequacy deriving, apparently, from a less-than-adequate preliminary conceptualization of the city.<sup>23</sup>

The confusion is only exacerbated by the place of the city in traditional political thinking. This thinking is a significant part of the traditional self-knowledge of the species. It is of importance in all cultural enclaves, and has remarkable similarity across cultural lines, as well as important divergences. Especially in Western political thought, the city has been the archetypical political body.

B

Political thought has built within it a trap. Hannah Arendt, summarizing the development of political thought in history, describes that trap in this way:

Our tradition of political thought began when Plato discovered that it is somehow inherent in the philosophical experience to turn away from the common world of human affairs; it ended when nothing was left of this experience but the opposition of thinking and acting, which,

<sup>22</sup>There is an element of the mythical in this. For instance, Los Angeles has only a partial transport net, and one but poorly diversified. New cities in L. D. C.'s typically are unique and not part of a vast metro area.

<sup>23</sup>This would appear to be in confirmation of a somewhat Heideggerian position, that one can reflect and investigate only those questions for which answers are already prefigured in consciousness.

<sup>24</sup>For instance, some notion of unjust government, usurped government, or tyranny is advanced, often with appropriate remedies. This does not mean an "Aristotelian," vaguely liberal, middle-class model is universal. But it is interesting to notice how long aristocratic city-states not dissimilar survived in northern India; cf: R. Thapar, A Historyof India I: New York (Penguin); passim.

depriving thought of reality and action of sense, makes both meaningless.<sup>25</sup>

The nature of current political thinking is clear; to think of the character of politics is to step back from the actually political. This is certainly the case, in the context of modern Western political thinking.<sup>26</sup> The very image of the political inquirer, whether as sociologist or political scientist, is that of "value-free" observation by a neutral observer. This image has its roots in the development of the philosophical perspective at the foundation of of Western European culture in the 8th century B. C., and was mightily potentiated with the beginning of "modernity" in the 17th century.<sup>27</sup> With the development of this "modern" philosophical reflection, whether of the nominally "empirical" sort or of the nominally "rational" sort, as Arendt correctly notes, thought of the political is no longer productive of action, nor does action-like behavior result from it, except at the distance the neutral observer preserves. I. e., a "neutral observer" may manipulate experimentally the "observed," but will not act in the context of observation as "one of the observed."

If the city is in its most basic character a political entity and collection of political entities of some sort, and the actual connection of thinking and acting, which is the very essence of politics, is obscured, then surely, political entities—actors and places of action—must be obscured as well. This obscurity, to which Arendt points, is shown in the sort of discourse that comes to be substituted for genuinely political discourse—and the results of which we have seen already in the remarks of social scientists. E. g., statistical "uniformities," in Max Weber's telling expression, come to be "regarded as manifestations of the understandable subjective meaning of a course of social action." The "formulations of a rational course of subjectively understandable action," which have in the past been understood as the very heart of the political, and the very root of the

<sup>25</sup>Hannah Arendt, Between Past And Future: New York (Viking), 1961; p. 25. Cf: Arendt, The Human Condition: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1958; p. 270 and Eric Vogelin, The New Science of Politics: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1952; p. 26.

<sup>26</sup>It is a simple fact that Western European political thinking, with its emphasis on the economic, is for all intents and purposes the only kind commonly thought today. One striking confirmation of this is the remark in a recent television documentary, that the Saudi government saw development as requiring the formation of an urban bourgeoisie. Cf: Heilbroner, *The Great Ascent*: New York (HarRow), 1961; passim.

<sup>27</sup>Vid. infra, chapter 4.

<sup>28</sup>Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*: New York (Free Press), 1964; p. 100.

#### Introduction

"civicity" of cities,<sup>29</sup> are now meaningful only when they allow of reduction to this special sort of empirical (but not for that reason Realist) generalization.<sup>30</sup> Weber is correct in his interpretation of this demand for understanding of the political entity through strictly empirical generalization as an attempt to develop an understanding of the "subjective meaning-complex of action" which is readily transmitted, in the same way the data and facts (which are data transmogrified through interpretation) of the natural sciences are made explainable, through an often uncritical use of "cause-effect" explanatory devices.<sup>31</sup>

The assumption of a rather Cartesian notion of causality and temporality, making efficient causality the only knowable causality, is inconsistent with the experience of the political as largely spontaneous, as spontaneous event provoking equally spontaneous response, as amenable to the judgments of taste and significance (usually *after* the event, as a ratification), and as eminently fluid. To the extent that cities are at once the spontaneous event arising from such a political experience, and the locus in which such politics continues to occur, it becomes perfectly clear why modern social science and the peculiar brand of "politics" arising within its compass have found the questions of the origin and being of the city so puzzling. In fact, attempts to address such puzzles would transgress the limits of what such a science might properly investigate. There is more to such politics than merely causal analysis will reveal.

In brief, then, modern social science enshrines the end of modern philosophy, the dichotomy between thought and action which Hannah Arendt describes so precisely. Doing so, it cannot address a question about the result of action, nor of the locus of action, both of which, it shall be seen below, are part of the very essence of the city. To the extent such social science is eccentric vis-a-vis the "real" world, the current received views of the city propounded by it are obsolete; they reflect obsolete basic assumptions about human being, society, and so on.

<sup>29</sup>Such occurred in special places set aside in cities of the past—the forum, the agora, or the square before the city hall of mediaeval cities.

<sup>30</sup>Weber, loc. cit.

<sup>31</sup>Weber, op. cit., p. 101.

<sup>32</sup> Principles of Philosophy, XXVIII, passim.

<sup>33</sup>Vid. infra, chapter 4 et seq.

П

In the ensuing study, I am interested in summarizing the social scientific data about cities, and adding to it some considerations which are nominally outside their proper areas of investigation. The social sciences, being utterly modern in their character, are limited by the Modern prejudice to consideration of efficient causality (while at the same time, on Humian grounds, being somewhat doubtful about the nature of efficient causality), and an assumption of material causality—there is something there to be described, after all. These limitations preclude meaningful discussion of formal and final matters, though; despite a growing interest in final causality as a mode of explanation, this remains a "minority opinion;" moreover, the current view of final cause is not consistent with earlier definitive views. From a philosophical ground, it should be possible to supply a proximate perspective on these "unfashionable" causal elements; it should be possible to conjoin them with social-scientific data, producing a more complete picture of what cities are.

Foremost among the specifically philosophical concerns in this inquiry is the tension between privacy as that has come to be understood in late-modernity and the social domain proper. Hannah Arendt has captured the sharpness of the polarity:

...It seems ... important that modern privacy is at least as sharply opposed to the social realm—unknown to the ancients who considered its content a private matter—as it is to the political, properly speaking. The intimacy of the heart, unlike the private household, has no tangible place in the world, nor can the society against which it protests and asserts itself be localized with the same certainty asd the public space....The modern individual and his endless conflicts, his inability either to be at home in society or to live outside it altogether, his ever-changing moods and the radical subjectivism of his emotional life, was born in this rebellion of the heart.<sup>34</sup>

That is, the tension which we today find between ourselves as private persons and as members of society is something which belongs to our time. A private domain existed in the past, certainly; it was not the privacy of the sophist but of the hearth; as private, it was not speculated upon in any great degree in classical antiquity.

<sup>34</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 38f.

#### Introduction

As an intellectual concern, privacy would appear to have arisen only in the post-classical epoch, reaching an acme in Plotinus and the fathers of the Church, subsiding and arising again in the outbreaks of personal religion in the Middle Ages—tied, probably, to the dynamic of personal salvation. This shift may mark the end of classical antiquity and the onset of what came to be called the "Middle Ages." <sup>35</sup>

In the modern epoch, however, a dual condition—the demand for a social science, parallel to natural science, and absent the seeming imprecision of politics, and the corresponding waning of strictly political institutions—has conduced to a largely secular individualism, which is wide-spread. It exists in tension with the survival of the ancient privacy of the hearth and the public domain coincident with it. The manifestation of this is the new sort of social rebellion, which is not of social bodies, but of individuals with similar ideologies whose coalition is merely temporary and conditioned by momentary consensus. The image is not unlike that posited by early-modern social-contract thinkers as the situation obtaining before the initiation of the social contract.

The absence of a stable communality in which private persons are associated precludes what Peirce called "the catholic consent which constitutes the truth." This tension is a wholly subjective phenomenon in all the senses of that much abused expression. Insofar as it results in a focus upon the individual as sensing, as being the only sure receiver for himself, of information, it tends to deny, if not the possiblity, the meaningfulness of the public consensus upon what is true, a consensus which extends as durable and general beyond one's own present self (and which is therefore, more than utterly subjective).

This is no new theme in modern thinking; that most preëminent of modern thinkers, of whose doctrine it is not too much to say it is the frame of all subsequent thought, both at the sophisticated level of the Academy and more vulgar venues, Kant, "was disturbed by the alleged arbitrariness and subjectivity of *de gustibus non disputandum est* (which, no doubt, is

<sup>35</sup>This appears to be one of the implications of Charles Cochrane's *Christianity and Classical Culture* (London [Oxford], 1974). The classical universe was character-istically one of στασις and ενεργεια; things were well balanced. This fits as much with popular Stoicism as it does with the common religion of Hellenistic world. By contrast, the Platonism of Plotinus and his followers, as much as Christian and other religious movements, introduces change and progress, both in the person and in the universe. It is not progress as that is understood in late-Modern times, nor is the  $\varepsilon \gamma \omega$  of the 3rd century and the Middle Ages the ego of post-17th century Modernity. But there seems to be a case that the former is the germ of the latter.

<sup>36</sup>C. S. Peirce, Selected Writings: New York (Dover), 1958; p. 83.

true for private idiosyncracies), for this arbitrariness offended his political and not his aesthetic sense."<sup>37</sup> Kant devoted the first part of his *Critique of Judgment* to a demonstration of how seemingly subjective remarks of taste advanced their claim to universality, overcoming the subjectivity which seems to be their necessary status. That taste is at the very least similar to prudence (a political form of judgment)—if not indeed a species of prudence—is amply evidenced in the various references to taste as, e. g., determinations in freedom, or as involving common perceptions, in the prefix and first part of the third critique.<sup>38</sup>

This fundamental division between individuals, this sense of solipsistic difference, from others and eventually, from oneself (the famous "identity crisis") founds a crisis of communication. Kant thinks it is through the judgment of taste (and hence, prudential judgments) that the ability to communicate innermost feelings, and to sympathize with one's fellow man, are manifested. Payce responds by noting, in the final analysis, "sympathy may try its best to bridge the gulf...[but the physical sundering of the organisms corresponds to a persistent sundering of immediate feelings. In short, being-individual, which as a problem becomes extraordinarily omnipresent in late-modernity, so that it can no longer be ignored, is a necessary part of the human condition. As such, it has always represented a contradiction in civic existence, now become overwhelming.

Thus the separation of man from himself is clearly a part of the inquiry at hand, into the form and purpose of cities as preëminent human dwelling places. The separation of individual from others with whom he is in society, while not being in community, is a material problem both to the understanding of cities, and to any normative remarks about them. Since cities are communal dwelling-places—men live together in them, in one way or another—the purposiveness expressed in cities is a communal purposiveness; hindrances to such communal purposiveness, as concealing an element of the causal structure of cities, become obstacles to the inquiry I am undertaking.

<sup>37</sup> Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 222.

<sup>38</sup>This perception informs the work of Hannah Arendt and Ernst Vollrath (*Rekonstruktion der politischen Urteilskraft*, as delivered in an early form at the New School Graduate Faculty). In accordance with the "political" reading of the 3rd Critique, it is appropriate that after a discussion of the judgmental faculty of taste, the judgmental faculty of purposiveness is addressed. A prudent choice is one that is tasteful; as tasteful, it embodies and expresses the standards operative in a given body-politic, and espoused by its members; as such, it comprehends the common purposiveness of that body-politic.

<sup>39</sup>Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment: New York (Hafner), 1951; p. 201.

<sup>40</sup>Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1968; p. 236.

#### Introduction

Along with this general problem of the separation of individual and communal matrix, and man from himself, the very nature of "the public" becomes an issue. Recognition of the disappearance or mutation beyond recognition of such a domain is common; "mass culture" is one way of speaking about it, as is the expression, "faceless cipher." What is less often taken up is the implications for the possiblity of thinking about the public domain—we continue to speak of it as if we had a clear idea of what it is, though this is perhaps not so. If the status of the individual is murky—as our concern with it suggests—and the public domain is defined in part in relation or in contrast to the individual, then there is a difficulty.

Hannah Arendt has contrasted the ancient world's conception of a static and immortal Nature, in which such a viewpoint was not meaningful, being merely mortal, with the modern notion of a world in process, where point-of-view is essential to its understanding:

The experience which underlies the modern age's notion of process, unlike the experience underlying the ancient notion of immortality, is by no means primarily an experience which man made in the world surrounding him; on the contrary, it sprang from the despair of ever experiencing and knowing adequately all that is given to man and not made by him. Against this despair, modern man summoned up the full measure of his own capacities; despairing of ever finding truth through mere contemplation, he began to try out his capacities for action, and by doing so he could not help becoming aware that wherever man acts he starts processes.<sup>42</sup>

To understand the shift in perspective this represents, one must notice the ways in which it is connected with the ancient matrixing of individual and community, as well as the changes which have happened. The important connection, as I believe, is the extension of human experience to the natural world about him; in the pre-Socratics, this resulted in the search for natural "conventions" like those voµot which obtained in the city (and which had seemed to exist only there, in contradistinction to the chaos of nature). In modernity, "convention" is lost in privatization, a merely

<sup>41</sup>Macdonald, Against the American Grain: New York (Random), 1962; p. 37. Also Cox, The Secular City: New York (Macmillan), 1966; p. 34.

<sup>42</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 62. There is also an interesting way in which this phenomenon is a kind of fulfillment of Heidegger's "Age of the World Picture"—but that discussion goes well beyond the present topic.

private point-ov-view being substituted. In short, the empirical attitude of antiquity was replaced by what might be called an "engineering approach," taking its cue from the engineering of the world commencing in the late 16th century and continuing to the present.

In classical antiquity (after the shift from a "prephilosophical" attitude), the way of encountering the world was of natural man (whose nature was to exist according to conventions) encountering a larger, more permanent matrix within which the human matrix operated—of which the city was understood as an hypotyposis, as well as an adjacent immediate matrix. In modernity, human being is conceived in Western thought as not entirely natural (natural law being in various senses antecedent to humanity's being-saved). It operates a world from outside it; it engineers that world to its requirements; it seeks to make its own matrix in the same way. But the most casual observation of this activity of the individual making his own world, his own community (arranging to be in this relationship, eschewing that one) reveals the continuous character of such a management involvement with one's world, and the relative character of any examination of such a world. If it be admitted that there is a common world as a matrix shared with others, then "world view" is an accurate expression of the modern attitude, deriving directly from the pervasiveness of individuality in modernity. Partial confirmation of this description is the extraordinary tolerance with which human beings today accept other peoples' actions and beliefs about the common space, so long as such notions do not manifestly interfere with one's own opinions.

To the difficulties attendant upon a discussion of cities as they are today, constituted by the waxing importance of the individual and his "management" or "engineering" of the society in which he lives from outside it, a third might be action *propter se*.

The city is the principle human venue of action; it is also its most obvious product, insofar as it is more than a merely chance agglomeration. Yet action is a topic largely neglected in modern Western thought. Insofar as modern Western thought rests upon a foundation in late-mediaeval interpretations of late classical antiquity, compounded by a priority for the theoretical management of the world in which one exists, the hierarchy of contemplation over action is accepted uncritically.

To be sure, the demand for action is often expressed; the common response is to seek a period of reflection in which some idea as to what action is appropriate may emerge—a "blue ribbon panel" or an "executive

#### Introduction

committee" studies the problem, offering a commentary and various alternative actions which seem likely to address the problem. Or one sees a new academic field created to propose general principles—business, heretofore a domain of action in response to market demands, becomes a highly theoretical enterprise. In the arts and sciences, the contemplative faculties—mind and sensory apparatus, conditions of the possibility of thinking things out, modeling faculties—supplant the empirical *cum* active-deontic in social science and philosophy as matters of study.

All these factors require careful consideration, because as they stand now in modernity, they preclude a view of what the city is. The city is a principally political entity in the strict sense; it has within it a certain spontaneity. This spontaneity, which is a political empirical fact—differentiating the political domain from the natural domain, and political reason from that appropriate to the natural sciences—is on the one hand a product of the city's origin in common action, and on the other hand, is maintained by the city's on-going need for active renewal as its circumstances alter.

### Ш

The purpose of this inquiry is to learn what a city is; part of the study will summarize what the social sciences have to say about cities, offering interpretations of that data and those opinions. But it should be clear by now that modern social science, powerful as it is in many ways, is largely—and seemingly by its own admission—inadequate to the chore of defining the city. It circumscribes the matter, without quite striking center.

Of course, if I am correct, and the city is still, as Aristotle has suggested, the quintessential human  $\sigma\nu\nu\eta\vartheta\epsilon\iota\zeta$  to  $\pi\sigma\varsigma$ , then the answer to the question I am posing is already understood primordially. Such an originary intuition is not the most satisfactory kind of knowledge, though. What is wanted is an expressable explanation of what is known, insofar as that may be possible within limits of knowledge and language. Traditionally, that knowledge which comports with explanation is a knowledge of causes. Aristotle offers the following definition of "cause:"

"Cause" means (1) that from which (as immanent material) a thing comes into being, e. g., the bronze of the statue and the silver of the saucer, and the classes which include these. (2) The form or pattern, i. e. the formula of the essence and the classes which include this (e. g. the

ratio 2:1 and number in general are the causes of the octave) and the parts of the formula. (3) That from which the change or the freedom from change first begins, e. g. the advisor is a cause of action, and the father a cause of the child, and in general the maker the cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing. (4) The end, i. e., that for the sake of which a thing is, e. g., health is a cause of walking.... These then are practically all the senses in which causes are spoken of, and as they are spoken of in several senses it follows that there are several causes of the same thing....<sup>43</sup>

The causes are named, respectively, material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, and final cause.<sup>44</sup> It is clear that a thing has several causes, the primacy of any one being dependent upon the momentary perspective of the observer. The kind of knowledge of the city with which this inquiry into the city is concerned must—if it is to be reasonably complete—be cognizant of all these aspects and their causes.

This traditional opinion, which reflects the complexity of the actual and potential world about us, has suffered a degree of rejection in mod-Whole classes of causality are largely rejected, as has been suggested above, from scholarly and scientific consideration. This is almost a precisely datable event; Cartesian rejection of final cause on the ground that God alone can actually know that for the sake of which anything is, seems possible only after the reassertion in Calvinist doctrine of the nominally Augustinian conception of absolute predestination consistent with God's omniscience. With the rejection of the possibility of knowing that for the sake of which something is, the possibility of completely comprehending the form of something (in rather Heideggerian language, the co-responsibility of end and form for the thing is disrupted) is rendered impossible. Effectively, after the nominal revolution in thought that is coincident with the advent of modernity, one can only know a thing scientifically in a partial way. Only two of the general classes of causes are recognized, specifically the material cause (implicitly) and the efficient

<sup>43</sup>Aristotle, Metaphysics (ed. Ross): Oxford, 1911; "D," 1013a24-34, 1013b4f

<sup>44</sup>However simple it may seem—and it is, after all, part of the intellectual set of most Western educated people since first set out in classical antiquity—the doctrine of causes is subject to a need for careful consideration. One can lose sight of the originary meaning of cause, as has been shown by Heidegger (among others) in the title essay of *The Question Concerning Technology...* (supra.).

#### Introduction

cause (explicitly). Efficient cause is given preëminence.<sup>45</sup> "Causal chains"—the list of movements and correlative movers—become the principal, if not the only, kind of explanation.

This prejudice for certain kinds of causal explanation is evident in standard accounts of cities. Much of the standard literature offers what may be characterized as "material" descriptions of the city— descriptions of the geography, design, and so on which make up the physical urban habitat. Some of these material descriptions are historical; others claim to be non-historical and essential. Other accounts offer descriptions of the way things change, or are kept from changing, in cities; these clearly fulfill the rubric for "efficient" descriptions of cities. Again, some are historical, and some are essential.

Therefore the situation seems to be this: Two parts of a complete account of the city have been provided in the usual social-scientific literature about cities and related material. But it appears that this discussion as it stands is not sufficient; our understanding of cities as they are today is inadequate to the reality, and the evidence of this is simply the unsatisfactory condition of city life and an inability to address what is unsatisfactory. Since it is clear that only two parts of a complete account are presently available, it seems a likely first step in addressing the inadequacy of present knowledge of the subject, is supplying the missing elements of a complete causal account. Moreover, even in the event that this first contemporary attempt filling the gaping hole left by standard social-scientific accounts prove not altogether successful—as is quite possible, given both the limited scope of the project and the difficulty of the topic—at least heuristically, the approach is bound to link concepts hitherto considered only separately.

In the next two chapters, the standard social-scientific account of cities will be summarized as the generally received view of cities. In keeping with the heuristic of the project, one chapter will take up "material" accounts of

<sup>45</sup>Compare this with the Aristotelian doctrine, in which form, embracing the totality, tends toward preeminence: 1013b22, 1017b21-26. While there is a species of teleology in Descartes' doctrine—a limited sort, by analogy, in which parts exist for the end of the whole—the necessity of this teleology seems rather less emphatic than Aristotle's "that-for-the-sake-of-which" ( $\tau\sigma$  'ou 'everal.) In the final analysis, it is quite possible to find a machine whose whole action is unaffected appreciably by the normal wear which alters its parts.

<sup>46</sup>Mumford's *The City in History* is an example of the former; Arango's *Urbanization of the Earth* exemplifies the latter.

 $<sup>47 \</sup>mathrm{Dahl's}\ Who\ Governs?$  exemplifies the former, and Sennett's various tomes often show the latter character.

the city, the other addressing "efficient" accounts. The fourth chapter constitutes the keystone of the study at hand. The chapter will develop, with perhaps excessive concision, a conception of social purposiveness—a variant on Aristotle's 'ου 'ενεκα—which informs cities; in general, this purposiveness could be called the "civicity" of cities, which is co-responsible with the urbanity described in chapters two and three for what a city is. Chapter five proceeds to the application of the new notion of civicity in conjunction with the social-scientific account in a more complete, categorial definition of the city in acceptable universal form—a formula in Western philosophical terms (and eschewing for the time being the problems of non-Western civilization, which nevertheless are admitted as of increasing importance in the consideration of late-modern social thinking)—necessary if a human enclave is to be deemed civic. What results is a categorial schema. The complex description, taken together, constitutes a reasonable account of the conditions under which cities are possible.

# "URBAN MATERIAL"

The first step toward understanding the city as it is today is an examination of the social-scientific doctrine about the "raw materials" of which modern cities are "comprised." Such a discussion of urban "matter" appears in the literature surrounding cities under different headings. The most obvious of these different "materialist" accounts is strictly demographic. This basic doctrine founds other, more sophisticated perspectives. Another extremely common approach, in accordance with certain social-scientific interests, is a species of functionalism, or structuralism, wherein the matter of which a given city is composed is treated as homogeneously organized. There are also economic and what might be called "government-efficiency" approaches to the discussion of the material ground of cities. It is this order that is followed.

I

If there would seem to be one thing about which there is little controversy, it is that people, taken severally and together, are the most basic element in cities:

People grouped together make cities. The spatial distribution of the population and its composition by age, sex and "race" are the demographic bases for urbanization and urbanism. Cities may profitably be perceived as social, economic, political or ecological (by institution) systems, but there is no escaping the fundamental reality that "the city is the people."<sup>2</sup>

Eldredge has simply recast the most ancient awareness of a city's component elements, admirably expressed in the two Latin words *civitas* 

<sup>1</sup>It will be abundantly clear the word 'material' is being used in a more flexible way than is normal in connection with the concept of material cause. However, this is not altogether unjustified, first on the grounds that what is meant by 'v $\lambda\eta$  in Aristotle's account is not perfectly clear, not what is meant by "matter" in normal modern discourse, but spoken variously, and second, that "matter" in a social scientific context must be understood to include relationships which molded in social change.

<sup>2</sup>H. Wentworth Eldredge (ed.),  $Taming\ Megalopolis:$  Garden City (Doubleday), 1967; I, p. 97

and *urbs*—the first an expression of the city as the body of citizens, the second, of the space which that body-politic occupies—and defines his remark. The recasting also neatly summarizes the new understanding of the relationship of those two perspectives. In antiquity, the view appears to be that place and inhabitants interacted to form the city—the urbs was the συνηθεις τοπος within which people were able to conceive of themselves as citizens comprising a civitas able to act together. In this modern interpretation the population is defined in terms of space. The shift in the modern understanding is clear: Nominally neutral social science is concerned with the identification of what is assembled, without assessing the τελος such an ingathering works out. Doing this, modern social science redefines citizens as merely urban dwellers, whose patterns of occupying space are more explicitly knowable than are the possibilities such occupation facilitates. Thus the social scientific study is in the first instance a study of space and occupancy, rather then of people taken as they present themselves and as that presentation actually develops.

### A

The most characteristic urban space, defining a way of viewing an urban dweller, is the neighborhood. The significance of the neighborhood is not, however, perfectly clear:

In the city environment the neighborhood tends to lose much of the significance which it possessed in simpler and more primitive forms of society. The easy means of communication and of transportation, which enable individuals to distribute their attention and to live at the same time in several different worlds, tend to destroy the permanency and intimacy of the the neighborhood. On the other hand, the isolation of the immigrant and racial colonies of the so-called ghettos and areas of population segregation tend to preserve and, where there is racial prejudice, to intensify the intimacies and solidarity of the local and neighborhood groups. Where individuals of the same race or vocation live together in segregated groups, neighborhood sentiment tends to fuse together with racial antagonisms and class interests.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, The City: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1967; . 9f

This passage advances a distinction between neighborhood and "urban ghetto." There is limited validity to this distinction, at most. What constitutes the neighborhood, after all, but a common awareness that it exists? In the city, this sense of locality persists precisely for the reasons this author maintains it disappears. To be sure, the modern city is a city in which travel and communication are greatly facilitated. To travel an hour or more to work within a city means stepping into a public conveyance in one's own neighborhood, and being conveyed with minimal fuss at modest cost to another part of the city. A loss of the sense of proper place, with a concurrent diminution of self-identity, might result. But though one is likely to travel about, and to have a somewhat wider range of habitats if one is a city-dweller, still one tends to identify oneself and others by the place within the city which is "home." E. g., the resident of the West Side of New York, from about 72nd Street to Riverside Church is not likely to be radically different in any mensurable way from his fellow New Yorker of the East Side. Yet it is a commonplace that very different sorts of people live in these areas. Or consider the domains now known as "SoHo" and "Tribeca" in the same city—frequently the latter area has been touted as an extension of the former. But each retains its distinct character, and attracts a different kind of resident. Nor is it the case these rather large areas are uniform. In fact, careful examination suggests a homogeneity within the smaller "block" which defines a sense of place in the city. And this homogeneity appears to have its roots, regardless of inhabitants (minority or recent immigrant, or well-established family), in the familiarity which comes from seeing and being seen by the same people on the same street.4

The pervasiveness of the neighborhood as an organizing element in cities has been shown by Weber:

The sub-division of the city into quarters was common not only to the cities of Antiquity and the Middle Ages but to the Oriental and East Asiatic cities as well. These served as the foundation for a political organization based on local communities and above all into extension to the entire political area—including the surrounding countryside—under the domination of the city.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup>To be sure, in some areas, especially working-class neighborhoods, the extended family living more or less together in the same territory enhances the effect. But it would appear—as much for safety's sake as for anyother reason—the upper-class Sutton Place resident will know many of his neighbors at least by sight.

<sup>5</sup> Max Weber, The City: New York (Macmillan), 1958; p. 202

Historically, the formation of such enclaves is obvious, well-established, even a universal phenomenon. That it takes different forms in different places is not surprising. As Weber himself notes, the *deme* divisions of the ancient Athenian polis were effectively unknown in other parts of the world, and in the Middle Ages of the successor Western European culture. The *deme* structure was a holdover from the days of small tribal holdings, imitated at the time of the formal abolition of the kinship basis of the Athenian polity in the revised political structure established in the Cleisthenian reforms. That is, they were culture-specific, in a time when intra-cultural homogeneity appears to have been more often the case than has been true subsequently. But with the culturally specific elements "bracketed" there still seems a pervasive tendency to organize within larger human agglomerations something akin to what today are the "blocks" or similar substructures.

Nor is the significance of the block much harder to document:

The unit of distance is the block. This geometrical form suggests that the city is a purely artificial construction which might conceivably be taken apart and put together again, like a house of blocks. The fact is, however, that the city is rooted in the habits and customs of the people who inhabit it. ... This structure has its basis...in human nature, of which it is an expression. On the other hand, this vast organization which has arisen in response to the needs of its inhabitants, once formed, imposes itself upon them as a crude external fact, and forms them in turn, in accordance with the design and interests which it incorporates.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup>ibid.

<sup>7</sup>R. A. Nisbet,  $\it The\ Social\ Philosophers\colon New\ York\ (Crowell),\ 1973;$  passim, especially chapter 1

<sup>8</sup>Park & Burgess, op. cit., p. 4 Blocks are typical of cities laid out in advance, so to speak. Manhattan's block structure, e. g., was completed and applied long before the city expanded to fill the island. It must have been a curious site, to see broad streets laid out, and in between, older farms and shanty towns filling the otherwise undisturbed countryside. This situation continued until late in the 19th century. And of course, it did not affect the older parts of the city, below City Hall, which had grown in a more haphazard way, or parts of other old settlements on the island, such as Greenwich.

Nor is the block structure, *per se*, the only possible way a city can be structured. Vitruvius, for example, speaks of laying out a structure intended to frustrate strong winds. Modern Paris reflects a structure intended by its 19th century planners to frustrate the fractiousness of the Paris Commune. Many older cities, both in Europe and North Africa, reflect

Asking what it might be in urban dwellers which produces this geometric pattern is of limited interest to social scientists; suffice it to say that a school of urban planning favored this (as opposed to some other) plan, imposing it without much regard to topography upon incorporated but as yet undeveloped parts of cities where possible. The merits of the ordering are debatable. But the effect it has had upon urban dwellers, the fixing of a certain sort of localizing as a way to determine one's neighbors, and how one may interact with them, is very much to the point. One has neighbors, but who they are is defined not by the proximity which comes by nominally chance circumstances; instead, an obviously mensurable unit, the geometric block (understood as a length of street—the unit is not uniform, intriguingly—is this a "rebellion" against the geometrization?) imposes its mensurability upon the dwellers along that block. In a sense, one real characteristic of their being is now their presence as a statistical element in an urban sub-unit; their neighbors approximate to that same statistical character in a way that residents of other neighborhoods cannot.

The full character of modernity is obvious in this; the new *mathesis univeralis* is part of what dictates this manner of framing society to establish neighborhoods. It has been successful, so that various urban renewal projects undertaken in the post-World War II period, where the block-cum-neighborhood has been violated are commonly recognized as failures.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, where non-residential areas are renovated for residential use (as, e.g., the Washington Market district of New York), the sense of neighborhood is soon established, and forms about a relatively defined stretch of street.<sup>10</sup>

This appears to represent a change in the way landed property is viewed. One common view is that there is an important loss of place and community, with the abandonment of proprietary interest in one's residence and its surroundings.<sup>11</sup> This is partly true, but for another reason. Proprietary interest in landed property in a city frequently differs from that of the country. The urban interest is strictly commercial, in one

original structures based on contouring for this or other purposes, overlaid in the course of centuries by other structures less formal and more political.

<sup>9</sup>Harvey Cox, The Secular City: New York (Macmillan), 1966; p. 83f inter alia

<sup>10</sup>In the case cited, a community created in the mid-1970's, one major street serves as an artery linking a number of dissimilar sub-neighborhoods with a rich mix of income and clutrue groups. This community is still in transition, and its development serves as an interesting laboratory.

<sup>11</sup>Scott Greer, The Emerging City: New York (Macmillan), 1962; p. 108

or another way. The actual owner of landed property is interested in "cash flow" or "net spendable"—not in its convenience as a place of residence or source of immediately commestible substance. [And one gets here some echo of that to which Aristotle addresses himself in his objection to those whose sole activity is "chrematistic."] But there are actual residents in some of these nominally commercial enterprises; these people, who have no real proprietary interest in their residences, nevertheless feel their "detention" of the property constitutes a species of ownership, not unlike the ownership attendant on country living. <sup>12</sup> This very different interest in the same property has produced in some cities institutional for a for the resolution of conflicting interests. <sup>13</sup>

The most elemental area of a modern city is a nominally geometric unit, the block. This basic unit determines the most elemental of human habitats, the neighborhood, as it manifests in a modern city. But the block is also a unit of measure, both of its residents, and of the larger urban agglomeration. This is not an unambiguous perspective, however. It can obscure the character of cities as artifacts.

R

The modern trend in the discussion of cities is to speak of them as centers of regional urbanization. While it would seem one would normally progress to looking at the city within its limits, defined by the aggregation of blocks and other similar units, such a progression would ignore the modern perception of urban regionalism. The city is not to be perceived as delimited by its sacred borders, its walls, with the sub-urbs merely convenient dependencies. Rather, the modern city is unlimited, and the seeming dependencies outside its limits frequently determine the character of the central city's existence.

The character of the urban region is described by Tunnard:

Look at the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas: they are contiguous from Lawrence-Haverhill, Massachusetts, on the New Hampshire border in the north to Fairfax County, Virginia, in the south. It is perhaps even more meaningful to point out that municipalities with a density

<sup>12</sup>There is also the concept of the "urban pioneer" with its implicit concept of seizing and holding and civilizing an otherwise abandoned territory.

holding and civilizing an otherwise abandoned territory.

13Rent stabilization, housing codes, and publicly controlled housing are examples of other civic actions taken to control this urban phenomenon.

of more than 100 people per square mile (that is, those that show definite signs of urbanization) stretch in a continuous five-hundred mile belt from Kittery, Maine to Quantico, Virginia...a belt which is still growing.<sup>14</sup>

The urbanization to which Tunnard refers is very different from the urbanization of the past—a city defined by its walls, or something exactly similar in intent. Other species of residential incorporation—e. g., suburbs—were defined not by some self-limiting feature, but by arbitrary reference to the self-defining city. Such limitations are not operative factors in Tunnard's definition of urbanity; density of population (i.e. urban dwellers as material elements counted in similarly mensurable units of space—here more uniform square miles rather than less uniform blocks) is a, if not the, principal defining characteristic of urbanization in this representative example from the the urban-planning literature.

To the extent cities "draw" non-urban populations while previously urban activities, ancillary to the activities of the city, are established in surrounding areas (or more recently, hitherto exclusively city-based activities are moved to what is deemed the more congenial surroundings of the suburbs),<sup>15</sup> thus encouraging these small communities to emulate urban population densities, it might be said that urbanization is spreading becoming somehow more uniform. This might be interpreted as spread of the city itself; the city is not perceived as limited. It might be perceived, as apparently Tunnard does, as being multi-centered regionalism, so that there is a convergence of urbanization in regions from a plethora of centers, only some of which are cities in the usual sense.<sup>16</sup> In either case, the perception of a distinction between *urbs* and suburbs is less meaningful, according to the modern view.

Concomitant with this view is the decline of the authority of the city to determine its relations with its nominal dependencies. There is a common opinion that the final determination of urban matters is best handled at a "higher level," given the lack of practical limitations on urban expansion. In part this based on a contradiction:

Our emphasis upon the expanding city, the "exploding metropolis," should not lead us to a fixation upon the geographical metaphor. Space itself has no given meaning

<sup>14</sup>Tunnard in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 6

<sup>15</sup> V. C. Ferkiss, Technological Man: New York (NAL), 1969; p. 126

<sup>16</sup>Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 97; also Alonso in II, p. 589

for social behavior: its meaning is always mediated by the technologies. If we consider that meaning to lie in the space-time ratio, we must entertain the possibility that, in social terms, the contemporary metropolis may not be spreading as rapidly as we think....It may be that the city is, in many ways, remaining constant or even shrinking because of the effects of instantaneous communications.<sup>17</sup>

The contradiction, clearly, is the insistence on the one hand that the geographical character of the modern discussion of cities is a matter of metaphor, while at the same time the merely geographical character of regionality has become the limit of the discussion. That is, it seems likely if the spatial attribute of the city be merely understood as metaphor, then some more truly apt attribute of the city would have to be given priority; the obvious candidate for such prioritization is the specifically civic character of cities as places wherein citizens gather to act together. But in fact, the modern trend in the discussion of cities has been to increasingly "geometrize" the discussion, taking citizens and regarding them as simply occupants of units of urban space.

The contradiction indicates a confusion as to the role of modern cities in their proper milieux: the consequence is to abdicate the role of civic governance to nominally higher echelons of authority, a state or provincial government, or even, in some cases, a central national government. There is ample empirical evidence for this, as well as theoretical justification. That a contradiction is operative becomes clear in the kind of dialogue which results, between the city officials, which need to arrange things as are mete to the needs of the city, and the higher echelon officials, whose mandate is among other things geographically broader—and perhaps therefore less constricted by the appearance of citizens as other than material to be governed. There is merit to this shift:

Most of the metropolitan growth since World War II has been suburban development, and of the population growth of sixty-four million expected by 1980, over 80 per cent will be in the suburbs. Thus, the channeling of new growth competes for attention with conservation and rebuilding of older areas.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 78f

<sup>18</sup>e. g., Tunnard in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 14

<sup>19</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 3

With the decision to regard as "suburban" areas by no means in proximity to a central city—though seeming so by virtue of superior transportation networks—broader interests are at stake in the apportionment of resources than those of the city propter se. For example, a network of roads needs to link the city and its suburbs, but also the suburbs among each other. The older pattern, with cities as the hub of the transport net (a pattern long established, and most recently implemented in rail and air networks) is adequate neither to the apparent population distribution, nor to the most common modes of transport, such as the motorcar.<sup>20</sup> The urban need to rehabilitate and modernize outdated urban systems has to be balanced against the need of newly developing "suburbs" for systems appropriate to that environment. Given as well that the suburb-dwellers represent an elite, relative to the majority of urban dwellers, the pressure for a higher echelon to mitigate the urban claims for priority in the allocation of limited resources is understandable.

It seems a strictly modern argument can be advanced for still greater priority being assigned to sub- and non-urban development: It costs less. The investment for typical urban infrastructure involves a higher standard of construction—it costs more per square foot to build a high-rise apartment or office building than it does to build a similar number of square feet in the lower standard permissible in less developed areas. Developed urban areas require such higher standard infrastructure construction to efficiently integrate with other parts of the system—the sewers, city-steam system, water and utility systems, etc., only then can be more effectively used with minimal cost.<sup>21</sup>

But this all suggests a puzzle in the assertion of the transition from cities to urban regions, which appears to be the heart of the modern set of assumptions regarding the character of urbanity:

The argument for the "sprawl" of urbanism beyond conventional city boundaries rests on a density of population and land use (with attendant demand for and efficiencies of urban-type services) like those commonly only encountered in cities in earlier days. However, the densities of land use in the "sprawl" area proper are not those of the central city nor are they uniform; only at the fringes of the city does one see a "blurring" of the pattern

<sup>20</sup> ibid. One needs to include busses in this judgment to recognize the limited applicability to L. D. C. cities.

<sup>21</sup>Ullman in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 86

of dense land use and population akin to that in the "sprawl" regions.

The passage above<sup>22</sup> indicates the nature of the problem. Given the obvious contradiction, something else, other than the geographic criteria discussed thus far, is operative. A reassessment, in accordance with the remark cited at the opening of this section, asserting people make cities, is needed, to get further in our understanding of how the modern city-dweller becomes a unit of measurement of urbanity. In short, the transition from citizen-block-neighborhood to urban region will not do; the city proper is not thereby better revealed.

C

The essayist, Dwight Macdonald, has summarized the view of a number of thinkers on the subject of human beings as demographic units:

The tendency of modern industrial society...is to transform the individual into the mass man. For the masses are in historical time what a crowd is in space: a large quantity of people unable to express their human qualities because they are related to each other neither as individuals nor as members of a community. In fact they are not related to each other at all but only to some impersonal, abstract, crystalizing factor....The mass man is a solitary atom, uniform with the millions of other atoms that go to make up "the lonely crowd," as David Riesman well calls our society.<sup>23</sup>

Where it seemed before that the urban dweller was an integral part of the urban geography, we have seen this is not really thought satisfactory in late-modernity—it fails when taken in conjunction with the modern insistence upon the "urban region" as the successor of the limited city of earlier days. People in cities may use land and facilities in a different way than do people living in non-urban areas. Yet the modern dictum is that cities are lost in urban sprawl. Mass-man, a collection of units taken as absent individualizing traits, and divorced from his dwelling place, fills the bill perfectly as the typical late- modern urban dweller, and thus, what is especially "urban." Interestingly enough, though a great deal of effort is expended attempting to define increasingly small subsets of the mass-man,

<sup>22</sup>vid. supra p. 74; citation from Greer, op. cit., p. 78

<sup>23</sup>Dwight Macdonald, Against the American Grain: New York (Random), 1962; p. 8

such attempts fail to recover the individuality of such human beings as actors.

One common way of making this attempt is to characterize the more or less "public" labor people do: They are involved in production, or they are involved in "service industries." They are "unskilled" or skilled. They are employed by the government (an increasing number) or they have jobs in the private sector.<sup>24</sup> It would seem the tendency is to see large cities proper as the locus of on-going activity in some of these areas, and less often the locus of others. For example, legal and financial services tend to cluster in city centers; light manufacturing continues in the city, but is under pressure to move to less costly areas; heavier industry and its related management has long since decamped to areas quite remote from the central city.25 Defining the kinds of work done in relatively more urban and less urban areas—or claiming that some areas previously not urban are now become so by virtue of the kind and intensivity of work done there —does not effectively delimit a specifically urban dwelling group, though. Rather, it merely indicates the homogenization the expression "mass-man" suggests.

A similar way of differentiating urban and non-urban populations is to categorize them by social rank and ethnicity.<sup>26</sup> This is a politically "loaded" device, but has the virtue of some accuracy: The cost of living in central city is generally higher than in less urban areas; those who live according to the conventionally accepted standards (pictured, appropriately, in "mass media") are generally financially better off, and with this superior financial position are generally on a higher social level than those who cannot afford to live up to such a standard. In the poorer parts of a city, the city-dwellers are often recent in-migrants to the city, either country-dwellers who believe they may fare better by virtue of improved social services commonly delivered in cities, or from foreign parts, clustering together in ethnically

<sup>24</sup>Ferkiss, op. cit., p. 109f

<sup>25</sup>This summarizes part of a study conducted by faculty and staff at Columbia University: Conservation of Human Resources Project, *The Corporate Headquarters Complex in New York City*: New York (Columbia), 1977. Of course, "heavy" industry was often not a city-based enterprise; it took its origin in relatively remote locations in the 19th century, and its transposal to cities was a later phenomenon. More often, a substantial community, but not a city in the strict sense, grew up in the area of the mill or factory. Many of the "steel towns" are examples; some great manufacturing cities—but ususally with pre-industrial origins—such as Manchester or Pittsburgh, may be counter-examples.

<sup>26</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 125f. Also consider the nature of social mobility—a modern urban characteristic more readily adopted by persons of higher social rank; cf. Park & Burgess, op. cit., p. 59; Webber & Webber in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 35; Greer, op. cit., pp. 91, 76.

defined neighborhoods for a generation or so. Since perceived ethnicity defines a deviation from the "high culture" of a given city, and such deviation carries with it a degree of social stigma, ethnicity can be a subcategory of the social rank categorization noted previously.

That such a device is actually of importance in understanding how city-dwellers are viewed in the city is to be seen in the apparent policy decision of urban leaders to favor those parts of the city inhabited by persons of nominally higher social (or economic) rank, while neglecting parts of a city where persons of lower social rank dwell. In favored parts, new parks are built (not infrequently in such a way as to dismantle adjacent unacceptable areas—the building of New York's Central Park had just such an effect, eliminating a shanty-town of substantial proportions). Public transportation is kept running, and is generally kept in better condition. Police protection may well be superior. Equally, in a newly developing area, city services will be minimized until such a time as the social character of the area is indicated.<sup>27</sup>

The suggestion which develops out of an examination of the organization of city-dwellers into various categories is dual: On the one hand, not all people who live in cities are really city-dwellers; there is a subordinate group of people living within the bounds of the city proper, who nevertheless are not integrated into that city's culture. These people are tolerated to some extent, but are not taken into consideration to any great degree if so doing is not absolutely requisite to keeping them quiescent. Others who live in cities, who are able to operate its systems and conform to its culture are very much catered to, to precisely the extent that they approximate to the highest level in the social hierarchy. A perplexity in this, especially as regards the modern city, is that a perception of who is in the very highest stratum may be distorted, so that the well-to-do land-owner, who nevertheless does not reside in the city (and may in fact not particularly well embody the city's high culture) may exercise undue influence upon the city's leaders, by virtue of his ("absentee") landlordism.

At a more theoretical level, it is clear that the distinction between cityand non-city dwellers is utterly qualitative and not quantitative. The citydweller is not determined, finally, by living in a particular pattern of density, but by his being perceived and perceiving himself to be part of a culture which gravitates about the city's "center." Interestingly, this con-

<sup>27</sup>The new residential area in New York's Washington Market district is undergoing such an assessment; it would seem the current government is not happy with its development as a lower/middle middle-class area.

forms with what has been discovered about the probable nature of civic origins. Tunnard is clearly mistaken when he asserts that people who live a life in an area without centers are urbanized. It impacts as well upon the way in which neighborhoods may be understood.

D

Increasingly, those who are least integrated into modern society—those who exhibit most of the attributes of rural folk—are concentrating within the highest-density portions of the large metropolitan centers.<sup>30</sup>

Cities have always included country-folk among their inhabitants. Archaeological data suggest that, almost uniformly, the very earliest urban enclosures (the formations of which are literally pre-historic) were inhabited almost entirely by people whose principal activities were neither urban nor civic, but rural; substantial parts of the area within the city limits were given over to agriculture, and of course, agriculture dominated suburban activity.31 Even quite late—well into historic times—the distinction between citizen and countryman was far from distinct: Aristophanes makes Socrates's neighbor, Strepsiades, a farmer, with country ways. This might reflect the influx of rural folk into the city during the period of the Peloponnesian Wars; it might also reflect the fact that only just prior to the Persian Wars is there evidence that the city of Athens became culturally distinct from the rural communes from which it was erected, and which still coexisted with it.32 Something of the same sort seems to have been the case for Rome, even at the very end of the Republic, if one may believe the account of Caesar's will.

In considerably more recent times, cities drew population from the countryside; after the initial period of the first industrial revolution (which saw the location of factories in relatively small towns, even villages<sup>33</sup>—

<sup>28</sup>See Paul Wheatley, *The Pivot of the Four Corners* [Edinburgh, 1971]; Wheatley summarizes and bibliographs the major discussions, and one important outcome of his scholarship is the evidence for a point of view as determinative of the difference between urbanite and country dwellers.

<sup>29</sup>Tunnard in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 11

<sup>30</sup>M. Meyerson (ed.), The Conscience of the City: New York (Braziller), 1970; p. 5

<sup>31</sup>Wheatley, op. cit., passim.

<sup>32</sup>Nisbet, op. cit., chapters 1, 2, passim.—The Cleisthenian reforms appear to be the watershed in the shift under discussion.

<sup>33</sup>A nice illustration of this is in Dicken's *Our Mutual Friend*. Heroine Lizzie Hexam—a city girl—is whisked into hiding in a rural manufacturing hamlet some distance from London, where she has no trouble settling in—indeed, she flourishes.

where "factoring" had long been a common enterprise), great industries relied for their supply of cheap, unskilled labor upon the inmigration from the country, or abroad.

But this sort of earlier inmigration was also characterized by the assimilation of the inmigrating population. To remain a "greenhorn" was somehow reprehensible. Nightschool classes were a popular means of learning what had to be learned to function—an acceptable command of the English language being principal among those accomplishments for those from abroad. To a great extent, this is no longer so commonly the case. Commonly, recent rural inmigration, both domestic and from abroad is characterized by the creation of "ghettos" within which the new rural inmigrant populations retain their decidedly non-urban folkways. To some extent, this unassimilated population remains so by virtue of the increasing complexity of urban life, to which a lack of skills basic to judgment adequate to the new milieu is a principal contributor. Departing the ghetto is an indication of accession in some degree to genuinely civic, high city culture.

Another factor, dependent upon that complexity, is also at work: In the past, it has been possible in late-modern society to rise from relatively humble origins to some eminence. More recently, one has had the phenomenon of decline in status, or the inability to rise in the first place, as a commonplace of urban existence. Weber has discussed the problem of declassé members of ruling elites in the context of the city;<sup>37</sup> there appears to be a current expansion in this phenomenon. The result is a population dwelling within the city, which is not entirely civic. Those with some "savvy" as to city ways prey upon the new inmigrants, but are themselves inept in the full use of the civic systems. At the same time, first-time inmigrants are literally unaware of the civic systems, or if aware, are intimidated by them.

In understanding what the expression, "the city is the people," really means, one has to delineate a range of authentic citizens. These are people who are able to effectively operate the civic system, who gather together in

<sup>34</sup>This is Sinclair Lewis's picture in The Urban Jungle.

<sup>35</sup>Meyerson, op. cit., pp. 4, 11. This pattern does not appear limited to the U. S. or "1stworld" cities.

<sup>36</sup>The late-modern city is a very complex place, with very complex "systems," and to the new inmigrant often represents a degree of sophistication for which no ready education is available.

<sup>37</sup>Weber, op. cit., p. 198, passim., see also M. Meyerson and E. C. Banfield, *Politics*, *Planning and the Public Interest*: New York (Macmillan), 1955; p. 98f, also ftn., p. 98

neighborhoods which exist as communities in which this aptitude is recognized and assessed. There also appears to be a range of "non-citizens" living in the city, but not assimilated to its systems, in the final analysis foreign who are to it, and representing a danger to the civic system side-by-side with which they exists. Modern accounts of cities, focussed on merely material accounts, appear to sidestep this issue in the treatment of city-dwellers as simply mensurable units in aggregations, missin qualitative differences, or even ignoring them.

E

How is the standard series of social-scientific intuitions organized? The first effort, sketched above, to organize the discoveries of a kind of "natural" association, the association of people in neighborhoods, has been shown to be of at best limited value, and to involve contradictions deriving from an inherent lack of clarity as to the nature of the urban as distinct from the nonurban. There is a certain "ad hoc" character to these efforts, perhaps. Such a view, while frequently at work in more "urban-planning" kinds of social-scientific literature, does not, fortunately, represent the best of social-scientific perspectives.<sup>38</sup>

The best social-scientific organizations of intuitions about the urban dweller seem well characterized by Alfred Schutz:

...The social sciences seek to 'understand' social phenomena in terms of 'meaningful' categories of human experience...the 'causal functional' approach of the natural sciences is not applicable in social inquiry.... All socially significant human behavior is an expression of motivated psychic states;...in consequence the social scientist cannot be satisfied with viewing social processes simply as concatenations of 'externally related' events, and that the establishment of correlations or even of universal relations of concomitance cannot be his ultimate goal. On the contrary, he must construct 'ideal types' or 'models of

<sup>38</sup> While this purely geographic approach seems clearly unsatisfactory, is a more subtle organization any better? To discover various categories into which citydwellers fall does not seem finally to extend understanding of the civic phenomenon to a clear doctrine of the city. It is not that it is uninteresting, but the question remains, how is it possible for the one group to be fully civic in its understanding, and another to be less than civic? To simply attribute this palpable difference to "upbringing" or some such behavioristically comprehended notion is, as I believe, to beg the question.

motivations' in terms of which he seeks to 'understand' overt social behavior by imputing springs of action to the actors involved in it.<sup>39</sup>

The physical aspect of a city—its urban prospect, so to speak—would, in this view, reflect such motives. Thus the features Weber adduces as necessary to a city-fortification, market, court and local law and some degree of autonomy<sup>40</sup>—are expressions of the psychic state of persons gathered together in civic association. Then, if this be a fair assessment of the way in which the social scientific organization of cities and related phenomena is necessarily organized, the second of the kinds of interpretations sketched above is that most in accord with the modern social-scientific predilection. Along with this integration of the data under the rubric of psychic motivation, there seems to be a commitment to a notion of progress that is, effectively not governed by specifically delineated ends, but open-ended—a conception of indefinite progress. 41 From this conjunction, it would seem that the psychic motivation with which social science is concerned is not teleological in character. That is, the civic action which results in the development of urbanity, in this view, would appear to intend no purpose, and is in fact chaotic.

The kinds of questions asked under such an organizing principle, of purposeful action which has no end, may be summarized as follows:

- What are the elements of which they [cities] are composed?
- To what extent are they the product of a selective process?
- · How are people included in the civic body?
- What is the relative stability and permanence of their populations?
- What about the age, sex, and social condition of the people?
- What about the children? How many of them are born and how many of them remain?
- What is the history [of the city]? What is there in the subconscious —in the forgotten or dimly remembered experiences—[of this city] which determines its sentiments and attitudes?

<sup>39</sup>Schutz in D. Emmet and A. MacIntyre (eds.), Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis: New York (Macmillan), 1970; p. 3

<sup>40</sup>Weber, op. cit., p. 80f

<sup>41</sup>Ferkiss, op. cit., p. 100f

- What is there in clear consciousness, i. e., what are its avowed sentiments, doctrines, etc.?
- What does it regard as matter of fact? What is news? What is the general run of attention? what models does it imitate and are these within or without the group?
- What is the social ritual, i. e., what things must one do [in the city] in order to escape being regarded with suspicion or looked upon as peculiar?
- Who are the leaders? What interests [of the city] do they incorporate in themselves and what is the technique by which they exercise control?<sup>42</sup>

Looking at the list above, one sees that this understanding of motivated action can result only in a list of facts, the interpretations of which are antecedent to the discovery of the facts themselves, i. e., facts which are subsumed under the predetermined conception of motivated action the ends of which are at the very least unknown. The definition of the city under such an assumption can only appear as a material collection, the internal organization of which is in some sense mysterious:

The many definitions of the city have only one element in common: namely that the city consists simply of a collection of one or more separate dwellings but is a relatively closed settlement.... If interpreted in this way only very large localities would qualify as cities; moreover it would be ambiguous....<sup>43</sup>

In short, it would seem this ambiguity derives principally from the uncritical idealism resting on merely determinative judgment, resulting necessarily in an inability to consider the internal organization of the material collection of civic elements—city dwellers and their artifacts.

#### П

The perceived difficulty of the "standard" account of cities, under the social scientific rubric of non-teleological motivation (if that is not a contradiction), to have access to the internal organization of civic phenomena,

<sup>42</sup>Derived, with some modification, from Park & Burgess, op. cit., p. 11f 43Weber, op. cit., p. 65.

has led to the application of more up-to-date functionalist or "structuralist" concepts:

Under the influence of the ecological approach, they have constructed a two dimensional theory of the city—a sprawling map of people in places. Theirs has been a metaphor emphasizing the unplanned, "blind" development of urban concentration, the regularities in the use of space that are unlegislated but enforced by mechanisms of competition. The city for the urban ecologist is the mass of population, heterogeneous and dense, segregated by wealth and cultural background.<sup>44</sup>

In this comment, the relation of the structuralist approach to the "standard" social-scientific approach is fairly clear; the conception, motivated-sans-purpose activity of city-dwellers is still at work here. Development is "blind." Nominally "instinctual" forces are at work. But the structuralist approach redefines those instinctual forces as internal to the city, at once the outcome of living together in cities and productive of civic phenomena. Having relocated and defined the motivation of human beings to form cities, the structuralist is open to a more flexible speculation upon the nature of cities, without being prone to excessively deontological predictions, as, e. g.:

The ecological structure of the classical city depended on a high resources cost....The city was clustered and bounded....Both the economic and political structures of the modern world are dominated by the reduction in [the cost of such resources]....The central cities may decay completely and an urban structure emerge that looks something like chicken wire, a network of ribbon development enclosing areas of country and rural settlement.<sup>45</sup>

What seems most obviously different is the insistence in this perspective of a non-linear conception, a rejection of a principle of civic organization standing outside that agglomeration of phenomena,<sup>46</sup> and a coexisting insistence upon the "feedback principle," by which is meant that the

<sup>44</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 7

<sup>45</sup>Meyerson, The Conscience of the City, p. 26

<sup>46</sup>*ibid.*, p. 78

organization of the phenomena is discovered "interactively" by the investigator with the object of his investigation.<sup>47</sup>

### A

This difference reflects the origin of the particular kind of structuralism here operative, functionalism, as a "polemic against Single Factor Theory." A system of interdependent variables is the central notion. Changes in any one element in the system produce an entirely new configuration, and require a new interpretation. This perspective takes on new power through the application of statistical methods. The questions this approach addresses may be understood in the following context:

The people with whom we interact are, in various parts and ways, introjected into ourselves. We see things and ourselves, therefore, from their perspectives, thus making them part of us. The contents of the self are, of course, derived from social interaction, and, therefore, some form of social interaction is necessary for self-development. Our discussion ... has ... been concerned with asking what kinds of social interaction are conducive to the development of self.<sup>51</sup>

Gouldner and Peterson, thus stating the basic complex of problems operative in the functionalist approach, indicate what may be the greatest of the puzzles with which modern social science, confronting the ultimate social enclave, may have to do. The difficulty may be expressed as the intersubjective action of a subject known finally only as an individual, a "self." The tensions at work in such a ground-problem are surely not novel, but they seem exacerbated in late modernity, perhaps largely due to the culmination of the development of the notion of the self. Interestingly, this culmination has been coincident with the presentation of modern social science as "hard" science. Social scientists understand the tension between self and society as the manner in which the self perceives itself as "real:"

<sup>47</sup>*ibid.*, p. 81

<sup>48</sup>A. Gouldner and R. Peterson, *Notes on Technology and the Moral Order*: Indianapolis (Bobbs-Merrill), 1962; p 7

<sup>49</sup>ibid.

<sup>50</sup>*ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>51</sup>*ibid*., p. 41f

There are at least two different ways in which the self can feel itself to be "real" or two senses in which it can feel sure of and validate itself: through feeling powerful in the course of conflictual validation or through feeling loved and approved in the course of consensual validation. The search for consensual validation, however, runs the risk of inundating the self, for it constrains the self to conform and be like others....Without tensions with others, the boundaries of the self become looser and more permeable, the line between self and others grows wavery. Conversely, the maintenance of the self's boundaries through tensions with others may exacerbate resistance and induce others to withhold consensual validation, thus undermining the self's convictions concerning its character and qualities.<sup>22</sup>

I noted above that this was not a complete novelty; what seems to me novel in this expression of a timeless problem is, primarily, the tendency to see such a set of tensions as more or less "natural," as inherently instinctive. As coincident with the presentation of social science as "hard" science, it involved a certain adaptation of biological notions of evolution and natural selection to social situations. This fairly obvious manoeuvre had been in the works since Darwin first had adumbrated his biological notion; its false start in Social Darwinism has been otherwise fulfilled in such more recent developments as various structuralist theories and sociobiology.<sup>53</sup>

Another important influence on functionalist social science as the account of the internal relations of people, was Marxist opposition of personal identity and alienation. The anachronistic "Enlightenment" character of Marxist thought, contrasting with 19th century Idealism,<sup>54</sup> encouraged the development of a social science claiming the same sort of material foundation as the physical sciences. The material causes of human action—now effectively behavior, being instinctive, only specifically human when not pertinent to other species—are natural-historical

<sup>52</sup>*ibid.*, p. 45

<sup>53</sup>It seems to me a principal influence in this development has been that eminent if out-of-favor Jesuit, Teilhard de Chardin; cf: Ferkiss, op. cit. p. 86.

<sup>54</sup>This position has been well developed by several commentators, e. g., by the noted Hegel scholar, The Rev. J. Quentin Lauer, S. J., in a course of lectures delivered in Fall, 1981 at Fordham University. It is widely subscribed. But cf: Ferkiss, op. cit., p. 69.

phenomena studied as economics, etc.. Identity and alienation are natural processes, not crises of will, or like psychic faculties:

For Marx, man is alienated because he has no control over what he produces; he can not decide what he wishes to make and is himself simply an object, a thing in the production process.... Alienation is man's divorce from nature, from a postulated real self.<sup>55</sup> ...As an actor in these roles he goes through the motions, but the "real" person is not involved. He is forced to wear a mask to conceal his true self. Sometimes the strain becomes too great and results either in individual psychological breakdown or in social conflict or more likely, simply in the pseudo identity replacing the real one, the mask becoming the face....<sup>56</sup>

The contradiction, that one is naturally alienated from his natural being, does not seem to be well resolved in most commentaries.

The concept of alienation and the shifts it produces in human behavior —in what has been called above motivation-sans-purpose—lends complexity to the conception of functions, and in part accounts for the changes in the civic milieux which are a cornerstone of the functionalist theory. At the same time, a reason for the absence of a  $\tau\epsilon\lambda$ oc is implicit in the doctrine; if the system is "alienated" and  $\tau\epsilon\lambda$ ot are natural, where naturally occurring alienation precludes the "natural" human action, teleological action will be absent. Gouldner and Peterson opine that the Nietzschean doctrine of the Apollonian and Dionysian is a useful explanation of the dichotomy in human action and behavior which underlies the shift toward a functionalist model of civic (and other) patterns of human interaction, from purposeful to motivated-butnonpurposeful kinds. The Apollonian and Dionysian dichotomy mirrors a fundamental alienation in human being:

The Apollonian factor entails a complex of norm-emitting, legitimating, surveying and sanctioning arrangements, emerging as an adaptive response to the intensified social conflicts and growing problems of impulse management which were then occasioned by the growth of Neolithic

<sup>55</sup>The definition of what is "natural" reflects both the pre-Idealist and Idealist apsects of the question at hand. The complexity needs to be noted, but this place does not allow of dilation on the topic. However the contradiction of a natural process divorcing one from nature is interesting.

<sup>56</sup>Ferkiss, op. cit., p. 71f

technology, stratification and heightened individuality.... Insofar as Apollonianism involves a stress on cognitive modes of experience and a hopeful, melioristic view of the world... we should expect it to correlate positively with [technology].<sup>57</sup>

Gouldner and Peterson's list of the Nietzschean Apollonian and Dionysian characteristics are shown in in the table below.

It should be fairly clear from the preceding discussion that the functionalist approach expands upon and supplies many of the lacks of the straightforward, classical social science of the "demographic" approach which was discussed in the section I of this chapter. It is not inconsistent with that approach and there is much overlap between the two, dependent upon preferences of particular social scientists. Most important for the study at hand, both posit the city dweller as a material element in the ongoing existence of the city.

#### **Apollonian Model**

- 1. freedom from all extravagant urges, no excess, "nothing too much"
- 2. rejection of all license
- 3. stresses "cognitive modes of experience", reason, knowledge and science
- 4. hopeful, melioristic view of the world
- 5. activistic
- 6. the *principium individuationis*, "know thyself"
- 7. emphasizes the plastic arts
- 8. maintains a compensatory belief in gods that lived
- 9. "It was not unbecoming for even the greatest hero to yearn for an afterlife."

#### Dionysian Model

- 1. sense of "glorious transport,"
   "rapture," "intoxication," "demoniac"
- 2. "sexual promiscuity overriding ... estab-lished tribal law"
- 3. surrenders to "intuition" or "instinct"
- 4. tragic view of the world
- 5. "loathe to act"
- 6. "The bond between man and man come to be forged once more," "the vision of mystical oneness," "surrender thyself"
- 7. emphasizes the "non-visual art of music"
- 8. (?) acceptance of the "terrors and horrors of existence" without illusion
- $9.\ acceptance$  of the dissolution of the self

Gouldner & Peterson's table of characteristics

# B

What are the actual elements of this functionalist theory as it applies to the understanding of cities? In the first instance, and consistent with the relation to a more primitive demographic doctrine, there is an

<sup>57</sup>Gouldner & Peterson, op. cit., pp. 51, 36

anthropology, which best serves the demands for a notion of humankind as a material element for social-scientific observation and interpretation.

Essential to this anthropology, and perhaps characteristic of any such modern theory, is a commitment to individuality, as opposed to community —the Apollonian over the Dionysian, in the language of Gouldner and Peterson. The motto is, "'My will, not thine, be done." 58 engenders with it the realization that "in a highly cultivated civilization, the social will is mighty and daily grows mightier and must, ordinarily and outwardly, prevail unless chaos is to come."59 The two are mutually reinforcing tendencies, so that the increase of the one causes the waxing of the other by way of seeming compensation. 60 This mutual interdependence, such that not one basic characteristic but two change, points to a significant increase in the complexity of the system of individuals and their social groupings under scrutiny. Royce neatly summarizes the situation which results:

> The highly trained agitator, or the plastic disciple of agitators, if both intelligent and reasonably orderly in habits, is intensely both an individualist and a man who needs the collective will, who in countless ways and cases bows to that will, and votes for it, and increases its power. The individualism of such a man wars with his own collectivism; while each, as I insist, tends to inflame the other. As an agitator, the typically restless child of our age often insists upon heaping up new burdens of social control, control that he indeed intends to have others feel rather than himself. As individualist, longing to escape, perhaps from his economic cares, perhaps from the marriage bond, such a highly intelligent agitator may speak rebelliously of all restrictions, declare Nietzsche to be his prophet, and set out to be a Superman as if he were no social animal at all. Wretched man, by reason of his divided will, he is; and he needs only a little reflection to observe the fact. 61

<sup>58</sup>Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1968; p. 115 59ibid.

<sup>60</sup>ibid., p. 116

<sup>61</sup>ibid., p. 117 One of the amazing things in this passage is the echo it finds in Arendt's Crises of the Republic, where her concern is the use of violence to manipulate the university. Her analysis of '60s student activists is verly like that of Royce's turn-of-the-century Nihilist.

The language may be a trifle archaic, as is the rhetoric; the image of mankind that it projects is precisely the most modern of modern images, precisely expressing the Nietzschean dichotomy in the description of Functionalism, noted above.

The images of a world under such a perspective are common in both fiction and non-fiction; the most effective picture might be that given by C. S. Lewis in *That Hideous Strength*, a demon-inspired artificial world. Or one might take the picture Ferkiss gives in *Technological Man*, of a "machine oriented" world. <sup>62</sup>

Man is a technological animal, and technological change is the fundamental factor in human evolution. This is simply another way of saying man is a cultural animal. Other animals have technologies..., and they sometimes possess a rudimentary form of culture as well, passing along acquired knowledge from generation to generation (rats, for instance, teach their young about the new poisons developed by man). But only for man are tools and cultures central factors in his existence. Only man has evolved culturally to the point where he consciously can alter radically his physical environment and his own biological make-up. 63

In short, the perspective expressed in the tension of Apollonian and Dionysian yields an image of a human being which is basically another animal, with certain propensities for making things and acting together, best summed up in the new species name, *Homo faber*. It is not clear how such activity is possible, and what it is that brings it about, and what sorts of things are chosen for what reasons.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>62</sup>Ferkiss, op. cit., p. 84

<sup>63</sup>*ibid.*, p. 35

<sup>64</sup>Part of the resolution may reside in the concept of communication often linked with Functionalism; cf. Cox, op. cit., p. 35. This is increasingly accepted in a range of "pundit-groups" just as there is good reason to believe it may already be in the process of passing away. Academic circles derivative of Foucault and Derrida on the one hand, and Apel and Habermas on the other (but lacking that incisiveness of seminal thought) are much influenced by a consideration of the speech-act as communication. One has the sense, though, that much of the interest remains in speech proper, not as directed to doing things. It is the view of the vita contemplativa, not gladly given to change. A rare philosophical voice favoring the vita activa is that of Charles Sherover, in his extensive essay on political life, Time, Freedom and the Common Good.

### "Urban Material"

C

The functionalist doctrine organizes human being in a hierarchy of ever-more complex groups. These groups are categorized as either exclusive membership groups or inclusive spatial groups. 65

The general treatment of cities, under the functionalist perspective, is under the inclusive, spatial category:

...Various populations are not only allocated different geographical subareas for their residential neighborhoods and workplaces, corresponding to their roles in the division of labor—they are also integrated within common schemes of action. Their interdependence may be gauged by the impossibility of survival for any particular part of the metropolis in isolation, while the interdependence of city and total society is equally clear. No individual in the city, no social class, can survive without the rights it can claim from others; these rights in turn stem from the functions allocated to the individual within the total complex.<sup>60</sup>

Principally, then, the apparently inclusive nature of the neighborhood is an overriding organizing and descriptive principle of civic life, as in the demographic account. But parallel to this most basic inclusive categorization, there is another set of exclusive groups which operate within, or occasionally (at least, at this level of discussion) coterminously with the city. The most obvious of these are interest groups and occupational groups; some are less well defined—such as social classes or finally, the group of citizens, the fundamental civic association, which may be construed (as anciently) to be exclusive, or (as at present) to be inclusive. This would seem to be an extension of and descriptive improvement upon the social-class description set out in the first part.

These two categorizations facilitate the development of a material perspective upon the city and city-dwellers. On the one hand, the purely inclusive description of city-dwellers, as occupying certain spaces, obviously allows a high degree of mensuration; some of this has already been developed above. But the conception of a pluralistic society of exclusive groups is also conducive to a materialist interpretation of city-dwellers. Such groups can be construed as material elements interacting according

<sup>65</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 37

<sup>66</sup>*ibid.*, p. 35f

to predetermined, non-teleologically-informed stimuli; their activities allow of more precise mensuration, since their activities are by definition the averaged sum of the activities of their members. [This has implications for the topic of the next chapter, which will be concerned with the agency-of-change in the city as understood in modern social science.]

Under the functionalist perspective, "the city is a differentiated part of a relatively large-scale society...;

it is the key arena in which the organizational output of one organization becomes the input of another.... It is large in scale, not just because of the number of people in its borders...but because of the organizational peaks from which they see and the widespread ramifications of their actions.<sup>67</sup>

This accords well with other general conceptions of the social structure which obtain in late-modernity; it is not however sufficiently universal on First, the position of the city vis-a-vis other social ortwo counts: ganizations has hitherto been either utterly independent, or utterly paramount in most cultural milieux. Second, it assumes the necessity of organizational centralization. While there is some evidence some such central location has been perceived as vital to certain service institutions banks, law firms, etc.—and the parts of productive corporate enterprises which deal with these services, 68 it is also the case in late modernity that most such organizational activity can be moved out of the central city, indeed into remote locations. However that may be, the central underlying assertion, that cities are social centralities, and complexes of hierarchically organized activity, mensurable with some precision by statistical means, seems securely in accord with other presuppositions operative in latemodernity.

Consistent with this fundamental assumption, "the increase in scale [of social bodies typically exclusive in membership] results in a widening span of compliance with given social organizations." Such an increase in scale practically requires some greater degree of proximity, if the social activity of such a group is to be effected in a meaningful way. E. g., a national union's activities may have broad effects benefitting its membership, but for practical and immediate benefit, the local association, with its close

<sup>67</sup>*ibid.*, p. 64

<sup>68</sup>Conservation of Human Resources Project, op. cit., passim.

<sup>69</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 47

### "Urban Material"

member proximity, is the group which effects the will of the group vis-a-vis the most vital issues of interest to it. Similarly, the national headquarters of a business or manufacturing concern may set general policy; the implementation of that policy in an appropriate fashion is dependent upon the capabilities of the local group. The local executive group, as its needs become more complex, remains the identifiable membership group, but its interests are modified by the larger body of which it is a part.<sup>70</sup>

To the extent such a larger body's character is determined by its representing the interests of a larger, hence more homogenous set of members, it becomes more mensurable, less idiosyncratic, and finally, more material. Its functions allow of greater understanding in terms acceptable under the rubrics of modern social science. Functionalism finds in the city as it understands it a locus of the highest-order, most complex, and thus, most average and most mensurable, ordering organizations.

D

There is some rather interesting evidence for the pervasiveness and acceptance of this Functionalist understanding of Humankind and its cities. First, there is the report of the resistance of new inmigrants to a given city to automatic subsumption under predetermined groups, so far as that is possible:

In conducting their study, the pastors were shocked to discover that the recently arrived apartment dwellers, whom they expected to be lonely and desperate for relationships, did not want to meet their neighbors socially and had no interest whatever in church or community groups. At first the ministers deplored what they called a "social pathology" and a "hedgehog" psychology. Later, however, they found that what they had encountered was a sheer survival technique. Resistance against efforts to subject them to neighborliness and socialization is a skill apartment dwellers must develop if they are to maintain any human relationships at all. It is an essential element in the shape of the secular city. <sup>72</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Reflected in the greater importance of communication; cf: Greer,  $op.\ cit.$  , pp 44-45f

<sup>71</sup> Greer, op. cit., p. 34; Campbell in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 53

<sup>72</sup>Cox, op. cit., p. 38f

To Cox's conclusion must be added a couple of facts: Clearly, any such city-dweller in a modern city must already be affiliated with a substantial number of groups having to to with employment and personal interests. Thus no immediate need for new affiliations is required to function in the new surroundings. Second, given the tension between Apollonian and Dionysian already discussed, the omnipresence of the Dionysian in the modern city should be expected to produce a corresponding omnipresent Apollonian insistence on self-selection of group affiliations, so far as that may be feasible. From another point of view, evidence of the acceptability of this construction of civic phenomena (increasingly urban to the exclusion of any actual "civicity"), is the matter-of-factness of the interpretation of modernity at work in this passage:

If we take as a beginning, American industry in the midnineteenth century, the most striking changes since have been (1) the increasing use of nonhuman sources of energy, translated through machines into human values; (2) the increasing span of organizational networks in which men and machines are integrated for productive and distributive purposes; and (3) a resulting increase in the amount of productivity for each human participant.<sup>73</sup>

The first point shows the evaluative, ultimately quantitative manner of thinking which pervades the functionalist perspective, as I have been at some pains to suggest. The second point indicates the emphasis upon hierarchically organized structures in a system.

F

By way of conclusion for this section, I note the following difficulties:

There is no ready way to separate the so-called Apollonian and Dionysian elements in human existence. The sharp dichotomy set out above, and generally operative in some such form (whether these metaphorical names be accepted or not), does not present itself except at the end of a very long process of interpretation. The same sort of internal contradiction, seen to be prevalent in the more primitive demographic theory set out in section I, and to which this more complex functionalist notion is apparently addressed, still obtains. While people are the city, what is lost is the fullness of human being. People as they are given to us

<sup>73</sup>Greer, op. cit., p41

<sup>74</sup>Meyerson, The Conscience of the City, p. 161

### "Urban Material"

in experience are lost in the interpretation of them as elements in an increasingly more complex socio-functional complex.

#### 75

Another, quite coherent, account of cities from within what has been denominated a "material" perspective, and standing in some senses opposite to the more sociological accounts of cities with which this discussion has been concerned thus far, is the description of the city as a primarily economic entity.

This account interfaces with the functionalist account, to some extent; the city's economic activity is one of the functions of which a functionalist account is comprised. But such an economic perspective can be taken by itself; this has a venerable history, both in general and in the limited time-frame of modernity.

#### A

Economically defined, the city is a settlement the inhabitants of which live primarily off trade and commerce rather than agriculture. However it is not altogether propers to call all localities "cities" which are dominated by trade and commerce. This would include in the concept "city" colonies made up of family members and maintaining a single, practically hereditary trade establishment such as the "trade villages" of Asia and Russia. It is necessary to add a certain "versatility" of practiced trades to the characteristics of the city."

This is a very basic definition, and suffers to some extent from being out-of-date. There is some evidence that the prehistoric communities from which the earliest historical cities emerged, and in fact, the early cities (in continuity with such pre-civic communities), did subsist as largely agricultural communities, with trade an important adjunct activity. The boundaries of early cities were such as to include within them large tracts of farm land surrounding the civic center cum citadel proper; the exigencies of limited transport for bulky goods, as well as defensive capability, suggested

<sup>75</sup>An interesting argument on the economic significance of cities is advanced by Jane Jacobs in *Cities and the Wealth of Nations* (NY [Random House], 1984). Ms. Jacobs' views are attractive and have been influential in thinking through implications of other material. There is something simplistic about the economics involved, but Ms. Jacobs has an unmistakable fee

<sup>76</sup>Weber, op. cit., p. 66; Weber quite properly hedges this set of basic characteristics.

<sup>77</sup>See Wheatley, op. cit., passim.

the propriety of such an arrangement, so that even in the Middle Ages (where city-based society was, after all, a well-established phenomenon), the proximity of farming to the city, even in the city to some extent, was not uncommon. The virtual exclusion of such activity from the modern city has been to some extent (how great an extent is not clear) a function of improving transportation, which has allowed the provision of the city from a greater distance.<sup>76</sup>

The importance of such activity from rather early on is suggested by the engagement of princes in trade, according to Weber:

Vases from old Hellenic cities like Cyrene picture the king weighing goods (*silphion*). In Egypt at the beginning of historical time a commercial fleet of the Lower-Egyptian Pharaoh is reported. Widely diffused over the world, but especially in maritime "cities" where the carrying trade was easily controlled, the economic interest of resident military families flourished beside the monopoly of the castle chieftain, as a result of their own participation in commercial profits. Their capacity to participate in the civic economy often shattered the monopoly (if it existed) of the prince.<sup>79</sup>

There was an enormous tension involved in such activity by the upper classes; conventionally, these patrician classes had been tied to the land, and its apportionment among their followers. Indeed, in some cases, patricians were legally forbidden to engage in trade—this was the case in the Roman republic. The strategy in such instances was to form an alliance with middle-class persons for whom trade was acceptable, and finance their activities. Some of the transition from a strictly agrarian patrician life to one increasingly devoted to "chrematistic" is evident in the

<sup>78</sup>This development is evident in New York. Farming continued in outlying boroughs, and even, apparently, in Manhattan (to a small extent) to the end of the end of the 19th century (I have an eyewitness account of this for the early 1900's). Some provisioning came from the largely industrial northern New Jersey, food stuff lightered across from Hoboken, and sold either just south of Canal Street, or transported by rail along the West Side (the rail bridges still survive). Goods now come from greater distance and are transhipped more often by motor transport, thus making a market area on the periphery of the city (near the junction of the national road net and the city road net) preferable.] Allowing for this sort of revision, still, the principle element in an economic-materialist description of the city is the presence of trade, and to some extent industry, the absence of agriculture, and the participation of numerous competing as well as cooperating mercantile establishments.

<sup>79</sup>Weber, op. cit., p. 79

#### "Urban Material"

comments of Plato, Aristotle and the comic and tragic playwrights of the late Hellenic period.

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to make of such economic activity the whole of the ancient city. Both archaeological evidence and the surviving commentaries of the city-dwellers themselves makes clear that a preoccupation with the merely mercantile and industrial activity in private hands was uncommon and considered perverse. Economics became an acceptable concern of the upper classes when economic failure threatened the larger existence of the city.<sup>80</sup>

However many such difficulties one may find with such an economic-materialist account of the city, from an historical base, still, it is an important perspective, held by a substantial number of scholars and representing a received opinion.<sup>81</sup>

In the case of the modern city, the economically-oriented perspective is often used to account for the decentralization of urban areas:

We have been called a "nation of nomads" but our movement is necessary for the flexible deployment of human resources in a large-scale and expanding society. It is a sign, a measure of social metabolism indicating the change and expansion of the larger system.<sup>82</sup>

When added to the kinds of remarks we have seen in the first two kinds of accounts of cities, and especially taken together with the kind of regional-plan discussion typified in the remarks of Tunnard (cited above), such an economic argument, that the workforce has to be dispersed flexibly, can serve a partial answer to the question of how decentralization is possible. That is, to the extent the first two accounts lack a clear and distinct telos, the economic-materialist account of cities can supply the lack to some extent.

Such an account will almost always take the form of a series of putative causes having certain economic effects. For example, schooling is often a major budget item in a city:

The cycle began in 1957 with the launch of Sputnik and the national drive to surpass the Russians in space. In

<sup>80</sup>*ibid.*, p. 199

<sup>81</sup>And it seems to me Weber's account, with only minor corrections, remains a prominent expression of the doctrine.

<sup>82</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 107f

1956 we spent \$388 per child in our elementary and high schools. By 1964 that figure (corrected for inflation) had risen to \$493 .... At the same time schools became a focus of the civil rights revolution. We believed that education could provide equal opportunity for everyone if it were adequately funded .... The wave crested shortly thereafter and the reasons were not all bad. We had built up the schools, in part, to beat the Russians to the moon, and we beat the Russians to the moon.

Understanding how these funds were allocated, and for what intent, and how, with the change of intention, a reallocation occurred, assists in the explanation of how the city progresses from one status to another. The difficulty of *post hoc ergo propter hoc* is largely disregarded.

The importance of the economic perspective is recognized by the sociological establishment; Park and Burgess gave credence to such arguments in their pioneering studies early in the 20th century:

The city is not, however, merely a geographical and ecological unit; it is at the same time an economic unit. The economic organization of the city is based on the division of labor. The multiplication of occupations and professions within the limits of the urban population is one of the most striking and least understood aspects of modern city life....<sup>84</sup>

R

Given the elements of an economic explanation of the city, and how such an explanation interfaces with more basic sociological analyses, just what does the doctrine say of the city:

The economists, late comers to the study of the city, see it in two lights. First, as a matrix of locations for firms—a necessary translation of a national economy into space. Second, and more pertinent to our inquiry, some economists have been turning toward an image of the city as an economic unit—a kind of super firm, based upon relations between importers and exporters, contractors

<sup>83</sup>F. Levy, A. J. Meltsner, and A. Wildavsky, *Urban Outcomes*: Berkeley (UC), 1974; p. 24f

<sup>84</sup>Park & Burgess, op. cit., p. 2

### "Urban Material"

and subcontractors (with the household as the smallest firm) all involved in an import-export business.<sup>85</sup>

This summary expresses two fundamental economic beliefs, that linear progress, meaning the development of new industry and trade, is essential to a competitive open economy, the which is predicated of most societies in the modern age, <sup>56</sup> and that cities are the places where the dynamics of human interaction favor such linear progress. <sup>57</sup>

Specifically, the kind of city which such a theory favors (as was suggested previously) is a relatively fluid urban region, in which a labor pool can be shifted with some ease as the demands upon it change:

The extension of industrial organization, which is based on the impersonal relations defined by money, has gone forward hand in hand with an increasing mobility of population. The laboring man and the artisan fitted to perform a specific task are compelled, under the conditions created by city life, to move from one region to another in search of the particular kind of employment which they are fitted to perform. The tide of immigration which moves back and forth between Europe and America is to some extent a measure of this same mobility.<sup>88</sup>

approximate % total employment

	city size	internal	external	ten-fold
1,000	21	79	_	
10,000	32	68	14	
100,000	43	57	16	
1,000,000	54	46	19	
10,000,000	65	35	24	

Approximate % of "remaining" external employment "captured" by increasing city size

Larger cities, under such a doctrine, are preferable to smaller ones; they better fulfill the economic expectations, are more self-contained, more efficient, and make greater progress faster. This table compares employment increases in the city, with that from outside the city, as city

<sup>85</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 7 Cf: Jacobs, op. cit., passim. Jacobs adopts this metaphore of city-asfirm, it appears, but only as one perspective on a complex object.

<sup>86</sup>Thompson in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 166

<sup>87</sup>ibid.

<sup>88</sup>Park & Burgess, op. cit., p. 17

size increases. The last figure reflects the absolute increase in workers as a result of a city's being larger, including external workers also coming to work "in town." Using economic doctrine to supply a  $\tau\epsilon\lambda$ o $\varsigma$ , to accommodate linear progress, fits with the predeliction toward urban regionalization.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the economic account of cities derives from the waxing part of any budget which is tied to government expense; it is commonly accepted that between 20% and 25% of a given locality's population in a first-world society is directly or indirectly employed by the government. To the extent economics has become increasingly a study of the way in which governments spend money, and cities are governmental entities, the economic account may best serve as the justification of the late-modern, first-world city, despite internal contradictions and informal fallacies committed.<sup>90</sup>

C

We are thus led to the last of the accounts with which this chapter will be concerned, the governmental bureaucratic line of thought about cities as material entities. This derives, as I believe, from the importance economics has secured to itself, and some linking comment seems in order. The relation of economics to administration is simply demonstrated by the theory of government budgeting, if that is not too snide a title for it:

An administrator's [budget] request will depend in part on where his funds come from. It has been suggested that the lower limit for an administrator's request is his current year's allocation; for administrators of general monies programs this allocation is an upper limit as well. Recent budget cuts have made these administrators so pessimistic that holding on to the current allocation is something of a victory.<sup>91</sup>

The different sources produce different behavior patterns, to be sure. <sup>92</sup> Access to federal funds has usually been considered to most desirable, as contributing to major departmental growth. <sup>93</sup>

<sup>89</sup>Ullman in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 75

<sup>90</sup>Levy et al., op. cit., p. 30

<sup>91</sup>*ibid.*, p. 47

<sup>92</sup>*ibid.*, p. 48

<sup>93</sup>*ibid.*, p. 49

### "Urban Material"

#### IV

If the three previous doctrines have been explanatory, the last is deon-tological; it dictates a pattern of action for a responsible governmental apparatus. This pattern of action is to address the needs of the well-to-do in the city, and the underprivileged city-dwellers, the first because they are influential and the second group lest they become bothersome, presumably. Interestingly, to the extent one is middle-class, the evidence is one's particular interests will be ignored.<sup>94</sup>

While a substantial portion of a city's resources will be devoted to serving the poor, this will inevitably be connected with a certain reluctance. It is a bureaucratic "good" insofar as such programs draw money into the city's economic and social institutions; it is an evil in that the dispersal of these resources never benefits the large middle-class of the city, to which the bureaucrats themselves belong.<sup>95</sup>

Another typical principle of urban bureaucracy is to disparage lesser urban agglomerations and the suburbs; one is reminded of the Mayor of New York who so misspoke an upstate city, and thereby foreclosed his opportunity to become Governor. Thobjection is similar to the objection to social welfare projects carried out in the city; the cost is borne by the city for suburban welfare, while the city derives only peripheral benefit at best. For example, the city provides a mass transit system, the benefit of which extends to suburbs who bear little of the cost. A city provides a wide selection of civic services to suburban dwellers who work in the city, but who bear little if any of the cost for these services. Briefly, the "principle" results from a factual perception of higher echelons diverting resources to non-civic ends, and to the coöption of the civic bureaucracy into this reallocation.

The great problem the city bureaucrat addresses is responsiveness to the changing city. Policies tend to remain the same, just as neighborhoods and urban populations change character with some speed.<sup>97</sup> This constant flux is not well addressed by the standard social scientific or public-

<sup>94</sup>*ibid.*, p. 219

<sup>95</sup>Thompson in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 167

<sup>96</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 4f The response is usually to claim outlying regions are actually carrying the city. Taking New York as an example, there is good evidence that suburbs and even rural areas benefit from cities without much return.

<sup>97</sup>Levy et al., op. cit., p. 12

administrative theories; as a result, the city bureaucrat is often at a loss for theoretical grounds for providing such a responsive public policy. A trivial example is the matter of public libraries. To build a new library facility may take years, in which the reason for its construction may disappear, or shift. To add correctly to the collection, or improve facilities in place already, will similarly demand some planning, which in turn may be obsolete by the time funding and action can be brought to bear on the perceived need, vitiating the project.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>98</sup>ibid., p. 195

# AGENCIES OF URBAN CHANGE

If Descartes was not the first, he was surely the most influential of the thinkers who asserted the impossibility of knowing final causes. He plainly asserts such causes to be beyond the ken of human reason, and commands the restriction to what can be discovered by the light of nature. Explicitly, Descartes limits this to efficient causality; implicitly, since effect must be upon something, he admits material causes as well, though it must be allowed that material cause in modern philosophy is probably different from whatever that concept may have meant to late-archaic Greeks.<sup>1</sup>

In the last chapter, what seem to be the principal doctrines, in sociology and other social-scientific disciplines, as to the elements of which cities are composed, were summarized and interpreted. "Urban material," so understood, seems to me to fulfill all the actual philosophical requirements for matter; the elements are not particular, nor "of a certain quantity nor assigned to any of the categories by which being"—in this case, the being of cities—"is determined."<sup>2</sup> Even people, in this perspective seen as urban dwellers, are merely potentially citizens; likewise, the system of interactions of which the functionalists treat are merely potentially civic interactions; and so on. The argument for the inadequacy of socialscientific doctrines about cities is that there is no clear way for them to make, from a list of material elements, specifically and uniquely urban matter. What results misses what the city is. To the extent social scientific accounts of cities are entirely, or even largely, devoted to a description of material, or the "elements" of cities, those accounts fail to show the city as participating in the changing character of human existence. But, if the city is the hypotyposis of human community—the underlying thesis of this study—then some agency by which cities change to mirror changes in the human condition, needs to appear.

Some parts of what has been already defined as urban material, specifically, some kinds of urban dwellers and some internal interactions, will be reinterpreted as agencies whereby action and change is effected in

<sup>1</sup>Descartes, *Philosophical Works*: Cambridge, 1975; p. 230f (principle XXVIII). Passages in the later Meditations suggest he was not so absolute as the Principles passage would lead one to believe.

<sup>2</sup>Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1029a20 (Ross's translation)

the city. This is more in accord, so it would seem, with the original understanding of the moving cause, than it is with a more modern understanding. The modern sense of efficient cause imparts to such agency of change some conception of mechanism. We say, "someone caused this" or "something is the cause of this;" we model the conception of causality upon the prevalent understanding of action as "motivated." That is, to the extent one wills some action, that will is determined in one or another way. It is the way in which modern social science is compelled to conceive the cause, so it seems.<sup>3</sup>

The mechanical agency can be understood as a strictly individual agency, vesting responsibility for creation in a person, the agent of change. Or, the perception of efficient cause as possibly mechanized, motivated, but lacking purposefulness, is not the only possible construction of events, as Kant noted in *The Critique of Pure Reason*.<sup>4</sup>

It is a matter for another time to really explore the contradiction this involves. Here, I simply summarize it: Modern social science asserts a species of motivation which is free of purpose. At the same moment, the same social science advances both a conception of willed action and of purpose. The former position is consistent with the rejection of final causality (and implicitly, of formal causality); the latter position is consistent with the waxing importance of individuality, especially in Western thought, and thought under the dominance of Western ideology. The former position, it may be argued, has held sway since the inception of modernity; the latter position has deeper roots, in classical notions of action, carried over into Christian thought interested in advancing a concept of individual responsibility for sin and redemption.<sup>5</sup>

The presence of such a contradiction in the social-scientific position is grounds for holding it suspect.

<sup>3</sup>This conception of motivation has been presented in part in the previous chapter; one way, but only partly correct, of reading the present part of the study is as an expansion on that notion of psychological motivation. However, there is more than merely psychological motivation at work in political agencies of change, obviously.

<sup>4</sup>Critique of Pure Reason, antinomies

<sup>5</sup>See Heidegger, whose point is ancillary to his discussion in the title essay of *The Question Concerning Technology...*: New York (HarRow) 1977, especially p. 8f. This is also a prinipal theme of the various works of Hannah Arendt, as already indicated. The problem with the Christianization of the concept of the individual has been a concomitant privatization, so that the individual exists only as an individual so that public action is impossible to think. But this notion was already developing in the classical world; one is tempted to think it may have had something to do with the accession to imperium of the Graeco-Roman culture.

I

Perhaps the most obvious agency of change in cities is "the machine." This political organization of city dwellers dominates city politics in ways increasingly less evident at higher echelons of government. The complexity of power precludes the limitation of the group exercising power to a small and intimate group meeting constantly (as opposed to frequently) with each other.

The corporate nature of the city, and its visibility as such, allows of the formation of a political organization:

Anyone who has heard the Viziers of City Hall in a great metropolis refer proudly to "The City" is disabused of the notion [that the corporate entity does not exist]. No matter how the rulers are recruited, they control a polity most immediately felt by the citizen, for they rule him "where he lives."

The quality of this corporate sense varies to some extent from polity to polity, dependent upon the relative strength of a mayor vis-a-vis other politically influential persons in and out of the machine, and vis-a-vis the permanent bureaucracy of the city. Wood notes: "Charles Adrian's exploration of city manager governments [a form in which the permanent civil service is ascendant] suggests...the interjection of strong institutional biases in favor of business, and middle-class definitions of needs and requirements; a contrary influence is often attributed to the mayoralty office in large cities." To the extent the machine is genuinely political, it necessarily recruits its members from all parts of the city's population perceived as embodying the corporate high culture. Its principal concern is the ability of new member to deliver votes.

The machine rewards the successful political leader in various ways, appropriate to his position in or relative to the machine. A *quid pro quo* is established. The supply of political "gravy" is renewed through the efforts

<sup>6</sup>The highest echelons of city government need to coopt influential people extrinsic to the machine, who have expert knowledge or special connections. Notice, in the Apology, Socrates recounts how the Oligarchs aimed at his cooption; the appointment of a senior financial person such as the head of Lazard Freres in New York, during its crisis, is not dissimilar.

<sup>7</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 21

<sup>8</sup>Wood in Eldridge, op. cit., I, p. 203

<sup>9</sup>See W. L. Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*: New York (Dutton) 1963; esp. "How to Become A Statesman." This wonderful set of political observations remains unchallenged as a picture of classical city politics.

of these political leaders and other activists within the machine, so that the system has something of  $perpetuum\ mobile$  to it.<sup>10</sup>

The corporate sense itself appears to derive from the proximity of nominal rulers and those they nominally rule. It is "nominal," since it is clear that close proximity, and indeed the mutual reliance inherent in the political situation (where the political leader needs his constituents, and the constituents rely upon the local politician and his connections to see to their interests), mitigates the separation normally implied in the ruler/ruled concept. This, linked to the sense of neighborhood, the local political leader's proper *milieu*—and through his hierarchy of connections, to the city as a whole—seems to result in a sense of limit and of communal, corporate identity from within the civic body which connects, in some, as yet unspecified way, with the urban limitations established in law:

Capitalizing upon the loyalties of the residents to their national political party, staffed with government employees and the politically aspiring, the big city machine weaves together the interests of the familistic communities of the outer city, the workingmen's neighborhoods, and the ethnic-identified populations. Built upon precinct and ward, it approximates the neighborhood and the local community, and the total population has available to it opportunities for participation in and representation before the urban polity.<sup>11</sup>

The politics of the city machine will vary according to time, place and political system. In a modern U. S. city, for example, the following picture might have obtained:

Along with Republican voters, the leaders of the business community have gone to the suburbs. Equally important is the loss of the middle-level cadres of the middle class—the aspiring junior executives and young lawyers, the educated and politically inclined club women, the small businessmen. These are the people who could constitute an effective organizational middle class for the electoral contests of the city. Their disappearance from the scene leaves those economic leaders who remain in the city...far up in the organizational stratosphere, with no links to the

<sup>10</sup>Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit., p. 70

<sup>11</sup>Greer, op. cit., p. 145

mass of voters. And the latter are, increasingly, union members, ethnics and confirmed Democrats.<sup>12</sup>

Political affairs are always in flux; the younger middle class has been staying in town more and more over the last decade or so, marrying—and more importantly, having children-later, and pursuing careers in whitecollar professions and businesses mandating a city-centered life. 13 Interestingly, this change in the socio-economic complexion of the city need not result in a radical change in the city's political machine. In New York, e. g., long a Democratic bastion, desiring election to city office virtually demands membership in the Democratic "mainstream." This is, if anything, enhanced by the influx of "Northeast Liberal Establishment" types, who find no easy fellowship with the local Republican organization (even though that machine is as, or more, liberal in practice as is the Democratic organization). Then there is the strong union activity in New York, which tends to ally itself more comfortably with Democratic positions, typically. What is especially significant is the development of strong middle-class unions in the city; the civil service union is but one of these. But these are not the same Democrats as those of but a decade previous. The city's machine has had to alter its own self-understanding accordingly.

The rule seems to be to please as many people as possible, not simply a majority, but rather as many of the minorities—and their special interests—as can be accommodated given the exigencies of the city's immediate circumstances and foreseeable path.<sup>14</sup>

In Chicago, for example, at the beginning of the '50s, a principle issue was that of government-sponsored housing. An inner city is well-built-up. Where it might be possible to locate new housing becomes a political problem at several levels: It is necessary to decide what developed land can be taken to use for this redevelopment. It is necessary to decide whose interests will be served—bureaucrats in charge of the project, developers, likely residents, owners of the property to be appropriated to the new use, and most importantly, residents (voters!) whose neighborhoods will be disturbed, and will be dispersed in relocation.

<sup>12</sup>*ibid.*, p. 158f

<sup>13</sup>One of the strangest phenomena in late modernity—and a phenomenon largely taken up only by the Hegelian Left—is the new white collar laboring class, well-educated and thoroughly coopted in some places, revolutionaries in others; cf: A. W. Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Riseof the New Class*: New York (Continuum), 1979.

<sup>14</sup>This is sound political theory; cf: Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic: (Oxford ), passim.

In Chicago the compromises made involved scaling down the size of the redevelopments in a number of instances, choosing to use city park land, and concentrating development in such a way as not to disturb too many citizens, even though this meant intensive use—indeed, over-use!—of the areas selected for the development.<sup>15</sup>

The principle people involved in such a compromise are those who are most central to the political machine's *perpetuum mobile*.<sup>16</sup> They are the able politicians who can actually understand the issues at stake, who are certain of themselves and their judgment, and have the right to believe their judgment will be ratified by their return to office—in short those who can rely on their sense of the will of the machine and of the voters who support it. They are also men able to keep their own counsel until the time for disclosure is ripe:

The people who had to be convinced [on the matter of public housing in Chicago] were the other "Big Boys." As Duffy later explained, "Out of the 50 aldermen you get 12 or 15 who you have confidence in—who you can trust and who are able; some of them are able, but you can't trust them—you wouldn't be out of a room 15 minutes when the newspapermen would know all about it." The able and trustworthy aldermen were (Duffy said) "the fellows who do the thinking in the Council" and most of them were also chairmen of important committees. It was with this inner circle of leaders and powerholders that he collaborated in shaping a compromise housing program.<sup>17</sup>

While this political process has been described in many places, any such description misses the actual character of the events described. It is too easy to ideologize the event, to see it in terms of a fixed set of values and ideals, and finally, as either nominally "good" or "evil." The inadequacies of such a view are numerous and have been catalogued elsewhere. Most especially, the tendency to see this political process as mechanical—we refer to its operators as "the machine"—misses the

<sup>15</sup>Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit., pp. 130, 253. This study, while dated as to its issue, nevertheless depicts faithfully the process which still obtains. Cf: Frank, Meltsner and Wildavsky, *Urban Outcomes*: Berkeley (U. C.), 1974.

<sup>16</sup>This is perhaps an obsolete concept in natural philosophy (where it may never have belonged, in the first place), but seems to remain central, as telos in political philosophy.

<sup>17</sup>Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit., p. 196

<sup>18</sup>See R. Panikkar, Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics: New York (Paulist), 1979; chapter 2.

genuinely careful and often exceedingly altruistic character of the process.<sup>19</sup> The politician cannot, finally, fail to have the interests of his constituents at heart; he will not be returned at the next election if his interests are perceived to diverge too greatly from those of the voters. And the machine is not interested in a politician who cannot deliver.<sup>20</sup>

Generally, the machine limits itself to the authentically political aspects of city policy making. The actual development of projects is carried out by the permanent civil service, and largely executed by them within the limits set by the general policies approved in the political forum. However, in some instances, it may be appropriate for the political leadership to intervene, as this description of politics in the Californian city of Oakland indicates:

There are two kinds of intrusions by top city policy-makers into project decision-making. The first is for a project which the (city) manager and council believe necessary to fulfill their own city policies. The second is seen when the council acts as a sounding board for public opinion, bringing the influence of citizen groups into street planning. Here the council may either initiate or scrap projects. Of course, the council has the last word, and unless engineers can convince the councilmen to change their minds, political projects usually get top priority.<sup>21</sup>

One example of the first kind of intervention is an expressway connecting the city proper with the Oakland airport. At the time (the early '50s), Oakland's airport was served by a minor road; the area was experiencing significant development beyond the capacity of that road; a major roadway was needed quickly to service that growth. The state had in fact planned to build a freeway along the same route, but this was deemed unsatisfactory due to the anticipated delay in construction; moreover, "the mayor at that time decided the city had about enough freeways. The three

<sup>19</sup>Ferkiss, op. cit., p. 50f

<sup>20</sup>Though such politicians may find a new life as a bureaucrat. This apotheosis is often quite pitiful, as that of Sen. Muskie in the State Secretariat, or that of Sen. Hayakawa as head of a movement to promote English as an official language. City politicians most often return to private life, as the city bureaucracy offers fewer places for non-civil- servants.

<sup>21</sup>Frank, et al., op. cit., p. 122

freeways constructed since 1950 had taken enough land off the Oakland tax rolls."22

The policy at stake here is clear; a new industrial area would succeed, benefiting the city as a whole, or fail, if this highway was not built. Moreover, the city already had the requisite right-of-way, and could go ahead immediately. If the city waited for higher echelons to act, the result would not only be the likely decay of a project needed for the economic viability of the city, but also the loss of land taxes to the general fund, with concomitant reductions in the city's ability to carry out other policies. There was, therefore, an interaction of a number of policies important to the city's political organization, and the development of the cross-town expressway was the vehicle to serve all of them.

Having made this commitment to the airport development, the city found itself in an ongoing project. For example, some 18 years later, the airport's development had reached the point where further highway construction was required. This development had been indicated for some while, but it was the direct intervention of the city manager which made possible the allocation of funds to secure additional right-of-way to support such construction. Something rather central to the phenomenon of the political machine is illustrated: It is very much "ad hoc" in its thinking. It tends to solve problems as they arise with limited consideration of the future problems, commitments, etc., which such a resolution may involve.

In the case of Oakland's airport and its connecting roads, issues originally important—such as keeping land on the tax rolls—lost vitality down the line, and were eventually subverted by the need for more and better connections to the airport. [Interestingly, the same problem cropped later, with a completely different import.]<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup>ibid.

<sup>23</sup>*ibid.*, p. 124

<sup>24</sup>In New York, another example is illustrative; the West Side Highway as designed was a satisfactory—though hardly perfect—solution to the problem of motor transport on Manhattan's west side. But as designed, it required a certain level of maintenance and a concept of appropriate limits to use. Absent that requisite maintenance, for which inadequate provision was made, the highway rapidly fell into disrepair. Excessive commercial use by heavier trucks aged the system faster than regulated use would have. A very real issue in the construction of its successor as proposed will be the ability to build into the civic highway maintenance apparatus a capacity to maintain the more sophisticated system the new highway represents; this involves, principally, political decisions.

The other case for direct intervention by higher echelons in project development and execution can also be illustrated from events in the city of Oakland. City redevelopment plans involve interaction among politicians in a political way. But other policy issues important to political leaders are at work. In Oakland, the decision to largely override mere engineering considerations, and expend both general funds and gas-tax revenues on certain highway and secondary road reconstruction was dictated by its being deemed a contribution of the city for government matching funds, at a rate of three federal dollars for every one expended by the city. This influx of money meant not only that needed redevelopment would be accomplished, but also there would be more "gravy" to be distributed, more political capital.

In the formal political apparatus, "the machine" of modern city politics one sees the most obvious agent of civic change. It is strictly civic, in that it is constituted by citizens, and remains necessarily responsive to them, though this relation can for short periods be subverted by other, non-civic powers.<sup>25</sup>

#### H

"The machine" is a formal political apparatus; it is limited by its formality:25

The urban political process is not directly concerned with the provision of goods and services, except when these "problem solving" activities can be translated into useful resources for the resolution of political conflict or its avoidance, or when, at infrequent intervals, in times of breakdown and emergency, an outright failure of law and order seems imminent....<sup>27</sup>

One might consider New York's community-board structure as a minimum formal political response to a conflict-laden situation. The issues which are brought before the local community board are varied and include land use, local fire and police protection, and general matters of civic concern. The machine uses such community liaison groups (and in New

<sup>25</sup>As, e. g., quasi-governmental bureaucratic agents, higher governmental echelons with no civic connection, and interest groups whose interests are essentially non-civic, or cannot be reconciled with the larger consensus.

<sup>26</sup>Put another way, subpolitical matters, in this context, are subordinated to the political. 27Wood in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 199; cf: Greer, op. cit., p. 169

York, there is a hierarchy of such groups from local level to borough level) to de-fuse conflict in a manner not unlike the more personal agency of the local ward politician of half a century ago. But the limits of the political quid pro quo are reached when the machine cannot provide one constituent group's needs without alienating another group. That sort of action would impede the machine's perpetuum mobile. In that instant, the machine is stalemated.

#### Α

At the same time, there are things which need to be done which do produce conflicts. The effective way of addressing them is to spur citizen activism. This sort of activism has its origin in a private citizen's call to his fellow-citizens:

Pulitzer had discovered, while he was editor of the St. Louis Post Dispatch, that the way to fight popular causes was not to advocate them on the editorial page but to advertise them—write them up—in the news columns. It was Pulitzer who invented muckraking. It was this kind of journalism which enabled Pulitzer, within a period of six years, to convert the old New York World, which was dying of inanition when he took it, into the most talked about, if not the most widely circulated, paper in New York City.<sup>25</sup>

Clearly a call to action is popular. Putting aside the penchant for the sensational, it might also be that a citizen finds in the call an opportunity to affirm his citizenship—his individual duty to act, on the one hand, and having the satisfaction of that action ratified in the polity in which he exists, on the other. There is some historical evidence this latter reaction is common to human enclaves. Weber notes that the civic guilds in China and the brokerages of ancient Mesopotamia conduced to group action in the affirmation of group interests, as was the case of urban parties in Western civilization.<sup>20</sup>

There have been, typically, two manifestations of citizen action groups—one more or less ad hoc, and capable of only demonstrative activity (frequently the participants are clients of the old ruling classes or new

<sup>28</sup>Park and Burgess, op. cit., p. 95

<sup>29</sup>Weber, op. cit., p. 120. Weber wishes to assert the uniqueness of the Western militaristic response; this seems to be beside the point.

authoritarian influences) and what today would be called a "legitimate" assembly.<sup>30</sup> These two varieties are pervasive, so it seems, in the history of cities, and are most frequently understood to be ad hoc or legitimate by the kind of activities they undertake. The latter sort rapidly is assimilated to the machine, is in fact a new machine. It is a species of revolution for citizens to gather together recognize other as peers, and assume management of their own affairs.

The *ad hoc* action group is interesting for the variety of forms it takes, and the way in which it complements a legitimate political establishment. A single citizen, if sufficiently active, may constitute an action group; if successful, he may become the nucleus of such a group, standing opposed to the established machine. Meyerson and Banfield document a typical example:

Stech showed his visitor a stack of his correspondence with city and county departments in which he asked for services and made complaints on behalf of the neighborhood. The county, it seemed,, had dug up the street in order to lay water pipe on Archer Avenue and it had never put the street back in suitable condition. Stech had threatened to sue the county if the street was not fixed. It was fixed. The trees along the road presented another problem; they were so large that they were dangerous to both drivers and pedestrians. When a man broke his glasses on a protruding branch, Stech again threatened suit and the trees were promptly trimmed. Then the Santa Fe Railroad built a pig pen in the area; Stech and his organization made such a commotion that it was soon removed.<sup>31</sup>

Such actions seem not to be counterproductive, but this typically nonestablishment citizens'-action organization is almost always a single-issue group; in the case here cited, the issue is the welfare of a certain limited locale. The problems such a group poses becomes evident when it expands its power. In the case of this particular group, the expansion came when Stech became leader in the Southwest Neighborhood Council. The interests of the city as a whole, and the city-wide policy of creating public

<sup>30</sup>*ibid*. p 122

<sup>31</sup>Meyerson and Banfield, op. cit., p. 109

housing, were stymied by this enhanced group's vocal opposition.<sup>32</sup> Effectively, the city was held hostage to a small group's local issue.

Ad hoc and legitimate groups converge,<sup>30</sup> but the ad hoc group isn't ever a fully legitimate partner. Its representation is too limited. Yet it is powerful because of the single special interest it espouses. Indeed, the singleness acts as a focus. It is not infrequently totalitarian in the strict sense, in that its understanding of a situation is based upon an evaluation, the key value of which is that held by the leader at the center of the group, which value organizes a totality of values, and which is adopted by others in the group without criticism. Such a group stands opposed to the genuinely political judgment which is reflective and critical in character.<sup>34</sup> Such a group's singleness of purpose and of structure allows it to bully the legitimate body-politic, which has to contend with the reconciliation of diverging opinions. In the event it can expand, it may, if it so chooses, utterly supplant legitimate government, as a number of totalitarian national regimes have demonstrated.

B

To understand the tension between legitimate, polity-wide, compromissory governmental machines and illegitimate, special-interest, single-issue groups, it is helpful to see the propensity for the latter is rooted in the most basic experiences and prejudices of the species.

First, there is the propensity of humankind to identify itself with the universe of which it is a part, on a one-to-one basis:

<sup>32</sup>*ibid.* p. 109f

<sup>33</sup>This is most obviously the case at times of political revolution; in the case of the U. S., local committees of safety spawned Continental Congresses (themselves pressure groups representing only a powerful minority), which subsequently framed the emergence of the constitutional and legitimate U. S. government some 14 years later. Something of the same progression, with very different outcome seems tracable in the transition from local soviets and a breakaway communist faction, to an hierarchical government in bolshevik Russia. Revolutions are, of course, infrequent and always *sui generis*, so it is awkward to draw grand conclusions from one or two of them. But the convergence of ad hoc and legitimate assemblies, and the possiblity of progression from one to the other, through revolution or cooption, seems a safe bet.

<sup>34</sup>Cf: Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (Doubleday 1961), p. 106; see also Kant, Critique of Judgement §74—the judgment which Kant calls "critical" is an absolute as opposed to merely relative judgment, and truly political judgment is of this sort, as has been clear from Plato to the present.

Some systems of man-universe correspondence were fully elaborated only in the higher cultures (India, China, the ancient Near East, Central America). Yet their point of departure is already present in archaic cultures. Primitive peoples have revealed to the investigator systems of anthropo-cosmic homologies of extraordinary complexity, which bear witness to an inexhaustible capacity for speculation. Such is the case, for example, with the Dogon in French West Africa. 35

Articulating such an homology, a human being comes up against the problem of his own existence as at once private and public.

As the articulation begins to manifest itself in the social sphere, "social differences tend to intensify personal differences, yielding enhanced individuation..."

- A discrimination of differences as well as likenesses, between the discriminating organism and others. The world is increas-ingly divided into two orders, that which is termed "I," "me," and "mine," and that somewhat residual category of the "other."
- 2. The discriminating organism also develops a sense of or belief in its own power, a belief that it can influence, cause, or control things in a sphere around it. In short, it acquires a conception of will.
- 3. The organism makes its discriminations; it distinguishes between times of alertness and times of quiescence, of shaped awareness and of formless nonawareness; there is not simply the fact of attachment and commitment to objects but a knowledge of such involvements; there is not merely a set of beliefs concerning such involvements but a scrutiny of them; there is not merely a self but a contemplation of the self. Thus the self develops and entails self-consciousness, becoming an object to itself.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>35</sup>Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*: New York (HarBrace), 1959; p. 169. The objection, that such homologies do not obtain in nominally high culture will not wash; modern natural science does the same sort of identification of human and cosmic domains, and seeks if anything to establish that homology with greater certainty than has hitherto been the case. Sociobiology and related notions, the current accepted doctrine in many circles, is one vehicle for this. Perhaps the best commentator on this is Hannah Arendt in her various examinations of the way in which politics has mutated in the modern Western high culture.

<sup>36</sup>Gouldner & Peterson, op. cit., p. 39f. I find the passages from Royce, quoted above and elsewhere in this volume, concur in this view of the essential tension between private and public—which is what this is all about. In short, this is not a novel notion, and has been

All this has immediate and practical effect. Identification with the universe, of the species, but also of the individual, as the homology develops, coupled with the increasing discrimination of the species and society from the individual, with a concomitant diminution of the former in the reflection of the latter (or at least, the public sphere is deemed merely problematic, in the technical sense of being merely possible, by the individual), has political consequences. The question of the independence of the individual, and the fulfillments of his perceived needs and desires, becomes increasingly central to his self-understanding. This concern with the "delivery of services" is reflected in a new orientation for the political sciences, away from a mere description of systems and theories of government and the machines they produce:

We need to know much more about the dis-tribution of community services than about the presumed determinants of that distribution. We need to be able to tell what the performance of urban government is, measured both objectively and subjectively, in a range of groups and neighborhoods, in order to see how it relates to various community traits, including the distri-bution influence.<sup>37</sup>

That such a shift in orientation has taken place is fairly well shown by a shift in terminology; what were once call "Government" departments are now called "Political Science" departments. Coincident with the change in terms, there has been a change in courses of instruction; where once the emphasis was in the "public law" area, now the focus is on service-delivery and its agents, assessed quantitatively. Since it appears services are frequently delivered as a response to and through the agency of individual citizens and citizen special-interest groups—a species of pluralism supplanting a degree of unity, as suggested above—the study of politics proper devolves into a study of mere agencies of change and efficient causality, much interpreted. and prominent among which are action groups.

These agents of change, the individual or small single-issue group citizen-activist groups, generally operate in a negative fashion. In the ex-

perturbing those looking at society for quite awhile. It does seem, however, that late-modernity experiences this tension in an especially exacerbating fashion. I am inclined to think this arises from a belief that the imprecision of the domain of human action can finally be resolved coming up squarely against the failure and increasing eccentricity of the assumptions upon which this belief is founded vis-a-vis the real world.

<sup>37</sup>R. C. Fried, cited in Frank et al., op. cit., p. 8

<sup>38</sup>Also cf: ibid, p. 13

ample given above, the negative quality was expressed in the threat to sue. This same citizen, when in a position to influence a larger audience, used his power to prevent the development of public housing, to stymie the overall policy of the polity. Another example of this may be found in the development of new roadways:

Opposition to a project generally appears after the project has been budgeted but before design or construction is begun. Usually residents of an area first discover that their street is being widened or reconstructed when the city begins to survey the land and acquire property.... If opposition arises, the complaints are handled directly by the city engineer and his assistant.... His approach seems to be that of explaining his point of view rather than listening to grievances.<sup>30</sup>

When special interest groups seek to advocate a change in policy, their "natural" ally is sometimes, but not inevitably, the other major non-political agency of change, the bureaucratic structure. When that alliance in not fruitful the citizen special-interest group is frequently in a position to exert direct pressure on the policy-making body within the machine.<sup>40</sup>

While the citizen-activist, whether an individual or a member of a group, acts in the city as an agent of change, his activity is largely (and increasingly) private, and often in opposition to the public policy determined by the political establishment. Such activism seeks equity—a term appropriate to private, not public law.<sup>41</sup> To be sure, different notions of equity will be operative in different interest groups:

The equity standard a person chooses to measure plays a crucial role in his judgment of agency performance.... The rich citizen uses equality of opportunity as his standard. The poor citizen is using equality of results as his standard. By applying different standards, [interest groups] can look at the same allocation and arrive at opposite conclusions as to how the agency [delivering services] is performing.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>39</sup>*ibid.*, p. 129

<sup>40</sup>*ibid.*, p. 131, cf. p. 137. See also the alliance involved in Oakland's sanitation program, p. 137.

<sup>41</sup>Cf: Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Indianapolis (B-M) 1965; §39, passim. 42Frank, et al., op. cit., p. 243

#### Ш

The political machine is the mechanism whereby the legitimate intentions of the polity are expressed and executed. Citizen activism, being "single-issue" and "special interest"—and ideologically informed—stymies the execution of polity-wide policy, sometimes inadvertently in this "veto" serving to forge a stronger, more authentic *volunté generale* than would have emerged from an uncriticized political action.

One might view the city bureaucracy as standing between these two agencies of urban change. It is not political (vis-a-vis the city as a whole)—in fact, civil service reform has made it increasingly less so (amply demonstrated by the ability of civil service unions to negotiate as opposed equals with the representatives of the polity.) It is not active in the same way a citizen-activism organization is active; its origins differ too widely. Clearly the city bureaucracy is aligned, to some extent, with the execution of city-wide policy; clearly it claims a special competence for influencing that policy, on the ground of long-time involvement with the management of the city. The bureaucrats' view—as succinctly expressed in the advertisements of a U. S. civil servants union—is that while politicians and their activities come and go, (union member) civil servants of various grades stay on to keep government running smoothly.<sup>43</sup>

### A

The officials work within the financial environment and pursue an incremental strategy, never reviewing the budget as a whole. Rather they take the budgetary base as a constant and make small program and distributional adjustments with an overall budget constraint.<sup>44</sup>

Constancy of program and budgeting for programs is a basic assumption in bureaucratic thinking; the "incremental approach" mentioned

<sup>43</sup>The commercial is an AFCSME promotion. That this does not simply refer to upper-echelon civil servants is evident from the image — a street sweeper cleaning up the mess left by convention delegates. This political importance of civil servants is really something quite unique to Western modernity. The *noblesse de robe* of the high Middle Ages was still circumscribed by middle-class (or lower) birth. Roman freedmen, staffing imperial offices, were still freedmen. A study of Chinese civil service suggests a two-tiered authority: High officials, directly dependent on the throne, were generally at the top of the social hierarchy in their particular territories, while local civil officials — staffing the local offices — were "second class citizens"; cf: Winston Lo, An Introduction to the Civil Service of Sung (Honolulu, 1987), esp. chapters 2 & 3..

<sup>44</sup>Frank, et al., op. cit., p. 26, cf: p.46

is the practice of merely adding to each budget line an amount to cover assumed, desirable expansions and inflationary costs. But the notion that programs, once established, cannot be cancelled also allows of another perspective, that such permanency is assumed as a matter of job-security by civil servants.

There is some merit to this notion. The discharge of civil servants is dependent on a number of factors, of course. To the extent that the notion of a civil service selected on merit alone has been adopted in a polity, discharge is difficult to effect. But a sovereign excuse for dispensing with a corps of civil servants would be the excision of the program such a corps administers; some might be absorbed in other program-administrations, but many would lose their positions. Since the question of just who would lose his position is an open one, a certain solidarity may be expected.

While there is some sense to this perspective, it is not well supported in fact. Most civil servants serve departments relatively understaffed in the first place; they tend to be genuinely convinced of the merits of the services they provide (a conviction which is generally justified); while an element of self-interest is undoubtedly operative, it would be incorrect (and even unjust) to assume it is the sole, or even predominant concern in most bureaucratic decisions.<sup>45</sup>

The conviction that such programs are necessary, and of merit, to the well-being of the polity does govern the advice they afford to the political machine under which they serve; it governs as well the relations between divisions of the civil bureaucracy:

Oakland's engineers have one decision rule for project selection which has little to do with need: undertake capital improvements when costs can be shared with other agencies. Projects selected under this rule may receive priority over others which normally would be considered more important. Because the department cannot expect much from the general fund, cost-sharing is its only readily available means to expand upon the bas of gas tax revenues.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup>That the civil servant is dedicated is evidenced in part by a willingness to tolerate better paid political appointees in parallel jobs, as well as a generally supportive attitude when dealing with the public. *Vid. infra* §C for more on the civil-servant mindset.

<sup>46</sup>Frank, et. al., op. cit., p. 120

This is but a single example; it appears generally the case that a department whose budget is externally constrained will favor projects for which it can expect to receive reimbursement either from a higher-echelon department of from another department of the same echelon, and will assign its priorities accordingly.<sup>47</sup> Some departments will have greater recourse to such strategies than others; e. g., schools and welfare services have recourse to higher echelons' (state and federal) education and social service agencies.

Departments compete, severally among themselves and grouped by service. The competition may take two forms: First, there will be conflicting goals pursued by different departments. The department responsible for the construction of city roadways will tend to understand the central concern of city policy in terms of efficient traffic circulation; it will seek to acquire land to build new roads conducive to that end. This may conflict with the projects of an agency whose aims are the development of commercial property or housing (which also requires land-accumulation). Second, there will be agencies with similar purposes, but different apprehensions of the most effective means to such an end; city planners may understand the complex of redevelopment *cum* road building in such a way as to put them squarely in conflict with the agencies in whose special provinces the individual projects would normally fall.<sup>48</sup>

B

It should be apparent from the preceding remarks that the civil bureaucracy is an interest group—or a series of interlocking interest groups. These series of interests can frequently stand in opposition to the more or less coherent interests of other, non-bureaucratic groups— most notably those of citizen-activists, as was noted before. Taking again the situation documented for Oakland's Streets and Engineering Department as exemplary:<sup>49</sup>

If opposition is intense, engineers may go so far as to study alternative routes or designs.... On the other hand, if the city engineer feels that com-plying with citizen

<sup>47</sup>*ibid.*, p. 119f

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup>*ibid.*, p. 126; cf: Donald Strauss, "Can Computers Help Us Save Democracy?" in *The Forum*, vol. 14, #4 (September, 1984).

<sup>49</sup>It is reasonable to treat it as exemplary; for a comparable study of a northeastern U. S. city, cf: R. Dahl, *Who Governs?*: (Yale ), though this is not so thoroughgoing a piece of work.

demands would be detrimental for traffic or impossible according to engineering considerations, he will not comply with public opinion. *Noncom-pliance is the typical situation.*<sup>50</sup>

The significance of the opposition is a determining factor in the degree of compliance. Churches, schools and hospitals enjoy a level of public support to which engineers are sensitive; "tearing down a school to put in a street is a sure way to waste tax dollars and gain enemies." Confrontation is assiduously avoided in such cases. But when general noncompliance becomes the rule of such professionalized civil servants, citizen-activist groups learn quickly that they must form an alliance with the political machine, which controls the purse of the civil bureaucracy, if they would overturn bureaucratic decisions. The machine's existence being dependent on votes, we have seen previously how this can effectively stymie bureaucratic projects, even if those projects had accorded with the general policies of the machine.

C

The city government is interested in efficiency and economy. It wants to see its money go into inputs that produce the greatest output... and it would like, as well, to reduce the inputs of tax money wherever possible, regardless of potential output.<sup>54</sup>

First, a concept of efficiency is defined. It is no longer the more ancient notion of doing-as-changing (efficio), but doing-as-delivering-mensurable-"outputs." The efficient government does more things for its constituency; the productivity of its agents is well-defined, readily identified and at least qualitatively assessable (and in the figure of d'Oresme, quantifiable, therefore, as a ratio) by appearing as a satisfactory "more."

<sup>50</sup>Frank, et al., p. 129f Emphasis mine.

<sup>51</sup>*ibid*., p. 130

<sup>52</sup>*ibid.*, p. 132

<sup>53</sup>Vid. supra, §II, also Myerson & Banfield, op. cit., passim. For an interesting evealuation of the motivations of civil servants, Frank et al., op. cit., pp. 163ff is well worth examination. For an examination of an entirely different sort of civil service, but with remarkably similar attitudes, cf. ibid., pp. 179, 174ff.

<sup>54</sup>*ibid.*, p. 205

Connected with this, governmental efficacy is linked to economics. This seems in part a corollary of the quantification of quali-tative assessment parenthetically noted above. The proximate source of this evaluative criterion comes from modern social-scientific economics.<sup>55</sup>

The civic demand—deriving from both the policy-making machine which pays the bureaucracy, and from other, citizen-activist and business/labor<sup>56</sup> interest groups which comprise the "organizational environment"—for a mensurable standard of accountability comports well with the apparent motivations of the civil service:

Our bureaucrat is, like all of us, concerned with his own welfare. He views his agency's policies as affecting that welfare. He is interested in the agency's clients primarily as they affect the agency and, through the agency, his own welfare. He cares about his profession, another aspect of the outside environment, as a source of guidance for internal conduct and as a means of furthering his mobility, this increasing his welfare.... The bureaucrat wants to serve the public through a secure career with not too much personal conflict. He expects a stable, and perhaps advancing income for the foreseeable future and gratification for meeting public needs. His personal goals cannot be reconciled unless his organization is stable.... The outstanding characteristic of this organizational environment is that it rewards conforming behavior in behalf of existing interests.... The profession necessarily hands down received wisdom. It encapsulates the experience of its members for getting along in organizations. It seeks to raise the status of the profession by lifting its standards. 57

In fact, the concern for a trouble free environment, in which conflicts with interest groups are minimized—and a concern to avoid the political complications of that non- or extra-professional environment— exacerbates the tendency to conformity within the civil service, with concomitant

<sup>55</sup>This application of the 15th century doctrine of d'Oresme to economics is attraibuted to J. S. Mill by Robert Heilbroner in his *The Worldly Philosophers* (NY 1967), pp 118ff. 56Vid. infra, §IV

<sup>57</sup>Frank, et al., p. 227: One of the difficulties with the abandonment of discussion (largely) to the Hegelian Left of the newly come up *bourgeoisie* is the failure to notice and critique extensively the carry-over in this group of what are commonly understood as "laboring class" attitudes and "values".

avoidance of the controversial. An example can be drawn from the public housing program in Chicago. The Housing Authority's head of planning was a former real estate broker, John M. Ducey. Ducey took the position that the question of integration and ghetto-dissolution be part of the master housing plan:

Ducey's proposal was never acted upon by the Authority, and do it was never sent to the Plan Commission. Informally Ducey received comments from the members of the Plan Commission staff. "It's a nice idea," he later remembered their saying, "but we couldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole. The farther the Plan Commission stays away from the racial issue, the better off it will be." 58

Controversial acts must inevitably be viewed as counterproductive, both subjectively and objectively. The objective assessment of their counterproductivity will rest upon the apprehension that what is controversial cannot be clearly understood qualitatively as better than some less controversial position, even though it need not therefore be qualitatively worse.

The dual objective of trouble free career and ready assessment has an interesting origin-cum-effect—a bureaucratic perpetuum mobile. It results in a profound concern for "good" planning. Some of this was evident in the earlier discussion of the tendency for city engineers to pay less attention to citizen-activist interests than to the dictates of their own professional judgment, if this is not mitigated by political-machine interference. The technical planners themselves see this as overcoming haphazard growth by greater political and technical sophistication:

...The net result of cumulative knowledge may be something novel in urban politics: the capacity of political action actually to contribute decisively to urban form and to touch more fundamental aspects of urban life. In place of cities built by the Invisible Hand and the occasional æsthetic whim of strategically located individuals, there may emerge purposeful public policy which has aspects of

<sup>58</sup>Meyerson & Banfield, op. cit., p. 132. Another example of the same unwillingness to address controversial issues is New York's unwillingness to implement a practical overall industrial development program in the South Bronx.

rationality and clearer satisfactions of public needs attached to it.59

This is an historically and logically naive notion. It misunderstands the histories of cities and city planning; it misunderstands politics in a peculiarly modern way. In the first place, what is here being called the "invisible hand" would seem to be ongoing, ever shifting interchange and consensus-formation by which the polity expresses its goals, altering them to fit an unstable shifting reality. In the second place, the position of which this is an expression would substitute for such an ongoing process embracing both politically legitimate and non-legitimate individuals and groups what one author calls a "goal technician", whose job it would be to formulate "plausible, compatible and feasible values and criteria for consideration by the policy-maker." The extent to which this formulation is influenced by other than interests internal to the goal-formulating group is not clear:

Radical social planners bent on changing the distribution of power and available actions to maximize individual choice and administrative social planners accepting the power distribution and attempting to secure behavior of the wards to conform to the tastes of their guardians are both pushing for social change. The left wishes substantial redistribution so that its clients will be allowed to transform themselves (along the lines of their choosing) while the administrative right wants the clients to transform themselves so that the whole game will work more smoothly, even if the chief beneficiaries of smoother functioning prove to be the more powerful. Examples of these ideal types are not hard to find in city planning. \*\*

In short, though there is a strong professional interest in a kind of divorce from some groups external to the technical planning apparatus,

<sup>59</sup>Wood in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 195

<sup>60</sup>See Vitruvius's *Ten Books...*, also Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (HarBrace, ), also Fustel, *The Ancient City* (Doubleday, ).

<sup>61</sup>Reiner in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 235. This passage has additional interest; it gives the quietus to one strange notion, especially prevalent in theologically informed (especially Roman Catholic) ethical discussions, that "values" can somehow be other than relative. The language used makes very clear that values (outside the hothouse close of philosophical debate) are in favor precisely because they are not absolute. Where they come to be treated as absolute, and as dictating a praxis, the more productive tension of the polity is lost. Vid. infra, §B.

<sup>62</sup>Dyckman in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 263; cf: Meyerson & Banfield, op. cit., p.262 note.

there is a counter-trend toward identification with other external elements. The principal identification is with the body of elected officials. It is increasingly difficult to separate and sharpen the (as I believe, beneficial) tension between political machine and permanent civil service. (8)

The bureaucratic establishment must accomplish this sort of evolution, in order to achieve the trouble-free performance which is a collective and individual purpose. In many cases, it is called upon to perform without clear indication of the duty it is to execute, so that its principally executive role is expanded to include the policy-suggesting (which soon inevitably becomes policy-directing) function. <sup>64</sup> Increasing complexity of expectations co-erces them toward the application of more sophisticated technical means, not simply for determining what policies should be fostered, but for imposing such policies upon the body-politic and its constituent interest groups. <sup>65</sup>

#### IV

So far the groups considered in this summary "phenomenology" of the agencies of change in modern cities have been relatively distinct. The elected political apparatus and its machine is well defined and visible. Citizen-activist groups are generally assessed as important only insofar as they, too, are visible. The civic bureaucracy—despite a tendency to coalesce with the political machine at the upper echelons—nevertheless is readily identifiable. There remains one more, fairly discreet, group which demands acknowledgment, though its existence is not so clear and so readily discussed as is the case with the foregoing groups. This group is the combine of business and labor.

Commonly, labor and business are viewed as polarized into two separate and opposed groups. Vis-a-vis the city, however, they have a

 $<sup>63 \</sup>mbox{Greer}, op. cit., p. 160 f.$  This mitigates the situation noted in Meyerson & Banfield, op. cit., p. 264 note.

<sup>64</sup>Frank, et al., op. cit., p. 15 This evolution is a generally accepted process. Lo, op. cit., accepts a variant of it for traditional China, and in doing so stands in a line of theorising about civil service types that originates in reflections on the British civil service. Commonly, civil servants fall into two classes, an upper, "administrative" class and a lower "executory" class. The former group has accomplished the shift to policy-making; in some civil service structures, service in the latter group is considered a grooming process for eventual advancement to the former group. Other considerations apply, naturally. Personal affiliation is generally important, as is a broader association with such institutions as a school—e. g., a "public school" background in the British establishment, or graduation from "Todai" in Japan.

<sup>65</sup>Ferkiss, op. cit., p. 97

common interest—the city's ongoing economic viability. At the same time, in an increasingly pluralist society, the members of each group will have additional identifications with other groups which are active in city life. Thus a business leader in New York becomes the head of the agency entrusted with the city's fiscal soundness. Union leaders control pension plans the investments of which are solicited by city government. The techniques studied in business schools differ in no important way from those taught in public administration school. <sup>66</sup> Both labor and business are lobbied by citizen-activists, who count leaders of both groups as members.

This bed is still more Procrustean: On some issues, business and labor pursue a common special interest from completely different perspectives—reflecting the expected polarity, but coalescing in related action. On other issues—e. g., the disappearance of an industry vital to the city—both elements may find it politically appropriate to share the same perspective and formulate common plans. How much this will be a marriage of convenience, and whether some lasting bond might be forged, is entirely beside the point.

#### Δ

Greer summarizes the basic position of this business community in the modern U. S. city:

The weakness of the businessman in politics is also partly a result of the massive shift in residence within the governmentally bifurcated metropolis. The population that has moved outward has included the great majority of what was, once, the Republican basis of strength in the central city. The familistic, nonethnic, higher-rank residents have moved to the suburbs....<sup>67</sup> Big business has few "trading cards" for the game of big city politics. It can exercise real power only at the top, for it lacks the troops to contend in the electoral domain. Its chief political force derives from (1) bargaining rights due to party control elsewhere, in the State House or in Washington; and (2) the potency of the newspapers, which are usually Repub-

<sup>66</sup>For example, New York University' teaches business and public admini-stration from one school at the undergraduate level. Yale University's first "B-school" offering was called the School of Public and Private Management.

<sup>67</sup>Frank et al., p. 158

lican in their ideology and which are big business in their own right. As distinguished from "power", businessmen have influence insofar as their opinions, as experts and as folk heroes of American middle-class society, matters to the mayor and his team.<sup>68</sup>

To be sure, the specifics Greer cites are limited to U. S. cities, and apply only unevenly to those. For example, Los Angeles ceased being a centralized city in the first decade of the 20th century. This was considerably before the "quality" departed from the more "downtown" areas for Malibu....

Greer's discussion does apply with a good deal of accuracy to other U. S. cities, especially those of the Northeast. It can be challenged in a couple ways. An important part of the city population exiting to the suburbs was upper middle class, a fairly conservative group in some ways, but—in the Northeast, particularly—determinedly liberal in others. This exodus began in the late-'20s or early-'30s (continuing despite the depression). Veterans returning from World War II swelled the flow, settling not in their old home areas but in new developments in what had hitherto been rural Still another segment of the population leaving the city consisted of working-class tradesmen and their families, now rendered "middle class" by virtue of post-war prosperity. These groups were, traditionally, Democrats. They carried their politics and prejudices with them. What was left in the city was not so much a "pathetic remnant" as a different mix of interests, which naturally manifested in a different polity. In this new polity, business had a very different position than it could maintain when its leaders were constantly on the scene. But change in the resident business community was no new phenomenon.70

As a group, the managerial caste within business does not command sufficient numbers to influence the polity directly in votes, or indirectly through active participation in the machine's political activities—as Greer rightly notes. But when it forges an alliance with its associated workers, it can acquire the voting numbers to command respect and response. This

<sup>68</sup>ibid., p164

<sup>69</sup>The initial indactor seems to have been the loss of the perception that the areas between Los Angeles's center and Santa Monica was not L. A. proper; the final indicator was the dissolution of the local rail net.

<sup>70</sup>D. C. Hammack, *Power and Society* (Russell Sage) discusses the shift in New York's business community at the end of the 19th century; this should be compared with the changes that have occurred more recently.

has been done, often coercively, but in some cases with the active support of laborers—as for the institution of protectionist legislation urged at all levels of U. S. government.

Labor has responded to the power of the managerial caste by developing a complementary caste of union leadership, equally visible and effective in presenting a view which is also complementary (not opposite) to that of the business management. [Interestingly, both castes are themselves nothing, neither capitalists nor entrepreneurs in the case of business, nor laborers in the case of union leadership. They exist as executives in the most literal sense. It seems that their own self-images demand they act to perpetuate this role. Their intentionality comes to resemble that of the civil bureaucracy, in much the same fashion as was presented in the previous sections.]

B

The history of this business/labor alliance dates to before their radical separation—a phenomenon of the first industrial revolution. In the West, it is tied to the development of a "special urban law" which Weber describes as "rational", opposing it to the presumably "irrational" law of the feudal estates. The concentration of power in the hands of especially well-to-do merchants appears to have been a function of being able to contribute more substantially to the maintenance of troops to offset the military power of feudal nobility and princes. The introduction of the concept of the corporation figures here. Weber focusses on this as it developed in England, where the development may have been both earlier and more complete. However, this development had parallels throughout Western Europe, and analogues in other cultural enclaves.

The imperial conception of the *Reichsstadt* seems equally important. During the high Middle Ages, granting privileged corporate status to cities was an attempt (unfortunately unsuccessful) for the imperial regime to reestablish its power base, destroyed by the papacy in the investiture controversy.

<sup>71</sup>Weber, op. cit., p. 111f As always, Weber needs to be taken cum grano salis. Nevertheless, with the caveat that he is still under the sway of a then-already suspect Idealism, which colors his historical analyses to the extent that sometimes the events are almost unrecognizable, Weber gets high marks for pointing out what is anomalous.

<sup>72</sup>*ibid.*, p. 128

<sup>73</sup>*ibid.*, p. 135

In both cases, as Weber notes, the development of civic law and corporate status—both intimately tied up with business carried out in cities—was part and parcel of the extension (or attempted extension) of royal authority over unruly baronage. He where this succeeded, it created a class of well-to-do businessmen dominating the upper echelons of the local polity, and their trafficking with the royal administration. Laboring classes, becoming more distinct as the growth of trade resulted in a centripetal concentration of industry-control in the hands of a smaller number of merchants, tended to become de-classed as citizens. Nevertheless, while de-classed, their interests, both as laborers seeking work and as burghers, remained to some extent bound up with the business leadership. This was not without some tension.

During and after the first industrial revolution (that dependent on steam power, while the later change to electricity represents a "second" industrial revolution), the coöption of labor became politically desirable. It was conducive to relative stability necessary for good business:

Pareto understood that the rapid integration of the workers into the social and political body of the nation actually amounted to "an alliance of bourgeoisie and working people," to the "embourgeois-ment" of the workers, which then, according to him, gave rise to a new system, which he called "Plutodemocracy"—a mixed form of government, plutocracy being the bourgeois regime and democracy the regime of the workers."

<sup>74</sup>*ibid.*, p. 136

<sup>75</sup>A great merchant, such as Jacques Coeur, became an a valued royal partner, while never losing his essentially urban roots, setting him off from the older, landed *noblesse*. These great merchants are quite different, it seems to me, from that other group of *parvenu* nobility, the lawyers who staffed royal courts and chanceries. In Italy and other areas close to the centers of ancient Mediterranean culture, city-based life never really disappeared, and great merchant families more or less continuously dominated events. In these cities, great nobles and the mercantile patriciate became virtually a single dominating class. Another whole set of differences appears to apply in the Middle East, and still another set for the Far East. All this greatly mitigates the value of Weber's analysis, which becomes more appropriately a reflection on northern European experience. However, it seems likely that *analogues* of that experience obtain for other cultures.

<sup>76</sup>*ibid.*, p. 142 note; for an analogous case, cf: p. 226 Notice, by the bye, that burghers are quite different from citizens. In some palces and times, e. g., Geneva as an independent city-state, three general classes existed—aliens, burghers who had limited rights by grace of special act, and citizens proper.

<sup>77</sup>Finer, quoted in H. Arendt, On Violence (New York [HarBrace], 1959), p. 72

The abolition of skilled labor, with its homogenization of labor as labor power, contributed greatly to this coöption. $^{78}$ 

The most recent wrinkle of this development, so far as a study of cities goes, seems to be the abdication to private developers of city development. As cities expand or improve, and this de-velopment is carried out in the private sector, 79 rather than by the city proper (through its own agencies) the city abdicates as well all but the most superficial control on the Its legislation to address defects in standards of that development. development is, historically, taken after a development has proven That is, recent history suggests that the influence of unsatisfactory. business and labor has been maximized, especially so far as city development as some special economic activity of the city is concerned (an activity providing business opportunities and jobs). The political machine perceives this as good, and fosters the relationship at the highest echelons. The city fathers encourage studies showing what a city can do for business, and what (organized) labor and business do for the city.80

### V

In the chapter on urban "material", to describe perspectives on the matter from which cities are composed was to describe the ideology of those holding such views. Matter itself is not an ideologizing subject; understanding matter as a material substrate, shaped or capable of being shaped into something is ideologically informed.

Agency of change, on the other hand, is entirely a matter of the agents' own ideologies. These ideologies may either coexist or even coöperate, or they may conflict. The latter case seems to be part of civil failure, and not particularly interesting in the present context. The overarching ideological unity which marks the coexistence of various agencies of change in cities needs to be summarized, however.

### A

It appears the general ideology under which all agents of change in a city operate may be discovered in the projects un-dertaken in a city, viewed together:

<sup>78</sup>Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1958; p. 90

<sup>79</sup>Frank et al., op. cit., p. 120

<sup>80</sup>Conservation of Human Resources Project, *The Corporate Headquarters Complex in New York City*: New York (Columbia), 1977, p. xxiv ff

Instead of providing amenities—the fountains and tree-shaded squares, the occasional statue and luxurious boulevards—which tend to paint the patina of pride over property values and ward off the ill effects of age, American cities content themselves with public austerity in the name of practicality and free enterprise. Instead of providing a pattern of communal design to benefit the movement and living modes of its people, the city stands indifferently by as each developer pursues his own particular purpose on what is only temporarily his own particular plot of ground.<sup>81</sup>

This "ideology" asserted for U. S. cities is not universal, even for Western European culture. Nevertheless, the picture he paints is of a more or less well-thought-out and adapted perspective as to how the city ought to develop, and the role in that development which various agencies of change should play. So far as that perspective seems perduring, it can be argued there is some overarching ideology under which such agencies interact to produce first a city, and with it an urbanity. In the case cited, the ideology is essentially one of *laissez faire* and the rejection of detailed planning; so this is also a rejection of some of the claims of the civil bureaucracy, for whom the notion of planning is an essential part of their professionalism.

There is a curious tension in this ideology; it seems to operate more broadly than the immediate subculture in which it is discovered would seem to suggest. One of the names for this tensions is "pluralism." It is summarized in the following maxim:

A determined minority in command of its subfield may push its item of public business quickly to the tip of the agenda.<sup>83</sup>

That is, the modern city is not a unified body of citizens; there may never have been a time when a city was unified in that way. Rather, there is a number of minorities comprising the agencies of change, as we have seen, and these admit of additional subdivision. Only one has any claim to represent the will of the polity proper, and that claim may even be a fiction. The others are special interest groups. The ideology generally operative in modern cities favors interchange among these groups, while at the same

<sup>81</sup>Mitchell Gordon, Sick Cities: Baltimore (Penguin), 1965; p. 395

<sup>82</sup>Martin Meyerson (ed.), The Conscience of the City: New York (Braziller) 1970; p. 1

<sup>83</sup>Wood in Eldredge, op. cit., I, p. 203

time favoring a notion of indivisibility and harmonious problem-solving, proceeding in some "scientific" fashion. It is in this tension—not to say, absolute contradiction—that the politics of the city is carried on, limiting the possibilities of urban change. Hannah Arendt limns the tension:

...We are dealing with organized minorities, who stand against assumed inarticulate, though hardly "silent," majorities, and I think it is undeniable that these majorities have changed in mood and opinion to an astounding degree under the pressure of the minorities. ...Our recent debates have been dominated largely by jurists—lawyers, judges and other men of law—for they must find it particularly difficult to recognize the civil disobedient [representing one kind of organized minority] as a member of a group rather than to see him as an individual law-breaker, and hence a potential defendant in court.<sup>84</sup>

It would be wrong to assume only the obvious disobedients are covered in this; a group of otherwise innocuous housewives might coalesce as a very significant and eminently disobedient group under circumstances of perceived threats to their families. Their importance as an activist group is not to be dismissed; neither can their appearance as a divisive force be ignored.

This is the heart of the ideology grounding actions of agencies of change in cities: a tension between a demand for unified, planned action (favored explicitly by some elements in the civil bureaucracy and the senior elements of the machine, and implicitly as conducing to their *perpetuum mobile*) tempered with the practical reality of pluralism and the power of minorities deriving in part from their focus upon single issues.

R

This tension can only exist under a conception of political (hence moral) relativism and of evaluative consciousness.<sup>85</sup>

First, the issues about which activist groups coalesce are subjectively defined, and evaluated as significant on ground deemed central only by the

<sup>84</sup>Cox, op. cit., p. 98f, cf: p. 76

<sup>85</sup>This is discussed above, in the context of "value" as an absolute.

activist group itself.<sup>86</sup> Their special interests are compared with those enshrined in law as the general interests of the polity as a whole, which is considered legitimate in this view only so far as it does not mitigate the centrality of the special interest.<sup>87</sup>

The term "value" owes its origin to [a] sociological trend ... even before Marx was quite manifest in the relatively new science of classical economy. ...Nobody "seen in his isolation produces values," but ... products "become values only in their social relationship." se

"Products" must be understood to include not only manufactures, but the conceptions under which various groups gather together in action. To give a sinister example, the judgments of a totalitarian dictator become the value system of the regime over which he rules only upon his accession to the authority of the state. It is a commonplace to note the connection of value-theory with the social sciences, but will receive due attention in the context of the next chapter. The connecting link can be briefly noted: It seems social science is understood as connected with a social technology, which in turn can make it possible to fuse divergent value systems perceived as operative under a pluralistic view of society or alternatively, to impose supposedly desirable values upon a populace. Under a value-theoretical construction:

Values, then, are the most general statements of the legitimate ends which guide social action. According to Kluckhohn, they involve "generalized and organized conception[s], influencing behavior, of nature, of man's relation to man, and of the desirable and nondesirable as they may relate to man-environment and interhuman relations." 90

<sup>86</sup>see, e. g., Wolman in Eldredge, op. cit., p. 67

<sup>87</sup>Cox, op. cit., p. 40f. It is a notion connected especially with Christian moral philosophy. In modern times, it seems in its present form to have roots in the kinds of moral philosophy expressed by Max Scheler; its earliest roots seem to have to do with a development in NeoPlatonism.

<sup>88</sup>Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: New York (Viking), 1961; p. 33

<sup>89</sup>The implications are suggested by Heidegger in An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 164; they are worked out in Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism: (HarBrace, ), especially part III.

<sup>90</sup>Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior: New York (Macmillan), 1962; p. 25

Values of themselves organize perceptions; they are, as it were, the ontological component of an ethics. From these values and the hierarchy they establish, norms are realized which dictate prac-tice. 91

A value system like this is highly effective, where one set of values and resultant norms can be made to obtain—as the history of the present century has amply demonstrated. In systems where the tendency to unified systems of action has been resisted, where pluralism survives, the result is the picture of tension, contradiction and interestingly, responsibility, described earlier in this chapter. Both kinds of agency will effect a degree of change in cities. Historically, on the tension-laden system, which opposes to the machine a number of independent interest groups, and which plays off upon each other a professionalized management system with well-defined values against a political apparatus aimed at perpetuating itself from other (quite various) grounds, proves perduring. In short, pluralistic tension mitigates late-modern proclivities toward totalitarian repression.

\* \* \*

Cities are places in which people gather together in a special way. The place takes on a specifically urban character if and only if the people occupying it interact in specifically civic ways. The standard social scientific accounts of cities are adequate descriptions of some outcomes of this interaction. An image of the urban space is fairly clear; the groups and organizing ideologies which are the product of interaction are fairly clear. The conditions of the possibility of such interaction, a transcendental concern beyond the scope of special sciences, needs to be developed. Interestingly, this need has been largely overlooked.

<sup>91</sup>*ibid.*, p. 26ff

# THE PURPOSE OF CITIES

The previous chapters were about common social scientific assumptions as they operate in an interpretation of cities: There are agencies of change—political persons and groups of all sorts—which act upon something—generally a place in which they and others have come together in a συνεθηεις τοπος. The connection between such events is supposed to be of a kind with events described in physics. The mode of explanation is not as neat a fit as it is for physics, but by and large, the inadequacy of standard schemes of scientific explanation can be safely ignored, or left to the philosophers....¹

In short, modern social science is, like everything else, an expression of modern metaphysics, pretty much the way it developed in the 17th century; this is not particularly controversial (though it may be unfashionable).

Nevertheless, the kind of accounts of cities summarized in the previous chapters seems inadequate, incomplete. This chapter aims at filling out the story. I propose to do this by being a bit "old-fashioned" and arguing that it is in seeing cities and the mode of living that goes with them as having a purpose. This means, among other things, quite seriously adopting the anachronistic notion that purposes are causes, at least as an heuristic device. It also means casting about at some length as to what that might mean, with excursions into what will seem hopeless by-ways of thought.

Human beings think of their activities—of which city-making and -dwelling obviously is one—as having some kind of reason or purpose. It is no good simply saying that this is a fiction with which people delude themselves. Even the most stubborn behaviorist appears to think there is some kind of purpose to the things he does.

In the case of theories about cities, purposiveness has long had a place. Aristotle, after all, made the observation that people came together in communities in order to live, but stayed together in cities in order to live

<sup>1</sup>See Hempel & Oppenheim, Aspects of Scientific Explanation: New York (1948), . The counter-position to the generally accepted and uncriticized Anglo-American line in social-scientific explanation, which has its roots in the thinking of Dilthey, is perhaps best expressed in various works of Alfred Schütz and Paul Ricoeur.

well. That is, the development of the city was marked by a purpose—indeed, a conscious one.<sup>2</sup>

Aristotle's distinction is interesting: Merely-living is not living well, nor is it living freely. It is simply life aimed at producing the means of its own sustenance, the things that people do out of natural necessity. As Hannah Arendt puts it in *The Human Condition*, this is "the way of life of the slave, who was coerced by the necessity to stay alive and by the rule of his master, but also the working life of the free craftsman and the acquisitive life of the merchant." All the people in these classes are permanently and principally engaged in getting a living; in some cases, it is not just that they need to keep body and soul together, but that the activity has become an overwhelming purpose. In rudimentary societies, where there is no other option than "making it," political activity is virtually precluded, in this view.

Slightly more developed, but still "pre-political" societies, with active trading and manufacturing, still focus on survival. There is a change; the craftsman's labor is now not directly for his own survival. Sometimes it is "fine," taking on the character of what Arendt calls "work." It has a degree of private, "spiritual" satisfaction associated with it. But since the work is still intended for exchange, whether directly in a sale or through some trading intermediary, it is still only transformed labor, where both necessary and useful things result.

Living well is very different. It is focused on what is "beautiful:"

...that is, with things neither necessary nor merely useful: the life of enjoying bodily pleasures in which the beautiful, as it is given, is consumed; the life devoted to the matters of the *polis*, in which excellence produces beautiful deeds; and the life of the philosopher devoted into, and contemplation of, things eternal, whose everlasting beauty can neither be brought about through the producing interference of man, nor changed through his consumption of them.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup>This is a loaded observation for the late-archaic Greek perspective, I believe. In his introductory essays to Aristotle's *Politics*, Ernest Barker notes that the city was the place of refuge from natural Chaos, in the Hellenic mind. Inside its boundaries,  $vo\mu o color below and human reason could operate. The tension between <math>color between color between color between by nature reasonable, by nature extend the chance to exercise that nature by remaining together in that environment—the city—which is consistent with reason and orderliness.$ 

<sup>3</sup>Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition: Chicago (U. Chicago) 1958; p. 12

<sup>4</sup>*ibid.*, p. 13. This is a strictly classical attitude, generally rejected after the 3rd century AD.. It is a commonplace to note that for the classical Hellenic mind, moral worth and beauty

For classical antiquity, this was the stuff of history. The beautiful deeds of men who shaped their world in ways defying the merely material shifts of the universal στασις could attain permanence only in transmitted history, a strictly human activity, itself beautiful and requiring transcendence of mere necessity. This transcendence could only happen after the transition from mere urban agglomeration—the  $\alpha \sigma \tau \nu$  of prepolitical Hellas—to civic society proper with its citizen-virtue—the  $\pi o \lambda \iota \varsigma$  or the Roman municipium. Seen from the perspective of that move's completion, a denizen of the Lyceum might well call that " $\tau \sigma \tau \iota \eta \nu \epsilon \nu \alpha \iota$ ."

The ancient city was understood as fulfilling particularly human purposes. Is there an analogue in late-Modern cities?

I

Most primitive among preconditions of civic existence is that of *natural* existence:

The earth is the very quintessence of the human condition, and earthly nature, for all we know, may be unique in the universe in providing human beings with a habitat in which they can move and breathe without effort and without artifice. The human artifice of the world separates human existence from all mere animal environment, but life itself is outside this artificial world, and through life man remains related to all other living organisms.<sup>6</sup>

That which is natural—including human beings as such— appears, as it were, "of itself," not with a view to some other end or purposefulness. Nature, taken as it presents itself, is free of purpose; the mountains in a given place do not fulfill in any obvious way an intention, but simply are. Oceans dominate the planet not to some end, but are simply there. Human beings are conceived and are born, in the most primitive view, by accident; if there is some purpose worked out, it is incidental to the natural events of conception and birth.<sup>7</sup>

were at least part of the same thought, and thus "identical."

<sup>5</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 45

<sup>6</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 2

<sup>7</sup>One of the perplexities of late-Modernity is how this fundamental experience of what is natural has been completely obscured. The loss is made clear in the concept of a *managed* natural world, a notion that has found favor in universities, councils and governments. The uncriticized assumption is that all in the universe with which humankind interacts can be understood, and from that understanding, can be engineered and managed. It plugs in place of the uncriticized assumption of  $\sigma t \cos \sigma_i$  in classical thought, and of progress toward the One in the Middle Ages.

What happens in nature is perceptibly different from what happens in the *world*—a decidedly human construction of reality. A world is a place in which purpose emphatically does obtain, in a manner analogous to the way in which human beings have purposes. Human understanding of the world is a matter of teleological judgment.<sup>s</sup>

Modernity has seen the disruption of this primæval antinomy. Now nature is seen itself as a tool to be harnessed to worldly ends; biological processes are interfered with, to the end that human goals (a healthier population, a larger population, a smaller population, &c.) may be effected. The awesome powers at the disposal of physics (already a highly constructed interpretation of the way things are) are applied to the end that military safety might be achieved.

In the city, the social sciences import methods originating in the natural sciences, and the engineering based upon them; governments apply these methods to manage urban masses more or less the same way natural resources are managed.

In short, that which was in and for itself is now perceived as material and an "efficient cause" by which "ends" are realized. These ends are not, however, conscious purposes, but expressions of unconscious motivations inherent in human nature. The nature of human being as rational-being is challenged in this shift. The modern city, akin to the *civitas Dei* posited at the cusp of classical antiquity and the Middle Ages, is understood as a place in which natural Chaos is subordinated to a human purpose waxing transmundane. The ancient city was by nature unnatural and apart, governed by laws that were proximally *customary*; the modern city is altogether natural and governed by natural laws. with all their supposed immutability.

II

### A

Recovering the civic world—lost in the late-Modern reduction of cities to simply-natural—begins in examining convention and personal artifice.

...Every construction or fabrication has the cosmogony as a paradigmatic model. The creation of the world becomes

<sup>8</sup>See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment: New York, (Hafner), 1951; part II. This matter comes up again in §V below.

<sup>9</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 150

the archetype of every creative human gesture, whatever its plane of reference may be. $^{10}$ 

This is twice divorced from the utterly natural. Human beings as natural beings have an immediate understanding of what is natural. But the explanation of such an understanding—its rendering in logical form—is not precisely congruent with what is understood; it is a cosmogony. That is, what is expressed in an *interpretation* of the utterly for-itself, a mediation in reasonable terms of that which is pre-rational. This cosmogony expresses a world; the world is not nature itself, but has a rationale to it which is foreign to the domain of nature. The city, as any other human fabrication, rests not in nature, but upon this interpretation which lends rationality to nature's appearance. The city, insofar as it is the archetypical human dwelling place, is the most perfect image of the world so conceived. But the image of nature expressed in that image of the world is mediated, and merely conventional. In its reasonableness, it eschews the chaotic aspect of the for-itself of immediate nature, substituting the relative order of convention passed on in the stable structure of history.

The city as cosmogonical archetype is puzzling. It is an "inversion" of the nature-to-human-construct process. Yet surely the "social matrix" is the most basic element of everyday, common experience, and "philosophers as different as James, Bergson, Dewey, Husserl and Whitehead agree that the commonsense knowledge of everyday life is the unquestioned but always questionable background within which inquiry starts and within which alone it can be carried out." Such an inquiry includes the surrounding world and its conditions (*viz.*, Nature), beginning with reflection upon the other as viewed in the common social context. It is the mutuality of context that makes such reflection possible. In the identity of this social context with nature, the difference of nature, which is for-itself, and society, which exists only as mediated and mediating, emerges as a contrast.

Which social context can best display this identity and difference? The most rudimentary social enclaves lack requisite permanency; their very "ad hoc" character on the one hand precludes their displaying anything, while on the other hand, the necessity for travail which is their raison d'etre eliminates the possibility of extended reflection. Less rudimentary social enclaves appear to support a small group of persons who carry out a degree of reflection, and transmit a limited, rather volatile tradition; these

<sup>10</sup> Eliade, op. cit., p. 45; cf.: Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 96f.

<sup>11</sup>Alfred Schütz in Emmet and MacIntyre, Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis: New York (Macmillan), 1970; p. 10

<sup>12</sup>*ibid.*, pp., 8, 10

societies "find" a cosmogonical model, observe it and record it. But in these societies, travail is still overwhelming so that the differences between the utterly chaotic and for-itself are not fully seen. With this lack of clarity goes too completely an unthought identity with nature. In the city, where a substantial class may subsist in greater freedom from necessary travail, the "received opinion" of a given culture as to how nature shows itself can come to a full expression. This has moral consequences for the way in which the city itself is construed.

In classical antiquity, the existence of this class was made possible by the existence of a laboring class, who "left behind them in return for their consumption...nothing more or less than their master's freedom...."<sup>13</sup> There is some question as to what analogous institution exists in the late-Modern city. It might be the adoption of a viewpoint, discussed above, whereby the sense of difference in the identity relation of nature and world is lost, fatally obscures the possibility of freedom, and with it the conception of a class of people who are freed so far as is possible from the exigencies of travail.

The issue at stake is...the generalization of the fabrication experience, in which usefulness and utility are established as the ultimate standards for life and the world of men. This generalization is inherent in the activity of *Homo faber* because the experience of means and end, as it is present in fabrication, does not disappear with the finished product but is extended to its ultimate destination, which is to serve as a use object.<sup>14</sup>

The definition of human being as fabricating being is a modern one, in no small part derivative from the exhaltation of efficient cause as the only clear and distinct cause, itself a principle mark of the onset of Modernity. To the extent human being is the agency by which some species of being effect some unknown and unknowable end, human being is able to coöpt it in a human world. Coincident with that coöption, human being itself is subjected to two kinds of redefinition:

 Human freedom, duty and right are redefined: Anciently, human freedom was that freedom from necessary travail that allowed one to do one's duty and thus exercise one's right. Poverty—the condition which compelled otherwise free persons to devote attention to attaining the necessities of life itself—precluded the full exercise of one's right, in that the duty to oneself and to others was subordinated to

<sup>13</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 83 (note), 86; cf.: Wheatley, The Four Quarters of the Earth, passim.

<sup>14</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 157

natural necessity.<sup>15</sup> In modernity, all three elements are defined in freedom to labor, the right to labor and the duty to labor. I. e., the productive life of a citizen is gauged by his performance as a wage slave.

2. As a precondition of this, the relation of human being, both to nature and the world, must change. Human being is now understood as divorced from nature and from the world, and as operator of both. There is a contradiction in this: In the first place, though divorced from nature and its operator, human being is still subject to natural necessity—one still must eat, one is inclined to procreation, &c.. In the second place, though the world is a cooperative human creation, now it is understood as something from which human being is divorced, to which it is inferior. This is consistent with the eruption of nature into the world as means to an human end.<sup>16</sup>

B

One outcome of this redefinition of human being has been the substitution of "teamwork" for cooperation.

Cooperation is the activity of a group of human beings working together in their diversity toward a commonly agreed goal. Teamwork is the unified act of an undifferentiated collectivity toward an effect, the nature of which, once the activity is undertaken, is no longer subject to agreement or any other sort of debate. Cooperation is a political act. Teamwork is a manifestation of the division of labor.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>*ibid.*, p 64f; for a succinct general definition of duty see Kant, *Metaphysical Grounds of Virtue*, §1-4

<sup>16</sup>This works well enough for Western European thinking influenced by problems arising out of Christian theology. How well it works for non-Western cultures is less obvious. Heidegger's notion of "representative consciousness," developed in An Introduction to Metaphysics (Yale, 1961), which I found very useful in understanding the problem, is based on an analysis of the development of Modern metaphysics, a phenomenon in 17th century Western experience. This phenomenon was probably influenced by developments in earlier Chinese thought, transmitted through such correspondents as Matteo Ricci (and generally admitted). But that is not sufficient ground for arguing a corresponding development. In fact, those Chinese scholars aware of the common origin were entirely perplexed that it had the outcomes it did in the West. The puzzle remains; heuristically, a simple answer may be that the dominance of Western modes of thought and high culture may have become sufficiently pervasive in the last hundred years that important cultural differences may be overlaid by at least a veneer of the same way of thinking. There is substantial evidence, though, that this veneer rapidly peels away under pressure. The INSPRA political risk assessment model, used in Germany, has traced this process in a number of cases. The results seem to be deemed rather sensitive, and not much has been published on the subject. I am indebted to my teacher, Dr. Joseph Doherty, who developed the INSPRA model, for many insights along these lines.

Division of labor is based on the fact that two men can put their labor power together and "behave toward each other as though they were one." This one-ness is the exact opposite of co-operation, it indicates the unity of the species with regard to which every single member is the same and exchangeable. (The formation of a labor collective where the laborers are socially organized in accordance with this principle of common and divisible labor is the very opposite of the various workmen's organizations, from the old guilds and corporations to certain types of modern trade unions, whose members are bound together by the skills and specializations that distinguish them from others.) Since none of the activities into which the process is divided has an end in itself, their "natural" end is exactly the same of "undivided" labor; either the simple reproduction of the means of subsistence, that is, the capacity for consumption of laborers, or the exhaustion of human labor power. 17

The modern urban area appears to reflect this understanding of human activity. It is not a place of common action, but of interaction. For example, a not uncommon argument heard in discussions of the city as a place where corporate headquarters might be located is the possibility of greater interaction with competitors and agencies serving the corporation. Modern urban areas—cities as they are now interpreted—are ideal places for large meetings, in that they possess (even create with intention) facilities for enhanced interaction. The service agencies—notably banks, law firms and courts, accounting firms—which are central to late-Modern enterprise locate in cities since interaction is their stock in trade. In these interactive enterprises, however, the activity assumes a goal determined  $\alpha$  priori and never questioned by the team working toward it.

<sup>17</sup>Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 123f; that this is a prevalent notions was brought home to me when I stood in for a high school social studies teacher. Rather than "civics" this teacher's pupils were learning the "sociology of sports" with an emphasis on the merits of teamwork.

<sup>18</sup>See C.H.R.P., *The Corporate Headquarters Complex in New York City*: New York (Columbia U. P.), 1977; *passim*. This study is dated; there is evidence that advanced telecommunications techniques, coupled with declining costs to implement them, are combining to mitigate the need for actual proximity in interaction. In fact, while reduced need to travel is cited as a reason for implementing these telecommunications strategies (this saves money) it is not the strongest reason for their use. Interpreting broadly, the absence of proximity is deemed a "plus" in interactions. This deserves further exploration in another place.

Step back for a moment and consider basic travail: One labors out of necessity, to supply the needs of subsistence. The goals of that labor are unquestioned assumptions, since it is not realistically possible (short of the consideration of the merits of suicide) to question subsistence. The motivation for such subsistence appears as a part of natural existence. It seems that the activities of commerce and industry, well beyond the limits of mere subsistence, are given that same character—part of natural subsistence. Such activity is considered as if it were labor. Human activity, viewed under this perspective, is devoid of any political character, as it involves no struggle toward a common goal constantly reinterpreted.<sup>20</sup>

Therefore the structure of the late-Modern city—as civic—is in important ways problematic in the strict technical sense; *viz.*, fraught with possibility, but little actuality. This is tied to the shift from a conception of free cooperating citizenship—albeit a limited citizenship—to a more inclusive social enclave whose constituents labor together (or at least, in proximity) to subsist, in a regression to the most primitive social structure. Were this the limit of human being, to speak of the "modern city" would be merely to speak a contradiction; the city as a "mirror" or nature could not exist.

C

The resolution of this dilemma appears to lie in the recovery of discussion. In discussing things with others, mutually exclusive opinions arise. These opinions induce inquiry: "The sole object of inquiry is the

<sup>19</sup>See the remarks on motivation in the second chapter above.

<sup>20</sup>A. Gouldner and R. Peterson, Notes on Technology and the Moral Order: Indianapolis (Bobbs Merrill), 1962; p. 44: "It is partly because the life of the self requires some measure of tension with others that the maintenance of self is a costly business. And because it is energyconsuming the self must be periodically relaxed or surrendered, as for example, in games, sleep, sex or spontaneous sociability with others. It is in part because the self needs periodic consensual validation from others that its sense of separateness from them is painful and it must lower its boundaries occasionally. On the other hand, it is because there can be no self without some differences from and with others, that the self sometimes seeks out and sharpens tensions with others. And indeed, the more the self senses the pull of its own passive, boundary-forgetting impulses, the more it may lurch into aggression. The maintenance of the highly developed self entails an endemic rift between self and society." This is not novel; Heidegger says very similar things in his essays on identity and difference. But tension arises in the political sphere; it grows out of the difficulties of cooperation. Teamwork is relatively less stressful; there is no need to resolve differences in already-stipulated goals (aside from very occasional and minor "fine tuning," perhaps). E. g., the team effort of investment bankers during the 80's (with its great physical demands) is less stressful than a politically charged activity such as a local campaign for office.

settlement of opinion."<sup>21</sup> It leads to a belief "that we shall think to be true."<sup>22</sup> Belief is principally a moral, not speculative, attribute of human being:

...What, then, is belief? It is the demicadence that closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. ...It has just three properties: First, it is something we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit.<sup>23</sup>

Belief reconciles in the final judgment in which it is formed the observations of speculative reason with the moral need to act in an authentically human way.<sup>24</sup> But its principal moral character derives from its being itself a habit of the mind. It contrasts with doubt, as Peirce observes, which is the privation of belief, and which, being erratic and not habitual, suggests the habitual character of belief by contrast.<sup>25</sup>

Another surety of the moral character of belief is its connection with thought in "ought;" in belief what is asserted is not so much that something is thus, but that, if one has thought correctly, it ought to be thus. The ought is a moral notion; more significantly, it is the notion which opens human being toward the future. Being open to the future is a necessary, perhaps the sufficient condition for action, as opposed to the merely subsistence-oriented activity described previously:

...Future facts are the only facts that we can, in a measure, control; and whatever there may be in the Future that is not amenable to control are the things we shall be able to infer, or should be able to infer, under favorable circumstances.<sup>26</sup>

In short, in belief, with its orientation to the future, both the possibilities of action and its real limits are disclosed.<sup>27</sup>

The social structures detailed in the previous sections are outcomes of beliefs. A focus on basic survival is fundamental to modern Western socio-

<sup>21</sup>E. C. Moore (ed.), Charles S. Peirce: The Essential Writings: New York (Harper & Row), 1972; p. 126

<sup>22</sup>ibid.

<sup>23</sup>*ibid.*, p. 143

<sup>24</sup>This seems to me consistent with Kant's observation in the first Critique, p. B833f.

<sup>25</sup>C. S. Peirce, Selected Writings: New York (Dover), 1958; p. 189

<sup>26</sup>*ibid.*, p. 222

<sup>27</sup>Moore, op. cit., p. 131, discusses implications and problems deriving from this construction of belief.

political theory, and to the practice of many leaders of social-activist movements. An individual seeks first and foremost, and by light of natural reason, to secure his own subsistence, not merely before other considerations, but to the exclusion of other things. This security is found most readily in the social enclave, if only as a place of refuge and from which to mount an offensive against the overweening strength of common aggressors.

On the other hand, as belief is future-oriented, and thus open to possibility, the necessity of modern compulsion to labor, reduction to natural necessity and so on, is mitigated. An alteration in the structure of belief can be expected coincidentally to show an alteration in activity consistent with politics.<sup>30</sup>

D

To summarize this section, Royce's comment on individualism seems appropriate:

As we all know, individualism, viewed as a highly potent social tendency, is a product of high cultivation. It is also a relatively modern product of such cultivation. Savages appear to know little about individualism. Where tribal custom is almighty, the individual is trained to conduct, but not to a high grade of self-consciousness. Hence the individual, in a primitive community, submits; but also he has no very elaborate conscience.<sup>31</sup>

Royce makes this sense of individualism to be a product of Jewish and Greek experiences.<sup>32</sup> His analysis is interesting, but subject to revision upon more recent study and a broader awareness of other cultural matrices than would have occurred to him. Even were it so, the developments of the

<sup>28</sup>Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen: Garden City (Doubleday), 1972; p. 115: Hobbes is exemplary of this assumption operative with greater or lesser priority in every subsequent social contract thinker.

<sup>29</sup>Hannah Arendt, On Violence: New York (HarBrace), 1969; p. 44; more or less the same sentiment is expressed in any standard commentary on the social contract theory of the origin of the state.

<sup>30</sup>By way of an *obiter dictum*: I do *not* think this is something that happens within a generation, but rather over a period of several generations. That is, I don't think the post-World War II generation and the half-generation preceding it, which more or less determines how things are these days, has much hope of changing how it does things. That is depressing, since the control over things this ruling generation has is much more extensive than that of its forefathers and -mothers.

<sup>31</sup> Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1968; p. 113<br/>f32ibid., p. 114

19th century, most especially the export of a Western European conception of the body-politic, renders that aspect of this doctrine obsolete to a certain extent.

The contraction of individual freedom to merely right-to-subsist—an economic interpretation consistent with the waxing of a labor-based notion of society—is another radical reinterpretation, become more generally received since Royce's time. The more modern version reads:

The right to the pursuit of this happiness is indeed as undeniable as the right to life; it is even identical with it.... There is no lasting happiness outside the prescribed cycle of painful exhaustion and pleasurable regeneration, and whatever throws this cycle out of balance—poverty and misery where exhaustion is followed by wretchedness instead of regeneration, or great riches and an entirely effortless life where boredom takes the place of exhaustion and where the mills of necessity, of consumption and digestion, grind an impotent human body mercilessly and barrenly to death—ruins the elemental happiness that comes from being alive.<sup>33</sup>

This is not all there is to living-well, that end toward which the city is, in one perspective, the means (as well as, from another perspective, an end). Human individuality, defined in this contracted way, is an obstacle to the definition of the city. To this negative constraint, a conception of community needs to be added which extends it beyond the level of mere teamwork to that of cooperation with an end in view that is greater than mere subsistence.

The kernel of such a doctrine appropriate to modern circumstances has been put forward in several ways; Royce characterizes it as "Loyalty."

Loyalty is the willing and thoroughgoing devotion of a self to a cause, when the cause is something which unites many selves in one, and is therefore the interest of the community. For a loyal human being the interest of the community to which he belongs is superior to every merely individual interest of his own. He actively devotes himself to this cause.<sup>34</sup>

Royce is interested in this as leading to a notion of universal community. Such doctrines are not often productive, if not connected with a

<sup>33</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 108

<sup>34</sup>Royce, op. cit., p. 83ff

conception of a strong local community. In developing a theory of the city, the concern of this study is the local community, in which subsistence is no longer the most pressing issue, to the extent that is possible, and in which freedom from that concern merely allows the individual to transcend both his basic natural character and his "social atomism," in the body-politic.<sup>35</sup> These days, civic loyalty is commonly thought of as part of the relation to the state, but it is readily apparent in conversation with ordinary people that their first loyalty is to their local community—the neighborhood writ large.

#### Ш

In sketching the preconditions of a theory of community from which better to understand the city, I've been drawn to the individual, as the most obviously purposeful entity. In doing so, I've been at some pains to show that there is a—preconscious?—purposiveness which is not specifically human so much as an artifact of a more general natural character. There is also something more than that, at least as a possibility —a concept of a community's purpose to which one is loyal.

Now the problem is, how does this work itself out in society? What social preconditions are important in understanding the city?

### A

Such social conditions may be presumed to be things that have escaped notice in the merely social-scientific observations, a summary of which has been made above; if noticed, they may have been ignored. This in an inherent difficulty in the received model of social-scientific observation.<sup>36</sup>

Much of the discussion in the previous two sections, as well as in the previous chapters, is about things to which social science should lend insight. Social science provides information complementary to that of natural science vis-a-vis the existence of human beings as purely natural entities. Its "face to face" orientation gives it information as to individual human activities.

But it does not seem the social sciences are able to address the actual issue of society as such, and as more than merely an agglomeration of single entities. If this is a case where "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts," then a social scientific (as that is usually meant) theory of soci-

<sup>35</sup>cf.: Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 7

<sup>36</sup>Schütz in Emmet and MacIntyre, op. cit., p. 7: "The identification of experience with sensory observation and of the experience of overt actions in particular [i. e., the overt method of the social sciences]...excludes several dimensions from all possible inquiry."

ety is a kind of mare's nest. $^{_{37}}$  So we shall be looking for our social theory elsewhere and in different terms—and in contrast to social-scientific speculation.

B

Late-modern society characteristically takes place in a time of teamwork; this stands opposed to cooperation, a more properly political form of interaction. Team-work is not generally conducive to the formation or conduct of civic society:

This unitedness of many into one is basically anti-political; it is the very opposite of the togetherness prevailing in political... communities, which—to take the Aristotelian example—consist not of an association (κοινονια) between two physicians, but between a physician and a farmer, "and in general between people who are different and unequal." The equality attending the public realm is necessarily an equality of unequals who stand in need of being "equalized" in certain respects and for specific purposes.<sup>38</sup>

Civic cooperation rests upon some predetermination of equality extrinsic to any obvious functional or pragmatic criterion. This predetermination must either be "by nature" or through some sort of conventional—and possibly, therefore, rational—mechanism; political theory does not allow of any other options.

Modern social science presupposes the former kind of predetermination. That presupposition is flawed (however venerable the tradition of thought upon which it rests may be). Were human beings by nature equal, they would, in essential aspects, be equivalent; if the specific difference of human being is their ability to reason, all must be equally reasonable by a common standard.<sup>39</sup>

This establishes a unidimensional equality as a ground for association, as noted before. But for whatever "natural" specific difference is selected (and reason is surely not a bad one), enough variation will be found that the common standard cannot be refined to less than a range of values. Moreover, while for metaphysical purposes such a predetermination has great utility (both in natural and moral philosophical discourse), the

<sup>37</sup> Vögelin offers a very nice discussion of this can be so: Eric Vögelin, *The New Science of Politics*: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1952; esp. p. 11

<sup>38</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 214

<sup>39</sup>This is the Cartesian message; cf.: Discourse on the Method..., paragraph 4

complexity of human being seems to require a multi- rather than unidimensional predetermination of equality. And Modern social sciences with their unspecified metaphysical systems, at any rate, find that largely beyond their scope.

Consequently, it appears the predetermination of equality must be by convention. This convention must be established before the formation of the civic body which is to be governed by it. This is an old tradition in Western political theory:

...The Greeks... did not count legislating among the political activities. In their opinion, the lawmaker was like the builder of the city wall, someone who had to do his work and finish before political activity could begin.... The laws, like the wall around the city, were not the results of actions but the products of making. Before men began to act, a definite space had to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent actions could take place.<sup>40</sup>

40Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 194l cf.: p. 63f: Arendt makes a distinction between acting politically and that kind of work people do which is private; this has been discussed elsewhere, and is an important part of the distinction she makes in The Human Condition. It is a notion foreign to the way we think today, where legislation is the preeminent political act. On the other hand, this attitude seems to me mirrored, in a way, in the manner in which the U. S. Constitution is amended; something similar seems at work in the German Federal Republic's concept of a "Grundgesetz." The normal "legislative" procedure is suspended, and a determination is made as to the conventions under which government—both in the formation of ordinances and in the exercise of magistracy—is to take place. This may be still more evident in that most peculiar of fundamental principles, the "English Constitution." Though the English may hark back to a mediæval Charter, it is widely recognized that this expression has little to do with the present magistracy; the most authoritative expression, indeed, is commonly represented as Bagehot's almost purely journalistic—and clearly private—volume of the late-19th century.

Things become still more complex, in that "legislators" frequently don't like the results of such fundamental legislative activity. Just recently, for example, the state of Michigan validated an amendment to the Constitution proposed over 200 years ago as part of the original Bill of Rights, stipulating that there must be an intervening Congressional election between proposal and enactment of pay-raises for Congress. It appears, due to the peculiarities of Constitutional law, that this delayed approval, finally amends the U. S. constitution in this way. But the affected legislature appears determined to ignore the amendment, or challenge it, or otherwise overturn it.

In any event, if fundamental legislation of this sort, which makes politics possible, is a matter of convention ( $\nu o \mu o \varsigma$ ) rather than nature, all sorts of interesting things happen. Among other things, Reason might still stand as the fundamental characteristic of human being, but it would no longer be understood as a *natural* characteristic, but more in the manner of "conventional wisdom." In that case, Reason, as a convention, focusses understanding of human being on discourse (in which Reason manifests). This is completely in concord with quite a bit of current thought about where things are headed in a changing world.

What we call the constitution of the civic body establishes it and its constituents in a state of conventional equality, making possible the cooperative action of naturally unequal individuals. The U. S. Constitution is a good example of this, as is the *Grundgesetz* of the German Federal Republic, as well as all "donative" constitutions issued by decree of one sort or another.

Therefore, it seems most of what we think of as "legislation" is more a matter of execution in accordance with the "spirit" of a fundamental law, rather than innovation. The principal duty of "legislators" is to frame plans whereby the constitution and interpretive ordinances are carried into effect.

To do this efficiently, different perspectives are needed, and must be reconciled into a plan of action—what is usually understood as the political process, and which is a genuine cooperation of different individuals, rather than a team effort of pre-political society.<sup>41</sup>

C

Society, in its "unspecified" form (absent its character as *civic* society) is coæval with the predetermination of conventional equality. "Pre-civic" society can be defined this way:

Society is the form in which the act of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumed public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public.<sup>42</sup>

Conventional society starts as an extension of human natural necessity; it is a framework in which individual necessities and the laborious resolution of them is accomplished more readily. The need to lend substance to the somewhat *ad hoc* character of such an emerging society leads to the formalizing process of fundamental legislation. This fundamental legislation—very possibly without it being intended—effects a change from a concern with life itself to a concern with living well, from merely economic community to political community. The conventional structure assumes the natural structure, and—quite literally, *artificially*—amplifies it.

Conventional society can be described by the social sciences, but only as a purely natural phenomenon. From this view, human being is simply

<sup>41</sup>Gouldner & Peterson, op. cit., p. 41 discusses the process of reconciliation.

<sup>42</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 46

<sup>43</sup>What was limited to, at most, a single household becomes a communal activity; ibid. p. 40, passim.

another species, a *Gattungswesen*, operating according to natural motivations.<sup>44</sup> The *conventional* structure proper, stands beyond the natural environment, and outside the scope of social science. But even this conventional society is not the city itself, merely the condition of its possibility.<sup>45</sup>

#### IV

Understanding the city and civic society as the realization of the possibility inherent in conventional society appears to involve a shift in thinking, from that of the physical sciences appropriated by social science to some kind of moral reason. In fact, it may be that it is only this shift in perspective that makes of one place a city, while another place, otherwise similar, fails to become one.<sup>46</sup>

### A

Perhaps the most striking difference between a place in which merely living is the purpose, and living well is central, is that the latter involves the touch of immortality.

To be concerned with merely living is to be caught up entirely in mortality. If one's livelihood is constantly at stake, there simply isn't time to think through anything but economic matters. A family-man with children in school and so on, in economically unsettled times, worries about keeping his job and what will happen should he lose it (the mortgage or rent left unpaid, health insurance gone...). Such a person *grubs* for daily bread as surely as his most primitive ancestors. Mortality is a constant spectre.

Generally, smaller human enclaves show this well. The common evidence of a concern for immortality—the artistic expressions through which human beings express their immortality—is limited, if not altogether lacking.<sup>47</sup> This is not necessarily a matter of size; relatively small communities affirm their status as cities in the way they are centers

<sup>44</sup>*ibid.*, p 116

<sup>45</sup>See Royce's description of purely social relations, op. cit., p. 112f.

<sup>46</sup>See Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 24f, where she makes a similar distinction.

<sup>47</sup>A television show, popular as this study is being revised, makes the point. It centers on the lives and interactions in a small town in Alaska. Part of the peculiarity that makes the story fun is the amazing amount of intellectual activity. At town meetings, pragmatic discussion devolves into heated metaphysical debate. The writers have even created a foundation myth for this fictional town, in which two liberated Lesbian women bring culture to the frontier. It makes a good story, and a funny one, because it contrasts so strongly with what is usually the case for small, isolated communities.

of artistic expression, while larger enclaves prove themselves not to be cities in lacking any vitality of this kind. $^{48}$ 

In antiquity, the city was the only place where human being could supervene its normal mortality. In some ways, this immortality was individual and tied to monuments. The surviving glories of Athens assure the memory of Pericles; the infamy of Nero is demonstrated for all time in the survival of his Golden Palace only as parts of a bath house.

Still greater immortality was assured in the erection of the city proper through its institutional foundation. Thus Solon's laws and Cleisthenes' reforms, which created the city, lend immortality to their authors. At the same time, these institutions and what arose from them, reflected immortality upon the citizens as a whole. We speak of Athenian civilization or Roman culture.<sup>49</sup>

In more modern times—our times, certainly—the concreteness of participation in the execution of the laws and other monuments, which constitute an enduring body-politic is supplanted by "finding a place in history." History, construed under this demand for immortality (in this peculiarly modern form), is something rather different from what it has been previously, and what it is authentically. It takes the character of a record of the great deeds of individuals out of context, or at least, in a context the interpretation of which becomes part of the deed. History becomes "privatized."

Here's a simple example: A president of the United States leaves a body of work behind—his official papers, memoranda, etc.; some are public matters and some are purely private. But all are archived as equal. Mixed in with the matters affecting the way in which the world is understood (the world being objective only to those who share it, so that other worlds can coexist with it), and which come to be part of the public tradition by which subsequent generations are inducted into thier society, are matters which have no bearing on the public domain. This injection of private things into the public domain signals the breakdown of the latter as distinct and special. It signals the interpolation of that which is by nature into the domain of convention. This kind of history establishes immortality by

<sup>48</sup>Some places, officially listed as "cities" in the gazetteer on the basis of recorded population, have only derivative involvement with such aspects of human immortality. This is especially true of suburban cities—a rather peculiar expression, to be sure.

<sup>49</sup>This appears a universal phenomenon. The special institutions of a given dynasty— e. g., Chou—are immortalized. So were the commentators and interpreters—e. g., Confucius. But we speak as well of *Chinese* culture, and all Chinese participate in its immortality.

<sup>50</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 75, 43

<sup>51</sup>See my article, "Hermeneutic Philosophy: History as the Singular Ground of Thought," in COGITO, July, 1983.

confusing that which is truly im-mortal—nature—with the domain of human mortality rendered immortal in action. This kind of history is consistent with social science. It fits with the kind of explanatory system laid out in earlier chapters. It is a determinant of the modern mind set from within which common concepts of the modern city are developed.

Unfortunately, such a history may also force a contradiction. It is hard, if not altogether impossible, to forge a concept of this kind of private activity which is consistent with the idea of an utterly conventional place given over to living well—a political space. The acts of persons are visible, but not as those of persons acting in community. This is the most disturbing factor in most modern historical accounts.<sup>52</sup>

This kind of history *can* "constitute" a community, as Royce shows.<sup>53</sup> But the community thus constituted is boundless. It is construed as extending back to the earliest origins of a supposed tradition and forward to as yet unborn generations. It slides into chronology, or into purely personal reminiscence, and the larger immortality is lost.

A rather nasty dilemma can crop up. Some scholars present the surviving remarks of classical thinkers as a perfectly accurate representation of classical thought as a whole. Other scholars show that what is known of such remarks is an incomplete *corpus*. The former claim also flies in the face of the obvious fact that we live at some distance both culturally and temporally from these assimilated roots, so that what is known is the received tradition concerning these thinkers and their doctrines, rather than what they thought. From this dubious foundation,

<sup>52</sup>This is to raise the perennial question, what is history; I am not going to get sucked into that debate too far. At the same time, it is interesting to notice the model histories of Chinese dynasties, which blend accurate records of the times with penetrating commentary and interpretation that by and large withstands even the most withering gaze of modern critics. This well-founded historical self-analysis compares favorably with Modern historical approaches; Hegel's philosophy of history—more or less a foundation of all academic history in the West, with notable exceptions—is particularly notorious for its dogmatism. One would think this would have passed into academic oblivion, but it hasn't. Biased and uncritical analysis is typical of many current exponents of a Germanic metaphysical Realism (e. g., Rudiger Bübner, responding to a question, simply dismissed non-Western cultures in an Hegelian handwave; Ernst Vollrath actually took on J. N. Mohanty on the question, is there such a thing as "Eastern Philosophy?"). Professor Marie Thérèse Eckhard offers a further consideration: Most history these days, she asserts (in private conversation) is written by journalists; she traces this to the moment when Alistair Cooke could be deemed an historian. The novelty of the phenomenon is debatable; the insight is nevertheless useful, since penetration and care in analysis is not demanded of journalists to the same degree it is of scholars. When the scholars become journalists, it is rather like having the inmates take over the asylum. In any event, there is very clearly a problem with history become mere reportage, on the one hand, or a vehicle for promulgating as true a purely personal value-hierarchy, on the other.

<sup>53</sup>Royce, op. cit., pp. 248f, 252

is erected some notion of a "Western" community from the prehistoric to the present, as if that were uniform and known and clear and distinct what there really is, is an heterogeneous tissue of discontinuities.

В

If history—as that is presently understood, and as it commonly founds the social sciences—is not a perfect ground for understanding cities, perhaps reason is a more important attribute on which to focus.

Immediately, the same difficulty appears: the indistinct interaction of the merely natural and that which is a product of human artifice. Consider this typical definition of Modern reason:

By right reason in the natural state of men, I understand not, as many do, an infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination, of every man concerning those actions of his, which may either redound to the damage or benefit of his neighbours. I call it peculiar, because although in a civil government the reason of the supreme, that is, the civil law, is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this civil government, in which state no man can know right reason from false but by comparing it with his own, every man's own reason is to be accounted, not only the rule of his own actions, which are done at his own peril, but also for the measure of another man's reason, in such things as do concern him.<sup>54</sup>

Reason, understood this way, is a private function of human being. Hobbes, of course, is the apologist for the modern centralized state; he is most interested in right reason erected by the comparison of one's own opinion with that consensus (or fiat) which is sovereign. This stands opposed to the pre-civil society he describes, in whihe consensus is erected. Both cases involve consensus, however—the actual consensus of people acting together from occasional interest, and political consensus embodied in law. Hobbes prefers the certainty of law enforced on all; he is dubious as to the possibility of consensus alone (which classical politics favors) providing such surety. Hobbes is at pains to show reason as tied to convention and even as subject to consensus. But he is compelled to ground this concern in the natural individual. He stands in a natural-law heritage.

<sup>54</sup>Hobbes, op. cit., p 123 (note)

From this, it is no great step to assert that it is through the promptings of a purely natural reason (or, adopting more up-to-date language, inherent motivations) that society comes about. This ignores the very different characters that society may manifest, as it develops.

An unresolved dilemma develops as a result of the insistence upon the merely natural origin of reason. Hobbes makes this clear in the way he treats the relation of the law-giving state and the reasoning individual. This is, generally, "received opinion" in Modern political theory. Living in society—most especially in that kind of society which extends itself beyond just providing necessities of subsistence—is very much a matter of artifice:

... The social will, in its corporate capacity, the will of the community, forms its codes, its customary laws; and attempts to teach each of us how he ought to deal with his neighbors so as to promote the general social harmony. But these codes—these forms of customary morality,—they have to be taught to us as conscious rules of conduct. They can only be taught to us by first teaching us to be more considerate, more self-observant, more formally conscientious than we were before.<sup>55</sup>

The very egoism which is naturally human, is necessarily subverted in civil society—the tendency toward which is also a human propensity. This may be, as Royce suggests, through bringing about "some higher level of our general self-consciousness;<sup>56</sup> the dilemma persists.

That subversion might also be accomplished through becoming habituated to having a place in society. That is a more commonly expressed view; it is the basic argument for public education, going back to Aristotle, among other things. A more sophisticated variant on the theme might make that understanding of one's place in community to be an ongoing process, never quite finished.

Traditionally, the common view is that reason operates in community as judgment. This is Plato's view in *Statesman*;<sup>57</sup> it is the political

<sup>55</sup>Royce, op. cit., p. 112; "General social harmony" pushes society beyond the limits of team-work required for subsistence, to cooperation with a larger purpose.

<sup>56</sup>ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Statesman, 283e, 283e

interpretation of Kant's Critique of Judgment.<sup>58</sup> Hannah Arendt summarizes this view:

The power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and the thinking process which is active in judging something is not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to From this potential agreement some agreement. iudgment derives its specific validity. This means, on the one hand, that such judgments must liberate themselves from the idiosyncrasies which naturally determine the outlook of each individual in his privacy and are legitimate as long as they are only privately held opinions, but which are not fit to enter the market place, and lack all validity in the public realm.59

Judgment supervenes the purely private assessment of situations operative in a merely natural, private reasoning. It is a strictly political and moral faculty.<sup>60</sup> Reason, as it appears in human beings by nature, is a purely speculative faculty by which one encounters the chaotic other and

<sup>58</sup>See Ernst Vollrath, Rekonstruktion der Politischen Urteilskraft: Stuttgart (Clett Verlag), 1976. The received view of the 3rd Critique generally makes the first section (in particular) out as only concerned with the judgment of beauty, consistent with its interest in æsthetic judgment. Vollrath—convincingly, I think—notes that the concept of a judgment of taste has long been linked to moral and especially political judgment. Moreover, there is a good deal of evidence for Kant's interest in moral and political judgment, while there is less evidence for his concern with the judgment of art as beautiful. The former concern is consistent with his own program as set forth in the Canon section of the 1st Critique; the latter has no place in it.

<sup>59</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 220, 222f: This passage, incidentally, is the most powerful argument the place of reason as a tool in overcoming merely natural or supposed inequalities in the formation of civil society. A good example of the way it works appears in the way the U. S. military establishment has come to embrace the integration of "minorities" and women, despite long-standing and deeply ingrained private prejudices. Having been told that the judgment of the principal magistrate and commander-in-chief (the U. S. president) was that only full integration was acceptable, the military establishment set about integrating the armed forces. More recently, senior commanders, having voiced their prejudices on the subject of women in combat roles, nevertheless made clear that a consensus to the contrary would be obeyed. The "follow through" of the military establishment—both career officers and civilian authorities—is admirably demonstrated by the generally high ratings the armed forces receive on their integration efforts, both in external assessments and from those serving. It appears the military establishment is eminently disciplined in the submission of merely private reason to reason as it develops into public judgment.

forms from it a world. It is rendered compatible with the purely communal demands of duty imposed upon a person in a world by one's fellows, in judgment involving both a perceptual and a teleological component.

If this is so, reason—construed as moral and judgmental—can only be understood as arising from the context of civil society; it may only be natural secondarily and by derivation. The expression, "natural reason," may be misleading.

C

Civic (not merely private) immortality and civil reason come together in action. Action is a good deal more fundamental and concrete than either immortality or reason:

... Both the Greek and Latin languages possess two verbs to designate what we uniformly call "to act." The two Greek words are archein: to begin, to lead, and finally, to rule; and prattein: to carry something through. corresponding Latin verbs are agere: to set something in motion; and gerere, which is harder to translate, and the enduring somehow means and supporting continuation of past acts whose results are the res gestæ. the deeds and events we call historical. ... The Greek word archein, which covers beginning, leading, ruling, that is, the outstanding qualities of the free man, bears witness to an experience in which being free and the capacity to begin something new coincided. Freedom, as we would say today, was experienced in spontaneity.61

Action is a matter of beginnings. It is spontaneous—that is, it does not arise out of long planning or merely from within an historical or personal complex of previous happenings. How can an act be spontaneous? There must be two antecedent logical conditions.

First, there must be an event, the occurrence of which is unpredictable. If events to which human action is a response were predictable, planning would be efficacious. But planning often fails, except in extremely limited circumstances and for short periods; even then it is subject to imponderables. If one looks to the source of such imponderables, it seems

<sup>61</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 155f

<sup>62</sup>My favorite illustration of this harks back to the days of central planning in the former Soviet Union: An American economist asked his opposite number in the planning office how the final resolution between goals and reality was accomplished. The Russian gave as his answer the action of seizing the end of his belt and drawing it tighter.

they must come out of nature, the chaotic domain wherein the order of human reason does not extend except provisionally. It is amazing how, despite the efforts of modern science and technology to extend the world into the natural domain, chaos continues to prevail.

Second, human beings must be free to respond. This freedom is the power to assess that which is present, prior to and outside the mediation of reason, and, through reason, accommodate it. This is, in the first instance, a reasoned reassessment of the initial apprehension, and an appropriation of the event into the world. Second, there is a judgment made as to appropriate response. The first assessment can be private, even solipsistic but the second is essentially civil, and subject to subsequent approbation or disapproval by the body-politic.

D

Judgment and subsequent approbation brings up authority. All action is necessarily authoritative, in that authority is the power to initiate and to be certain that what is initiated will be approved by others with whom the acting authority is in community, who are called to participate in that action. On the other hand, the lack of authority precludes action.

Authority, ... can be vested in persons—there is such a thing as personal authority, as, for instance, in the relation between parent and child, between teacher and pupil—or it can be vested in offices, as, for instance, in the Roman senate (*auctoritas in senatu*) or in the hierarchical offices of the Church (a priest can grant valid absolution even though he is drunk). Its hallmark is unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is needed. ... To remain in authority requires respect for the person or the office. The greatest enemy of authority, therefore, is contempt, and the surest way to undermine it is laughter.<sup>65</sup>

Notice that authority has no recourse to coercion or persuasion. <sup>66</sup> If someone does something under coercion, of course the actor is not acting freely. The action is taken under the immediate necessity of doing

<sup>63</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 153, 144f

<sup>64</sup>*ibid.*, p. 220

<sup>65</sup>Hannah Arendt, On Violence: New York (HarBrace), 1969; p. 45. Wilhelm Hennis, sometime professor of political science in the University of Freiburg, has made a related case for the notion of "legitimacy." It is, he says, largely a measure of the "respectedness" of those in authority.

<sup>66</sup>cf.: Arendt, Between Past & Future, p. 93

something to relieve the coercion. The coercion itself—and the agency or person exercising it—is also compelled, by a desire that demands the instrumentality of the coerced actor. In a sense, there is a "team" relationship between the coerced and the source of the coercion. That coercion and action in the proper sense of the word—as something free of necessity—are irreconcilable was recognized in antiquity; that recognition has never been seriously doubted in Western political theory and practice.<sup>67</sup>

That persuasion also stands counter to authority is a more subtle point; Hannah Arendt attributes this to Plato. The distinction is a fine one. To persuade means the rectitude of the deed one has done is not immediately recognizable. But an act from authority should only need to be made known to be seen as right and proper—persuasion should not be necessary. That is, the person possessed of authority acts in full assurance that his act stands approved before the fact. To question the act is to question the competence of the actor's authority, and in the process, to deny it.

The reasoning for this argument can be summarized this way: Prior to the constitution of the civic body, human beings gathered together have, in principle, no common established institutions by which action may be taken. There certainly are such institutions in households, but households are private, and subject to the despotism (literally, in the case of the archaic Greek household!) of its head. Where there are no public institutions, either the strong exert their will over others, or in the case that a rough equality of strength obtains, some will seek to persuade others. Once the civic body is constituted, as part of that constitution, common institutions come into being. Deeds done by those vested with the authority of those institutions and acting within their prescribed boundaries, perform acts which stand approved in advance by the community. Such people have a mandate; they are *commanded* to exercise the imperium. The constitution prevents excess—it is absolutely sacred and violating is not just treason, but sacrilege.

In fact, some evidence for this position already has appeared in the context of the discussion of the political machine. When it is in office, it holds a monopoly of this authority; it claims (rightly, by virtue of being in office) a mandate. The machine's *perpetuum mobile* depends on retaining

<sup>67</sup>cf.: Cicero, *Actio secunda in Verrem*, V, esp. 163: One of the gravest charges against Verro was that of coercing citizens of the Republic.

<sup>68</sup>Arendt, op. cit.

<sup>69</sup>Arendt, On Violence, p. 44. The notion of "mandate" is an important one; it is, after all, the right to command, to exercise authority. A mandate is vested in the office, or even the collection of offices together, not in a particular office-holder. Thus, it is mistaken for a given magistrate—a Ronald Reagan, e. g.—to claim a mandate; the entire government holds the

office and the authority which is its expression. Doing so, it is "in power" literally and figuratively.

By contrast, the authority of the civil bureaucracy is merely derivative. It possesses no *imperium* of its own. When bureaucrats take it upon themselves to act beyond the obvious bounds of the institutions they administer, their actions are perceived as corrupt and unjust, a flagrant violation of the constitution of the civic body. Equally, the expression of "special interests" by individuals, who through "demagoguery" or similar persuasive techniques gather about themselves a following, is usually deemed pernicious to the well-being of the body-politic.

It does not seem this perspective is limited to Western culture. Chinese imperial government relied entirely on the existence of a continuing body of officials whose authority derived from the mastery of the institutions they administered. The concept of the competent individual, as opposed to the technical specialist, as the only acceptable governor from the level of the capital administration to the level of county was clearly articulated in pre-imperial times, and formed until the present century an effective gauge of the powerfulness of the regime. If the officials were of less than the highest calibre, assessed by the standards of Confucian education, to the regime was understood to be close on failure. There is also a sense that persuasion or coercion to action other than that perceived as right and proper was antithetical to good government; Chinese history and myth lauds scholar-officials who protested any such thing, sometimes loosing their lives in the process.

It is an interesting coincidence that the Confucian norm was first expressed within a century of the similar notion of Plato in *The Statesman*.

Authority is the expression of a person's recognized competence to lead through action. To exercise authority, reason which is inherent in human being by nature, is extended to judgment. Kant says that such judgment "woos" a consensus, so that others, being shown the acts, immediately understand them as if already ratified. This extension of reason into the

mandate. The individual magistrate possesses an *imperium*, perhaps, but one of the purposes of civic institutions is to circumscribe such an *imperium*, and indeed, subject it to periodic validation.

The position of legislators is even more peculiar. Though persuasion is antithetical to political action, in a legislature persuasion is a normal way of going about business. It is probably this contradiction, in part, that caused classical political thinkers to place legislation outside the political arena proper.

<sup>70</sup>As when a government had fallen on hard times, and had been selling not merely official titles but also the offices that went with them, or when the regime was largely foreign and could not attract sufficient scholar-officials.

domain of human action—*moral* reason—involves, so it seems, a supervention of the merely natural in human being.

If this sort of reason is not admitted, it is hard to see just how there could be anything like a city, as distinct from other kinds of human agglomerations. It seems to be something not really necessary to the affairs of smaller enclaves; other, substantially less cumbersome mechanisms can suffice for private activity.

On the other hand, while this kind of reason can be attributed to larger societies—and Modern state theory is little more than the attribution of earlier civic categories to states—the relative intimacy of civic society that makes action possible under this model is absent in a nation-state. It is not clear that even the magnificent visibility of activity the communications capabilities of late-Modernity afford can substitute for that intimacy.

E

Thus far the discussion has been of purely secular elements in the human mind set. Religion needs to be acknowledged. Ultimately, the city is a religious center—without that having anything to do with any cult other than the civic religion.

For religious man, space is not homogenous; he experiences interruptions, breaks in it; some parts of space are qualitatively different from others. ... There is, then, a sacred space and hence a strong, significant space; there are other spaces that are not sacred and so are without structure or consistency, amorphous. Nor is this all. For religious man, this spatial nonhomogeneity finds experience of an opposition between space that is sacred—the only real and real-ly existing space—and all other space, the formless expanse surrounding it. It must be said at once that the religious experience of the nonhomogeneity of space is a primordial one. ... <sup>71</sup>

The world is the space within which human beings live and which they constitute through an interpretive moment. It is sacred. The urban space is an expression of this. It is bounded and ordered. To enter into a new space and ally it with the old sacred space through colonization is a religious event; there are other events of like significance in the history of all cities. Cities are orderly, the antithesis of natural chaos; religion is at

<sup>71</sup>Eliade, op. cit., p. 20

<sup>72</sup>Fustel makes this clear in *The Ancient City* (Doubleday, ). Also cf.: Wheatley, *op. cit.*, who makes the case from the foundation of modern archæology.

least an expression of human preference for order over chaos. The two are linked, if only in having a common origin in human being.

This raises the question of modern, formless "conurbation" where boundaries are unclear and the claiming process involves no link between original place and the new place. Suffice it to say, one would expect authority to be weak if not altogether absent in such places—and the prediction proves correct. For example, in Oakland (discussed in earlier chapters), the city bureaucracy aims at the exercise of an imperium supervening the mandate of elected officials.

### V

One gets beyond the limited perspectives of the social-scientific doctrines about cities only by adding something beyond them. The previous sections have described elements of human being suggestive of that "something."

Call it "purposiveness." This comports well with the notion of a conversion of chaotic nature to an understandable world—one with various personal attributes and a view of society, and the special aspects of the modern "mind-set" which seem important in understand what a city is in late-Modernity. It also fits with the concept of public reason in authority, resulting in immortality.

Purposiveness is also interesting because it is something to which modern social science may not, on its own presuppositions, extend. Without the concept of human purposiveness, discussion of formal and final causes are impossible. Such causes—signs of purposiveness, as that has been traditionally explained—are either ignored by social science, or mutated into a species of efficient causality which is amenable to standard social-scientific dogma. The question of the real existence of purposes—telou—may be set aside. But the *belief* in their real existence, and action based on that belief, needs to be considered. In fact, the concept of action, set out above, is a perfect ground for this, since action—*political* action, anyway—is meaningless if not purposive.

But what is purposiveness in human, communal existence, and how is it possible?

#### A

Hannah Arendt's distinction of action from labor is a very good beginning point. The latter is activity undertaken to supply things necessary to subsistence. It becomes specifically human activity as fabrication.

Labor contrasts with action in several definitive ways. First, labor to supply the needs of human subsistence may take place in conjunction with others, but need not. A person may live the life of a hermit, for example. Second, the level of subsistence is generally so defined that the activity undertaken to supply its needs does not require great specialization on the part of such people as may labor together. Most positions in the laboring community can be filled equally well by any person without regard to training or background; this is arguably the case even in advanced technology-oriented societies. The possibility of a division of labor, without regard to qualifications other than natural happenstance (the size of the laborer, perhaps) leads to what has been described above as "teamwork."

Arendt also distinguishes action from work. Like labor, work can take place in isolation; it is defined by the special skills of those doing the work, unlike labor, where special skills are not particularly important. Labor tends to be social, because human beings have found that they can better supply their subsistence needs through a team effort. Work, on the other hand, tends to be private and personal. The most obvious examples of "workers" in Arendt's sense are scholars and artists. The activity is, from the very beginning, a private one. It involves a private vision, and is only made public when it is more or less complete. This private vision is largely concerned with a rendering of what is natural as a world, with the intention of presenting that image to one's fellows—but always and only after one is convinced that the rendition is completed, a purely private assessment.<sup>74</sup>

It can be argued that this private activity, while not producing the means of subsistence, is at least conducive to such production. For example, a scientist-turned-engineer is no longer simply pursuing his

<sup>73</sup>This only seems a contradiction. Though technological society would seem to spawn specialists, and foster specialization, in fact the *laborious* end of society favors "generalists" by which is meant people without skills and generally untrained folks. Second, special training supposed to better prepare for higher positions in the laboring hierarchy are demonstrably free of content. Even that most modern, high-tech tool, the personal computer, is aimed at the elimination of specialization; programming is intended to be absent arcane elements, and even to be unnecessary. The few specialists required in the creation of personal computers—e. g., the design engineers, and system-software programmers ("software engineers") are an isolated group, badly treated and the butt of jokes. See Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 91.

<sup>74</sup>The question is, how important is the public presentation? There is a gratification, surely, in the very act of making the presentation; it is greater still if the work is well-received, and there may even be a perverse satisfaction if it is not well-received ("those utter boors, those critics/incompetent scholars/fill-in-the-blank, clearly cannot appreciate the brilliance/lucidity, &c."). But the work itself is already a "done deal;" and, since it is done as a purely private activity, it is not clear that a public ratification or validation has any material significance.

scholarly interests, but directing team efforts, usually deemed by others, at least, as conducive to subsistence. Social-scientists on the government payroll would be in much the same situation.

All this is very different from action:

Action ... is never possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act. Action and speech need the surrounding presence of others. ... Action and speech are surrounded by and in constant contact with the web of acts and words of other men.<sup>75</sup>

Where labor and work are specifically human ways of being-natural. they are not themselves expressions of what we understand as being-Action, on the other hand, is the expression of something specifically human—even definitively human, if the ancient definitions of human being as at once "πολιτικον" and "λογον εχον" are accepted. That is, action is something in which individuals—never abandoning their individuality, and most especially retaining the ability to conceive a world and express it in speech—begin and continue with others an enterprise defined by a purpose, the end of which is more than mere subsistence. To the extent action goes beyond what is merely an extension of ongoing subsistence, it is sui generis, and the categories (derived form ongoing experience) under which its merits might be assessed don't fit.<sup>77</sup> Only categories arising from within the realm of action itself—the political milieu—and which the action itself creates, are adequate to any assessment of it. These categories are either *post actu* approbation, or constitutional intrinsically related categories.78

В

Action is the concretion of willing. It is, therefore, the most moral of human activities, in which human moral reason has fullest play.

Kant characterizes the will as natural, as well as something through which what is natural can be assimilated to the world of human activity. "As the faculty of desire," he says, will is a "natural cause." As a natural cause, it determines what is practically possible, as opposed to determining physical possibility. In the speculation that something is practically

<sup>75</sup>*ibid.*, p. 188

<sup>76</sup>*ibid.*, p. 22f; cf. p. 84 (note)

<sup>77</sup>*ibid.*, p. 31

<sup>78</sup>cf.: Royce, op. cit., p. 107

<sup>79</sup>Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 8

<sup>80</sup>ibid.

possible, i. e., that is can be willed, that possibility is assimilated from the realm of theory to that of practice.  $^{\rm st}$ 

The natural precept becomes subject to the laws of practical reason, and to the concept of freedom. So Since the legislation of the understanding and of reason are entirely different, but are exercised upon the same "territory of experience," there are both legitimate and illegitimate modes in which free human action and merely natural human existence can coexist. The key to legitimacy is found in the concept of freedom, which in turn imparts to the interpretive perception of nature—the world—a sense of purpose which is foreign to nature itself. Kant describes this unity:

The concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the world of sense the purpose proposed by its laws and consequently nature must be so thought that the conformity to law of its form at least harmonizes with the possibility of the purposes to be effected in it according to the laws of freedom. There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains; and the concept of this ground, although it does not attain either theoretically or practically to a knowledge of the same, and hence has no peculiar realm, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of one to that according to the principles of the other.<sup>84</sup>

Action takes place in a world recognized as purposeful, in which different perceptions—hence, different senses of purpose—are in dialogue. In short, human beings, defined as  $\lambda o \gamma o \nu \epsilon \chi o \nu$ , come together and, speaking together, forge a common world. This is the primal act—the  $\lambda o \gamma o \epsilon \gamma$  incarnate. It is also the first expression of human will. All other acts are executions of the constituted implications of this innovation. <sup>55</sup>

<sup>81</sup>*ibid*., p. 7

<sup>82</sup>*ibid.*, p. 8f

<sup>83</sup>*ibid.*, p 10f

<sup>84</sup>*ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>85</sup>In part, this is the message of de Toqueville's L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution Francaise. It is why the U. S. Constitution is more important than the Declaration of Independence. The latter is an explanation of things gone wrong in an old world, but the former actually founds a new world. By comparison, the French revolution failed because it could not distinguish in any real way between its Declaration of the Rights of Man from its need for a new constitution. It remained mired in the very world it wished to replace.

But suppose the unified—though different—of the supersensible is obscured, through the irruption of nature into *civic* society, so that *civil* society comes to be seen as merely the product of natural motivations and purposiveness is no longer a matter of freedom—may not even exist. This is the position of late-Modern social science. If this is so, it is no longer possible to speak of human freedom, or morality. In fact, it would seem impossible to theorize about any society in which such action is possible; it would be completely meaningless to do so. This is not limited to "behavorist" or "behavioralist" social science. *All* Modern social science, by virtue of the assumed premisses of Modern thinking, are committed this way.

C

The preceding subsection commits this study to a species of metaphysical (but not, therefore, epistemological) realism. That is, there is some domain of things, distinct from those thinking them, though it is not necessarily clear what those things are. This has really been the underlying metaphysical assumption from the beginning. It is not a bad assumption; most people share some variant of it, at least in day-to-day life. But it does stand in stark contrast to the prevalent Idealism which "officially" undergirds most modern thinking, and in which the only really real thing is my mind, and in which a distinction between metaphysical and epistemological Idealism is not possible.<sup>87</sup>

Judgment is the faculty which can reconcile individual moral perceptions with perceptions of nature. In judgment, possibilities are perceived in nature by the will and understanding are subjected to the laws of reason.

Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) be given, the judgment which subsumes the particular under it (even if, as transcendental judgment, it furnishes, *a priori*, the conditions in conformity with which subsumption under that universal is alone possible) is determinant. But if

<sup>86</sup>The old schools of Anglo-American, linguistic-analytic philosophy—the sort popularized by Russell and Ayer, and Quine in this country, and very much the dominant philosophical mode in the U. S. for three or four decades, get caught in an egregious contradiction when they make moral philosophy into sociology. If they are right, then both moral philosophy and sociology are mere chimeras. See Ayer's Language, Truth & Logic, chapter 6.

<sup>87</sup>For neat definitions of the terms involved, see esp. the entries for *Realismus* and *Idealismus* in Apel and Ludz, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*: Berlin (de Gruyter), 1958.

only the particular be given, for which the universal has to be found, the judgment is merely reflective.\*8

More often than not, it is Kant's "merely reflective" judgment that is important in seeing possibilities and from them determining laws of action. This is the sort of thing Kant doesn't really like, but that is where most of us are. We are confronted with a constellation of things and events, and we forge them into a unity and do a "now, what?" Sometimes, however, we have very clear ends toward which we need to go, and forge the constellation present to us accordingly—Kant would like that even less, even if it is the determinant mode of judgment.

At least, the latter mode of reflective judgment is critical, and Kant would favor that. Moreover, it is ideally suited to the special cooperation that is action. Reflective judgment is suited to the spontaneity of situations rising out of the chaos of nature, commanding human response.

The model through which political judgment may most easily be approached is the judgment of taste. Like the political judgments human beings make, whether acting in concert or from authority (and in that, assuming their acts are at least in concert with the thought of their fellows), "the judgment of taste also claims... to be valid for all men." This is not *a priori* validity; there is no objective necessity. Rather, it is a subjective necessity, the validity of which rests upon a presumption of *post actu* ratification. This was discussed at some length as a characteristic of authority. Reflective judgment, independent of concepts, in its move to the universal from the particular, discovers a unity for which objectivity may be claimed. The property of taste and the property of the particular of the particular of the particular of the particular of the property of the property of the particular of the property of the property

To discover objective validity in a subjective judgment, merely subjective interest, which is present in the original response of the will to what is present to it in intuition, must be suppressed:

Every interest spoils the judgment of taste and takes from its impartiality. ... Judgments so affected can lay no claim at all to a universally valid satisfaction, or at least so much less the claim, in proportion as there are sensations of this sort among the determining grounds of taste.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>88</sup>Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 15

<sup>89</sup>ibid., p. 27

<sup>90</sup>ibid.

<sup>91</sup>ibid., pp. 53f, 74f

<sup>92</sup>*ibid.*, p. 58

Should such purely subjective interests be suppressed, the conflicts which commonly attend judgment are also reconciled. The political analogy is fairly clear: In action, cooperation is secured through the objectification of one's judgments according to the rule of the institutions which confer authority; this involves a suppression of merely personal interest, and, in the case of the person bearing authority, a dual identification of the common interest of one's immediate constituency (which may oneself alone, or a group of which one is representative), and of the body-politic as a whole. At the confidence of the suppression of the common interest of one's immediate constituency (which may oneself alone, or a group of which one is representative), and of

D

Common interest actively constitutes purposiveness. The judgment of taste that a thing is beautiful or sublime apprehends in the object of judgment some fulfillment which is expressed as its purpose. That purpose may not, in fact, have anything to with the thing as it is in itself, and may rather be the expression of a purposiveness in the human being making the judgment; i. e., purposiveness appears as a human interpretive moment in rendering worldly that which is natural.

In political judgment, the interpretive moment wherein a possible fulfillment is perceived is identical with the moment in which personal or local interest is subjected to a broadening perspective.

The perception of things as fulfilling some purpose is commonly transferred from its status as interpretation to the thing itself:

...The concept of an object, so far as it contains the ground of the actuality of this object, is the purpose; and the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is only possible according to purposes is called the purposiveness of its form.<sup>95</sup>

Since the purposiveness of a thing is conceptual, it cannot exist in the thing as it is in itself, but only in its worldly interpretation. Yet that purposiveness is expressed as if it were in nature. 96 This transference is a purely reasonable activity.

Practical purposiveness, the purposiveness which a will expresses in action, is more obviously a humen interpretive moment, being, as Kant

<sup>93</sup>*ibid.*, p. 186; cf.: Hobbes, *op. cit.*, pp. 122f, 116

<sup>94</sup> This is developed as the thesis of Tussman,  $Obligation\ and\ the\ Body\ Politic\ (Oxford,\ 1968).$ 

<sup>95</sup>Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 17

<sup>96</sup>*ibid*.; cf.: p. 20

says, "a determination of the free will." And a such a determination is a determination of reason. Kant believes this is a determination  $a\ priori$ , but one that is critical, grounded in reflection, and thus a synthetic  $a\ priori$ .

E

The importance of purposiveness to this inquiry is simple: Cities, as specifically human places, and as "trans-natural," fulfill a purpose. As soon as cities are seen as tending toward an end, human natural existence (the coming together in order to live) and human artifice (building cities in order to live well) are reconciled. That's not to say there aren't puzzles in this; the notion of an end as a cause has seemed a bit funny from the time it was first expressed (*Metaphysica* allows it, but does not make it a cause in the strongest sense). Modern philosophy rejects outright it—but it keeps cropping up in one form or another.

### VI

If action expresses a purposiveness which is ratified *post actu*, then the community of actors must be a limited one. A world-wide country is thinkable, but not terribly practical; a *universal* community is an absurdity, since the parameters of the ratifying body would be unclear, and authority could not be defined.

What delimits the community of actors, both as to place and membership—these two elements together comprising what is meant by city?

### A

What this question really asks for, in the first place is an "outward and visible sign" of the special grace that defines a community of actors. The religious language is deliberate; this is a matter of civil religion. Of such a sign, Eliade says:

... Some sign suffices to signify the sacredness of a place. ... In such cases, the sign, fraught with religious meaning, introduces an absolute element and puts an end to relativity and confusion. Something that does not belong to this world has manifested itself apodictically and in so

<sup>97</sup>*ibid.*, p. 18

<sup>98</sup>ibid., also p. 26, but cf.: p. 41

doing has indicated an orientation or determined a course of conduct.<sup>30</sup>

The most obvious civic delimiting sign is the city boundary—until quite recently, a real wall, and until still more recently a matter of considerable concern. The importance of the city wall is very well documented in the standard literature about cities. <sup>100</sup> In fact, when boundaries become fluid, the sense of city (what I have been calling "civicity") is in decline. However, this most obvious sign of cities is a trifle ambiguous. There is a confusion of *urbs* (the city as place) and *civitas* (the city as a body-politic). We need to find a strictly *civic* sign.

В

The existence of a community leading the good life, beyond mere subsistence, would be a good sign of a city, completely in harmony with ancient tradition and the more modern emphasis on community-ascommonwealth. The "good life" is a complex concept:

The "good life," as Aristotle called the life of the citizen, ... was not merely better, more carefree or nobler than ordinary life, but of an altogether different quality. It was "good" to the extent that by having mastered the necessities of sheer life, by being freed from hard labor and work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures to their own survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life processes. At the root of Greek political consciousness we find an unequaled clarity and articulateness in drawing this distinction. No activity that served only the purpose of making a living, of sustaining only the life process, was permitted to enter the political realm.... 101

This needs to be restated positively: The freedom to act, to hold and exercise authority and spend time being aware of the institutions of the body-politic untrammeled by more than minimal concern for natural necessity (some concern—such as daily meals—being inescapable) was the

<sup>99</sup>Eliade, op. cit., p. 27

<sup>100</sup>E. g., in Fustel de Coulange's *The Ancient City*, Mazzolani's *The Idea of the City in Roman Thought*, Wheatley's *Four Quarters of the Earth*, &c.. Building and re-building city walls is always an act of historical significance, and is not limited to any one culture. One of the marks of Han Chinese renascence in the Ming dynasty was the renovation of city walls, allowed to fall into disrepair by the non-Han Yuan dynasty. In city cultures where walls seem to have been less common, analogous boundary structures or markers inevitably are found; the significance of such marks is, as inevitably, something of which the culture is aware.

<sup>101</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 36f

sign of the citizen. The fact that the citizen could not do any of these things except in concert with others of like status was sufficient to prove the existence of the civic body.

Citing Weber, Arendt goes on to note that this definition was asserted in the face of the very real difficulty attendant upon abandoning the activities related to naturally necessary support to a sub-citizen class who could use their control of subsistence against the civic body, and the coincident creation of a "pensionopolis." 102

A comparison with a very different acting community is instructive. Royce notes that the apostolic Christian community was a corporate entity. While Pauline theology defined it as a "mystery," nevertheless it was expressed in "practical concreteness" and involved "active heroism." <sup>103</sup> Both the New Testament and patristic writings suggest that this community also required setting aside merely natural necessity as a principal concern, in order to achieve a "good life" consistent with salvation. That the highest expression of the Christian communal life has most often been associated with monachism (though this is clearly a post-apostolic innovation, its development is quite early), in which natural necessity is subordinated to a life of prayer and holy action, is further affirmation of the principle, and a good example.

C

The actions demanded of a citizen in leading the good life are not leisurely. On the contrary,

Coulanges, in distinction from other authors, stresses the time- and strength-consuming activities demanded from an ancient citizen, ... and sees rightly that Aristotle's statement that no man who had to work for his livelihood could be a citizen is a simple statement of fact, rather than the expression of prejudice. 104

Arendt also notes that laborious activity precluded full civic status well into the early Middle Ages. The demands of leading a civic life demanded

<sup>102</sup>*ibid.*, p. 37 That is, the slaves could revolt, and marginal groups, free but not citizens (what in later times would be "burghers" in Geneva, for example) could go on strike or move elsewhere. And older citizens, as happened in Athens, could make their free time pay by serving with some regularity on juries, or in some other capacity, for which a small sum was paid; the analogy with today's welfare system, which creates a group who live entirely upon "entitlements," is disturbing.

<sup>103</sup>Royce, op. cit., p. 94

<sup>104</sup>Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 65 (note)

full attention; a person devoted to getting his daily living had little if any time for such—from the perspective of natural necessity—frivolity.

This concern extends to making money—there is a sharp Aristotelian disapprobation of a life that is  $\chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\circ\varsigma$ . This is not something limited to late-Archaic Athenian society. It applied to Romans (senators might be farmers, but not tradesmen) and the same sort of prohibition obtains, for similar reasons, in the ancient Chinese disparagement of trade and low-level farming. Money-making was understood to be simply an extension of the concern to supply the needs of natural necessity, though it might be one step removed from the actually necessary activity of labor proper.

It is interesting to think how this not-uncommon view alters in the course of a society's development. There always comes a time, so it seems, when wealth and the success at making-a-living rises to prominence as a desideratum in determining who is politically worthwhile. And historically, this shift always seems to be coincident with the development of what may be called an "imperial" government. In ancient Rome, the change of the Republic as a community of (at least nominally) equal people into the empire was accompanied by a change in the activities citizens undertook—and also in the nature of the citizen. The citizen of the Republic was defined by duties fulfilled in the *cursus honorem* and voting and so on; the imperial citizen was defined by entitlements and obligations due him from the state—e. g., the right to be tried by Roman courts. Other societies experiences other, similar changes.

The similar modern situation, where wealth is a prime qualification for citizenship, has been coincident with deterioration of active political life. Citizenship is merely a privileged status, but not one demanding cooperative action. This development has been coincident with the rise of nation-states in which important political activity has been transferred out of the hands of the local body-politic to a supervening, socially-technological apparatus.<sup>105</sup>

In a word, wealth and concern with money-making, and "upward mobility," &c., stand opposed to the achievement of the good life. 106

<sup>105</sup>ihid

<sup>106</sup>A consequence: Socialism stands opposed to politics. It not only claims that the state will wither away, but actively promotes that end. Socialism is very concerned with chrematistic, in its insistence on capital formation and the provision of natural necessities for all. Modern revolutionary movements—both those sponsored by the former Soviet Union and other like regimes, and those sponsored by the U. S.—are also opposed to politics; they actively campaign against the formation of a body-politic, not only through their terror, but by consuming the common wealth that would make civic freedom possible. In this sense, socialism merely furthers the projects of the "liberal" enlightenment.

D

In addition to the internal distinction of the coherent and limited community afforded by the conception of the good life, transcending mere natural necessity, there is also an external distinction.

> The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and This provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or one indicative of substantial content. ... The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association dissociation, ... The political enemy need not be morally evil or æsthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible. These can neither be decided by a previously determined general norm nor by judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party.107

Who the enemy of the civic community is not all that important. That it is possible to distinguish such an enemy, even to the point of xenophobia, seems quite important to the self-definition of a community, with the attendant sharp awareness of institutions, in which a citizens participates, and which are forbidden to an alien. The community defines itself and its norms as "good" and its way of acting constitutes the "good life," with the provisions and limitations noted. The alien way of life is not good; "not-good" is not for that reason *bad*, but it is something to be countenanced, tolerated—not embraced.

In previous times, the exact criteria for citizenship and the determination  $a\ priori$  of aliens were matter of debate, never wholly resolved. In late modernity, the criteria are still more elusive. This will prove a problem in the synthesis toward I am working. It will keep the synthetic resolution merely provisional.

<sup>107</sup>Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*: New Brunswick (Rutgers), 1978; p. 26f. The former Soviet Union may have been the most precise model of what Schmitt, supposed to be a fascist theorist, is talking about in this "'tween-wars" essay. The theory he develops is quite generic; cf.: Hobbes, *op. cit.*, p. 111. On internal enemies, cf.: Cicero, *Actio prima in Verrem*, 36. Form more precise discussion of this in Schmitt, see *op. cit.*, p. 28f, and note, p. 28.

### VII

Cities may pass away from external depredations, either in warfare or from supervention by nation-states. They may also destroy them-selves. It may be that the auto-destructiveness of the civic body is the precondition for more obvious depredations. $^{108}$ 

### Α

The basic cause of a city's downfall appears to be a failure of intellect. Sometimes it is impossible to think comprehensively; the very attempt is discouraged. There is a concomitant spiritual failure, a sort of "privatization" of purposiveness and closure of the world. Politics ceases as a public enterprise and comes to be merely the promotion of party professionals' *perpetuum mobile*. It is more naturally allied with a bureaucratic apparatus having a similar end and less with the body of citizens, who become merely a privileged group to be governed, rather than a body of cooperating activists. 111

This kind of politics fits well with a notion of human being as merely natural. Strictly political reason—prudence—simply can't survive the privatization; personal interests come into play. and we're back in the realm of pre-civic natural necessity.

Emotions or perturbations of the mind are species of appetite and aversion, their differences having been taken from the diversity and circumstances of the objects that we desire or shun. They are called perturbations because they frequently obstruct right reasoning. They obstruct right reasoning in this, that they militate against the real

108Syncecism is the basis of civic foundation; "dececism" is no less possible. This is documented in the ancient and mediæval practices of civic foundation and has parallels in other cultures; cf.: Weber, *The City* (Macmillan, 1958), p. 143, also Wheatley, *op. cit.*, also Sansom, *A History of Japan*, vol. II, for a discussion of castle-towns in late-mediæval Japan. However, it is not a sufficient condition; prior (logically, if not temporally) to the ingathering of households is the foundation of a ceremonial center and the establishment of walls; cf.: Wheatley, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

109See Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 31. It is intriguing that the most lively intellectual publications are not published in the more "advanced" political societies, as this is usually judged, but in areas under development. Political literature in the former Soviet Union and the U. S. has generally been analytic of trends or rather ponderous pontifical pronouncements of pundits. By contrast, journal literature from Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent is fresh and often challenging to received opinions, as scholars seek to reform their cultures' institutions faced with change. An occasional move, to combine Marxist realism with Confucian humanism (paraphrasing Beijing University's Tang I-jie) is the hallmark of Chinese forward thinking. Et cetera.

<sup>110</sup>Eliade, op. cit., p. 178f

<sup>111</sup>Schmitt, op. cit., p. 32

good and in favor of the apparent and most immediate good, which turns out to be evil when everything associated with it hath been considered. For though judgment originates from appetite out of union of mind and body, it must proceed from reason. Therefore although the real good must be sought in the long term, which is the job of reason, appetite seizeth upon a present good without foreseeing the greater evils that necessarily attach to it. Therefore appetite perturbs and impedes the operation of reason....<sup>112</sup>

This is precisely what happened in the principal turn of 19th century political theory. The means of this change was the determination that "political" events were subject to the law of history, a dialectical outcome of the play of largely natural forces. What is left of politics is not action, but ideology.<sup>113</sup>

R

The second auto-destructive element in civic existence is the emergence of prevalent violence as a substitute for political discussion. It seems the condition for such prevalent violence is the intellectual failure discussed above.

Violence, as a political tool, is "rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it." Its emergence signifies the breakdown of legitimate authority. On the one hand, civil disobedience (not to mention rioting...) reflects upon the respectedness of those who embody the institutions of a given body-politic, so that their authority is deemed ineffective. They are not "doing the job" for which they were invested with the *magisterium* (now turned *imperium*). To disobey them is ideologically correct, since their inefficacy precludes the achievement of legitimate civil ends. On the other hand, criminal disobedience reflects the decline of a specific authority, the police."

When those invested with the civil *magisterium* themselves resort to violence (which inevitably seems to accompany the shift from *magisterium* to *imperium*) the civil society can hardly be said to exist. An extreme example of this, at the nation-state level, was attendant upon the

<sup>112</sup>Hobbes, op. cit., p. 55 [my emphasis] This is a Platonic expression of the matter, rather like a discussion of good in the early Socratic dialogues. It is a nice bridge to the consistent doctrine in Kant, summarized earlier.

<sup>113</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 30; cf.: Schmitt, op. cit., pp. 24, 22

<sup>114</sup>Arendt, On Violence, p. 79, cf.: p. 46

<sup>115</sup>Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Republic: New York (HarBrace), 1972; p. 74

Watergate episode of the mid-'70s. The evident and continuing violence of the civil magistrates and their servants created an atmosphere of criminal disobedience in response to other disobediences. The mirror of this is found in the temporary collapse of the state's economic structure; its resolution in the accession of a person perceived as fundamentally decent to the principal magistracy was accompanied by increasing economic stability.<sup>116</sup>

#### VIII

What we've been about in this part of the book is foundation-building. The earlier chapters set forth the "received opinion" about cities; that was interesting, but seemed incomplete. There is more to a city than its "matter" and the "moving cause" its citizenry represents. Moreover, that citizens did things was assumed; why they did things wasn't very well accounted for. To go ahead, some kind of political theory was needed, and this chapter reached back into a fairly broad range of traditional notions about how human beings can think and act together to accomplish ends they have in common, to forge such a theory. The idea is simply that cities are the center of human activity, and that activity is political, insofar as it is truly human. Understand the activity, and the nature of the habitat that permits it should be clear. Political activity is purposive; cities express that.

This has been a fairly involved argument, that cities are, among other things, an expression of the purposiveness of human existence. They have a purpose in themselves, and its fulfillment is a means to a larger human end. The case is convoluted; a summary is in order.:

In §I, I asserted that civic existence is, for human beings, the fulfillment of natural existence, and get into a discussion of what it is to be human, by nature. My concern here is not to rehash "natural law" theories, but to understand human being as naturally city-based.

\$II is about building a world: \$IIA is about convention and personal artifice as these come together in the fabrication of a world from natural

<sup>116</sup>Irene Scheuer, in an unpublished manuscript, documents a number of parallel cases. Her thesis is simple: When politics is in good order, then conditions throughout society reflect it, and vice-versa. I think this has real merit. It also raises some intriguing notions. For example, one could, without much difficulty, sustain a case that the various magisterial and legislative office in the U. S. have been given over to people who've not been politicians for the most part, since the Nixon debacle of the early '70s. As this is being written, the U. S. presidential campaign is shaping up to be a contest between a person who has rarely been a politician (George Bush served one term as a member of the House of Representatives, and one term as president; his other offices were appointive, or virtually so) and a person who has been mostly a politician. It will be interesting to see how this develops; will the U. S. electorate finally trust a politician again, and what number of them will make any choice at all?

(that is, apparently self-emergent) events. People make things, in short. This world-building is a cooperative effort, but in §IIB, I make a case that the Modern emphasis on "teamwork" subverts the possibility of cooperative action. As a result, making a common world (the essence of cities) fails. §IIC is an attempt to steer a course back from teamwork to cooperation. The problem here is rampant individualism, discussed in §IID.

§III is about communal purposiveness. This is not something received social science is well-suited to examine, as I show in §IIIA. Moreover, in §IIIB, teamwork, substituted for truly political cooperative action, actually stands opposed to communal purposiveness; it substitutes the equality of the assembly line for the equality of people with different capacities and skills cooperatively creating the city under the governance of a convention. It is the basic contention of this study, developed in §IIIC, that human society arises from a convention of this kind of equality.

§IV relates this convention of equality in action to moral reason—the reason that governs properly human activity. The proximate cause of humans being this way is a desire for immortality, as I show in §IVA. §IVB is a digression on the nature of moral reason based in judgment, as that operates in the foundation in thought of cooperative action. §IVC shows how reason (and judgment) come together with civic history in action. This conjunction is expressed in authority, which initiates ("authors") action—discussed in §IVD. Finally, §IVE is a digression on the civil religion.

§V is about "purposiveness" proper. Sections §VA and §VB contrast purposive action with labor. §VC notes that moral reason (judgment) in action commits one to a kind of metaphysical realism. A common interest in a commonly percieved (hence, objectively real, for all intents and purposes—and standard sneers on the subject of naive realism is really academic pointlessness) world is shown, in §VD, as that which actively constitutes purposes. The conclusion, in §VE, is that cities are the expression of such purposes.

# CITY CATEGORIES

The last chapters covered several "causes" of cities—as that notion is used heuristically for this study.

Material and efficient causes came from the social sciences; that is pretty much their limitation, and material causation is really only admitted by the social-scientific point-of-view in order to have something that efficient causes can move.

Final cause—the end, or better, purposiveness—in cities is not something social science is up to; in fact, social science is not even aware of any such thing, except perhaps in a weakened manner that has no power. Nevertheless, human beings think what they do has purpose, and that is sufficient ground to accept the notion, in the case of something that, in this study, is understood as purely human artifice.

Final causation was not easy to wrest from the matrix of observations, however. It turned out to be something that arose in cities as *civitas*, as citizens gathered together, acting toward a common end called "the good life." That is very vague; it has no obvious content—and that is good, because if it had content, it would not be universal.

In any event, a concept of purposiveness was needed, because, following the heuristic model of four causes, it is necessary to get to a formal cause for cities; as Aristotle says, to know a thing is to know its causes, and "cause" is most properly spoken of material and formal cause—together, they are substance. Ordinary common sense makes it clear, the form of a thing—both conceptually  $(\epsilon\iota\delta o\varsigma)$  and "physically"  $(\mu o\rho\phi\eta)$ —must be adequate to the purpose.

I

Civic space, the special limited territory of a city, expresses the unity of the body-politic, defines the plurality of its constituents, and represents these as a totality.

<sup>1</sup>Metaphysica, Book  $\Delta$ 

### Α

Already the matter of the conversion of nature to a world in experience has been discussed. This is a logically—and usually, temporally—prior act, upon which all subsequent acts are founded.

... The discovery ... of sacred space possesses existential value...; for nothing can begin, nothing can be done, without a previous orientation—and any orientation implies acquiring a fixed point. It is for this reason that religious man has always sought to fix his abode at the "center of the world." If the world is to be lived in, it must be founded.<sup>2</sup>

The original sacred space is that of the family circle and the physical territory it occupies.<sup>3</sup> When families come together in larger communities, a new sacred space is created, representing the common family spaces of all the inhabiting clans.<sup>4</sup> Those living outside the community so defined are a species of enemy;<sup>5</sup> should they succeed, by overt hostility or simply through the fact of becoming dominant in the affairs of a place which is not sanctified to them, they let in nature. If they are staved off, it is a holy victory:

"Our" enemies belong to the powers of chaos [viz., nature]. Any destruction of a city is equivalent to a retrogression to chaos. Any victory over the attackers reiterates the paradigmatic victory of the gods over the dragon (that is, over chaos).

The ancient space was defined by walls. Destroying a city's walls was a final act, through which the sacred space of the city was desacralized. What was destroyed was a unification of a number of diverse families, each with its own traditions, which had discovered a common purpose in increasingly more sophisticated expressions.

<sup>2</sup>Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: New York (HarBrace), 1959; p. 22

<sup>3</sup>Cf.: Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City*: Garden City (Doubleday), n.d.; esp. the sections on the family religion.

<sup>4</sup>ibid., p. 136f: This may be true for the world of classical antiquity about the Mediterranean, as Fustel describes. Other places seem to have followed different customs. For example, ancient China's civic centers were built around the family altars of the royal house; outside the royal, and perhaps some noble clans (the scholarly accounts differ), people had no ancestors to worship. This attitude toward those not members of ruling houses appears to have survived well into Chou times, and to have been influential even to the present time.

<sup>5</sup>see above in "The Purpose of Cities," where the exclusiveness of cities is discussed.

<sup>6</sup>Eliade, op. cit., p. 48

<sup>7</sup>Fustel, op. cit., p. 118

What modern analogues of the ancient sacralized space exist to afford unity to a given place, creating a common world? Even in those ancient, walled cities of the past, the walls have come down, or, surviving, are meaningless artifacts of the past. What are the limits in the modern city?

In antiquity, the evidence for the growth from pre-civic to civic space is clear.<sup>s</sup> The relationship of family space to civic space was evident and could guide the understanding; in modern society, the sense of family is so attenuated (even, apparently, in less-developed countries) that it no longer sacralizes a space.

On the other hand, the block seems to be a well-defined neighborhood space, and the sense of a special territory may have a modern root in this experience, which is very different from rural, non-urban experience.

At the same time, it was clear from our investigation of the modern understanding of such spaces, that the delimited spaces of neighborhood block were not matched in accepted theory with a notion of a delimited city. Rather, the dominant idea of modern city spaces was of a fluid region. In fact, a city with a well-defined boundary is something of an anomaly these days. Three brief illustrations of modern cities serve to illustrate the possibilities in late-Modern cities:

San Francisco is a city with well-defined boundaries. It is a city of modest size; as we know it today, it is really a mid-19th century foundation, with little connection to its Hispano-Mexican heritage. Interestingly, the city and the next higher government echelon, the county, are identical in extent. The city's position at the end of a peninsula provides a substantial part of its territorial definition, but even at its land border with the suburban spaces to the south, what is urban and what is not is clear to the casual observer. The city has developed to its territorial limit, and fortuitously has not transgressed that limit. The city's sense of unity has developed concurrently with the more obvious growth of the city.

Los Angeles has similar historical roots in a pre-civic colonial outpost; its virtual foundation occurred somewhat later, and it experienced a refoundation of a sort, during the second and third decades of the present century. Whatever boundaries may have existed in its earlier development,

<sup>8</sup>In Athens, e. g., φρατριαι structured the city until Cleisthenes "reformed" them and deprived them of any real meaning, just before the Persian Wars; in Rome, the *gens* was dominant until the end of the Republic. In China, clan affiliation appears to have been dominant until the effective end of feudalism in the Warring States period (subsequent clannishness in China—extant to this day—is not the same politically significant clannishness of the Chou dynasty). Wheatley develops the parallels to Western and Middle Eastern systems in the context of his study of Chinese cities, *The Four Quarters of the Earth* (cited above).

they had completely broken down by the end of the 1950s, of so that Los Angelean urban sprawl encompassed its own suburbs. It is no longer possible to distinguish city from non-city. At the same time, a waxing "particularity"—individualism and pluralism run rampant—shows up; the best evidence of this is the proliferation of individual transportation (everyone owns one or more automobiles) and the disappearance (except for a token survival) of a public transit system. In Los Angeles, civic unity, and civil cooperation has been largely impossible for decades. Consequently, crises are endemic (Los Angeles has twice been the flash point of rioting when other cities, in equally serious situations in other cities have proven resolvable).

San Francisco and Los Angeles represent extreme cases; a "mixed" situation, like that of New York, is more common. Modern New York is a late-19th century amalgamation of the cities of New York and Brooklyn, with suburban territories of the Bronx, portions of what was Queens County (the other portions became Nassau County) and Staten Island. The city is sharply demarcated from New Jersey by the Hudson River, and less sharply both from areas in New York State not within its juridical boundaries, and those within its borders but distinctly suburban (sort of a "Landschaft" to Manhattan's and Brooklyn's "Stadtteil"), by the increasing attenuation of the public transportation systems as one leaves the city proper. The result is that one may live within the juridical boundaries of the city, yet perceive oneself as living outside it—as is the case, say, of a resident of City Island, a resort and boating center in the Bronx.<sup>11</sup> The delimitation is not so sharp in this situation as it is in San Francisco: it is sharp enough that the resident of New York has a civic identity foreign to an urban sprawl such as Los Angeles.

This modern kind of demarcation is not so precise as was that of antiquity, or of the cities in Europe's Middle Ages. The fluidity of the modern neighborhood does not support the kind of association from which higher common association can grow, except occasionally. Its special space, the block, is geographically sharp, but more often transgressed than the sacred

<sup>9</sup>A curious volume, *Over the Range to the Golden Gate* (Chicago, 1903), illustrates the sprawl of Los Angeles by the contrast it shows with the turn-of-the-century situation. Los Angeles was 16 miles from Santa Monica in those days; today they abut and are indistinguishable.

<sup>10</sup>Los Angeles had a very good public transit system, based on a rail network. It was torn up and not replaced; the right-of-way was sold off for development. This has made the creation of a new public transit system very costly and difficult.

<sup>11</sup>This can be frustrating to city residents. Such outer areas are soonest deprived of city services, as when the New York municipal administration "wrote off" peripheral parts of the city in the mid-'70s, concentrating resources on the part of Manhattan south of 96th Street, the city-center of Brooklyn and the wealthier parts of Queens.

lands of the ancient  $\varphi \rho \alpha \tau \rho \alpha \sigma$  or gens. Perceiving the unity of the modern city is correspondingly more difficult. Both city boundaries and internal territory need further definition.

B

To be a resident of the civic space is to live in company with others. As Hannah Arendt notes, "…in Latin the word, 'to live' has always coincided with *inter homines esse*, 'to be in the company of men…;'" Roman existence being completely civic (as its legends of foundation, recorded and interpreted by Fustel, reveal), we may properly regard this understanding of life as equally civic. It also fits well with  $\tau\epsilon\lambda$ o $\varsigma$  of the city worked out in the last chapter.

Aristotle comments on this living-together with others:

It is manifest, therefore, that a state  $[\pi o \lambda \iota \varsigma]$  is not merely the sharing of a common locality for the purpose of preventing mutual injury and exchanging goods. These are necessary pre-conditions of a state's existence, yet nevertheless, even if all these conditions are present, that does not therefore make a state, but a state is a partnership of families and of clans in living well, and its object is a full and independent life. At the same time this will not be realized unless the partners do inhabit one and the same locality and practice intermarriage; this indeed is the reason why family relationships have arisen throughout the states, and brotherhoods and clubs for sacrificial rites and social recreations.<sup>13</sup>

There is no doubt that people do come together for mutual security and trade, under any number of circumstances.<sup>14</sup> But those alliances are temporary. Machiavelli would make the more permanent foundation a result of the special virtue of the founder in choosing a site and in legislating.<sup>15</sup> But even if the actual founding legislation of a body-politic occurs prior to its existence, from "outside," the on-going execution of this legislation depends upon a cooperative effort of the citizens of a place.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup>Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: New York (Viking), 1961; p. 73

<sup>13</sup>Aristotle, *Politics*: Cambridge (Loeb Classical Library), 1932; 1280b30. Cf.: Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*: New York (Free Press), 1964; p. 137 14Nicolo Machiavelli, *The Discourses*: Harmondsworth (Penguin), 1970; pp. 100ff

<sup>15</sup>*ibid.*, p. 102

<sup>16</sup>That founding legislation, and to some extent, the legislation of ordinances, takes place prior to the actual coming-to-be of the body-politic, as was noted in other places above. Machiavelli chooses poorly in his choice of Rome as a model; the *auctoritas* of the Roman

This execution of the basic legislation occurs in the first sacralizing of civic space. In Rome, as Fustel records,<sup>17</sup> this involved each initial inhabitant throwing a clod of his native soil within the sacred space defined by the furrow marking the city limits.<sup>18</sup> This group activity is precisely analogous to the sacralizing of space occupied by a single family or clan. In each case, there is a special innovation.<sup>19</sup> In each case, it needs to be a cooperative effort, through which a "we" is established; in the Roman family, the "we" was established by husband and wife, respectively priest and priestess of the family cult (there are analogues in other cultures), while in the state, it is the heads of the family cults gathering together. The initial cooperation continues; if it fails, the city disintegrates physically as well as spiritually, since the *civitas* establishes the *urbs*.

The modern city operates under a handicap. "Teamwork" supervenes cooperation and prevents the admission of diverse competences. Human being is perceived as undifferentiated (people are "equal" in being undifferentiated units of potential labor). The plurality of such undifferentiated individuals coming together to cooperate in the execution of laws within the unity of civic space is not really thinkable in late-Modernity.<sup>20</sup> One expects to find particularity and individuality made a special

senate included legislation, in that it could create ordinances for the day-to-day affairs of the Republic, and in a couple instances, change the Republic's very foundation. The Roman senate was "patrician" in the most literal sense; it was the ongoing gathering of the "fathers." I have not seen this character explored anywhere, but it appears that the senate was, in a certain sense, "outside" the society for some of its functions, when those involved responding to novel circumstances which called forth a change in the constitution of the Republic. On the other hand, it may be that *auctoritas* actually requires a certain being-outside. When legislators are "inside" the frame of the body-politic, history suggests they act as agents for their constituents; only when divorced from the body-politic for which they legislate can they be *representative* and objective.

17Fustel, op. cit., p. 136

18Eliade, op. cit., p. 30: Eliade cites a passage from the Shatapatha Brahmana, suggesting this sacralizing is at once an individual and group event. In China, the initial sacralizing included not only the founding members of a city (cf.: Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1 [Princeton, 1983], p. 13 (note) quotes a passage from the Tso Chuan, in which even nominally ignoble merchants are associated in the founding of a state); ancestors participated in the founding sacralization, which centered on the ancestral temple and its rites performed by an unbroken line of descendants. What is different is the way things move outward from the civic center to the walls of the ancient Chinese city; in the West, it seems things moved from the walls inward, in the sacralizing process.

19Eliade, op. cit., passim.

20Some politicians appear to understand the problem, and there is talk of things such as a "rainbow coalition" or a "gorgeous mosaic," with a corresponding idea of cooperation among diverse groups to discover common interests and forge common solutions. It is not clear that this is more than rhetoric. In New York, where the latter term was the slogan of a winning mayor's campaign, the subsequent reality was perceived by established functionaries in agencies with which I worked as merely providing an excuse for divvying up political pork in a manner more favorable to those hitherto not significant in the process. There was no

virtue, with concomitant voiding of the possibility of plurality in unity. In a city such as Los Angeles, it becomes blatant. $^{21}$ 

C

Machiavelli asserts: "Now of a truth no country has ever been united and happy unless the whole of it has been under the jurisdiction of one republic or prince..." Machiavelli's special time defined the possible forms of the institution of totality through which the unity and plurality of the civic space was expressed. But the expression of some kind of totality seems essential:

...This fact speaks for the stability of the amalgamation, that whenever one of the elements of the Roman trinity, religion or authority or tradition, was doubted or eliminated, the remaining two no longer secure. Thus, it was Luther's error to think that his challenge of the temporal authority of the Church and his appeal to unguided individual judgment would leave tradition and religion intact. So it was the error of Hobbes and the political theorists of the seventeenth century to hope that authority and religion could be saved without tradition. So, too, was it finally the error of the humanists to think it would be possible to remain within an unbroken tradition of Western civilization without religion and without authority.<sup>23</sup>

The Roman trinity is simply the collection of institutions which together defined the unity of that civic space (*urbs*, of course, but more important, the way in which it was inhabited as *civitas*). There are analogous structures for other bodies-politic. For imperial China, authority was vested in the imperial person, but not absolutely (the measure of its

noticeable change in operation at the agency level; deals continued to be cut "the old-fashioned way" though there was some lament over having to work with new officeholders whose grasp of the rules was perceived as muddy.

<sup>21</sup>Particularity as a predominating element in Los Angeles became obvious to me as I was waiting for a bus along Wilshire Boulevard—itself an act counter to L. A. norms. Looking up and down the street, I was impressed by the strident assertiveness of shop signs. Each was placed on a signing tower erected to be higher than those around it, to assert the uniqueness of the shop. Where such towers were not in use, or some similar stratagem by which the shopkeeper made clear his special virtue, the shop occupied a location where it was set off from surrounding businesses, and thus asserted a special individuality and separateness. The comparison was sharpened by familiarity with the situation in New York, where quite substantial businesses are indicated by almost indiscernible signs—sometimes by none at all.

<sup>22</sup> Machiavelli,  $op.\ cit.,$ p. 145

<sup>23</sup>Arendt, op. cit., p. 128

ratification is expressed in the highly complex concept of the Mandate of Heaven, as that evolved over nearly thirty centuries). Tradition evolved from a primitive sense of fear and respect for those who had gone before, and remains an active element in the culture. Religion is so essential to Chinese thinking that it has always been considered appropriate that the government regulate it; even the post-imperial regimes do so for reasons that have little to do with the outwardly Western face they present (and the ROC government on Taiwan calls its legislature the "Li-Fa Yuan"—the Bureau of Rites and Laws, completely consonant with ancient Chinese thinking about human conduct). The unity established in the foundation act by a plurality is passed on by this multifarious institution to subsequent generations, lending immortality to the city.

The best evidence of a late-Modern city's failure to erect such a multifarious institution is seen in Los Angeles. Authority is not claimed, religion is ill-defined and tradition is lacking. Authority cannot be claimed, because many parts of the *urbs* are not subject to the collective will of the *civitas*; some sections are nominally independent, and others do not own the sway of the city government. Religion is haphazard to an extreme degree. Tradition is impossible with a fluid population, the bulk of which is new to the city, and deliberately anonymous.

By comparison, in a relatively well-defined city as those things go in late-Modernity, San Francisco, tradition is omnipresent, a matter of civic pride. San Francisco's civic center and public spaces reflect this pride, and the importance of being from San Francisco (never "Frisco") is asserted in being aware of the city's special heritage, setting it off from even surrounding communities. The symbols of religion are prominent (the Roman Catholic and Episcopal cathedrals each occupy " $\alpha\kappa\rho\sigma\kappa\lambda\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ ") and the madness for cults which is a normal feature of the Californian myth is surprisingly muted. Strange as it may seem, in a city where a nonconformist movement<sup>24</sup> centered two decades ago, authority is reasonably well established, and evidenced in the achievement of substantial civic projects, as well as the horror engendered when a prominent officeholder (a bearer of authority) was gunned down by a political opponent.

<sup>24</sup>It is an open question just how nonconformist the "hippie movement" really was. Most of its participants were middle-class young people dedicated to leading an easy life of pleasure, more or less consistent with the undemanding life of children. There was a surprising degree of conformity within that set of strictures (after all, it was identifiable as a "movement"). And it is generally accepted that a substantial number of those "counter-culture" members eventually acceded to conformity with more "adult" roles; this even became the stuff of television comedies.

The limitation of civic space is important. Sharp boundaries mark the limits of sacralization. They are associated with coherent institutions defining the body of citizens who act together in founding and maintaining the city. At least coincidentally, late-Modern cities often lack sharp boundaries; they also lack well-defined institutions through which the foundation act is carried forward. The degree of correlation between the two elements is not as yet established.

### П

The civic constitution defines for a city what is real, and negates what is not real. This expresses the limits of the body-politic, in much the same way a city boundary defines the limits of the *urbs*.

### A

The civic constitution allows the city to form an environment in which more than mere subsistence is possible. The pre-civic activities of subsistence in various stages of sophistication are not precluded, but more carefully governed; they are a real basis of what goes on it the city, and they undergird it.

The initial aim of the oath-bound fraternity was the union of locally resident land-owners for offensive and defensive purposes, for the peaceable settlement of internal disputes and for the safeguarding of the administration of justice corresponding to the interests of urban residents. Not to be forgotten was the further aim of monopolizing the economic opportunities of the city.<sup>25</sup>

Other grounds obtain in the real foundation of cites. In the ancient city, the most profound was common worship, a point made both by Fustel and by Wheatley as well as Weber.<sup>26</sup> These grounds are already well-defined prior to the actual foundation of the civic pact; agreement on them permits the sacralization of civic space. The sacralized space makes the formation of a sæcular union feasible, and desirable.<sup>27</sup> The desire really is for freedom to rationally determine what is possible and, from what is possible, to be able to select what ought to be done. Something parallel to the pre-religious association is needed.<sup>28</sup> This public guarantee is the

<sup>25</sup>Max Weber, The City: New York (Macmillan), 1958; p. 110

 $<sup>26</sup>_{opera\ cit}$ .

<sup>27</sup>Machiavelli summarizes the importance of conjoined religion and politics in *The Discourses* (op. cit.), p. 143; cf.: Weber, *The City*, pp. 168, 102.

<sup>28</sup>Arendt, op. cit., p. 148f: "...Wherever the man-made world does not become the scene for action or speech ... freedom has no worldly reality. Without a politically guaranteed public

constitution; a constitution renders perduring in the public sphere the association founded from the private sphere.<sup>29</sup> The genuineness of the constitution is determined by the way in which it establishes a public sphere:

...Inasmuch as the "constitution" means the same as "government" and the government is the supreme power in the state, and this must be either a single ruler or a few or the mass of citizens, in cases where the one or the few or the many govern with an eye to a common interest, these constitutions must necessarily be the right ones, while those administered with an eye to the private interests of either the one or the few or the multitude are deviations.<sup>30</sup>

The constitution makes it possible to share the interpretation of nature as world which a given person may have, establishing a common world in which mere subsistence can be elaborated into something more.<sup>31</sup> All conception of what is real proceeds from this common determination, in which the merely private assessment can be ratified in conversation with others who may be presumed to share a similar perceptual framework.

В

Deviations from the constitutions mentioned are tyrannies corresponding to kingship, oligarchy to aristocracy and democracy to constitutional government; for tyranny is monarchy ruling in the interest of the monarch, oligarchy government in the interest of the rich, democracy government in the interest of the poor, and none of these forms governs with regard to the profit of the community.<sup>32</sup>

To read this as simply some kind of utilitarian consideration of constitutional deviations misses Aristotle's point. These are deviations from constitutional government because the common interest is not represented. No public space is created, but only one private interest—or perhaps, a series of disconnected private interests, a strife-ridden collectivity such as a *junta*—operates.<sup>33</sup> The fact that the private domain is never really superseded in the case of a dysfunctional constitution means that there

realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance."

<sup>29</sup>Aristotle, op. cit., 1276b10

<sup>30</sup>*ibid.*, 1279b26ff; cf.: Arendt, op. cit., p. 148

<sup>31</sup>Cf.: Eric Vögelin, *The New Science of Politics*: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1952; p. 41 32Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 1279b5ff

is no way to test one's personal perceptions against those of one's fellows; there is no group sharing a common perspective.

Machiavelli puts forth an interesting variation of this defect. He comments on a party within a city calling upon outsiders for assistance. This happens, in his opinion, when the constitution fails to provide for judges who can resolve the differences in perception which from time to time arise in the body-politic. In such a case, no forum exists for the resolution of prior, private perceptions in a suitably public way.<sup>34</sup>

Deviations, in short, show what a proper constitution is, by contrast.

A monarchical polity *can* establish a common world, as that notion has been developed in this study. The monarch is the principal operator of the polity, and others participate only with his sufferance. The public sphere can develop so long as the monarch operates the polity in the public interest; to do that, he functions more or less the same way as the chief magistrate in a republic, with more or less the same authority.

Problems arise because it is hard to trust the private disinterest of monarchs; they have tended, in history, to favor their own interests over those of the polity, or to understand the latter only as an extension of their private interests. The same holds true for oligarchs.

The distrust begins in the pre-political ground of subsistence; the most noticeable difference between monarch or oligarch and everyone else is that the former gets a bigger share of the means of subsistence, at the expense

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup>ibid.; also Arendt, op. cit., p. 105. Should the single interest be extended, becoming a "value" dominating the views of other, still privatized personal interests, it becomes the most basic condition of totalitarianism. In late-Modernity, this is a particularly acute problem, since "value-theory," popularized in the early part of the century by such people as Scheler, and taken over wholesale into, especially, religious-ethics programs (it is the darling of the sectarian ethicists), has come to be an ordinary mode of speech, an uncriticized assumption about human behavior's foundation. For a very complete discussion of how this happens, there is no better book than Martin Heidegger's well-coded response to the Nazi regime, An Introduction to Metaphysics (Garden City, 1962), especially chapter 4 (and even more especially, p. 164, where the Nazi viewpoint is addressed explicitly and with the most obvious academic disdain!); Hannah Arendt's massive study, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, ), follows from some of this (Arendt, after all, encountered Heidegger early on in her career, though before the Einführung), developing it further and with a close interpretation of history at its core—see, in particular, volume III.

<sup>34</sup>Machiavelli, op. cit., p. 127 Schmitt (The Concept of the Political [New Brunswick, 1976]) asserts the possibility that relatively private concerns can become "the new substance of a political entity," but this appears to be a confusion of pre-political events with political events proper. What he is really addressing is the condition of revolution, viz., reversion to the pre-political situation from which a new constitution—defective or otherwise—may arise. In short, he describes a terminal point in the "life" of a constitution. In fact, Schmitt was on hand to see this happen in Germany of the '20s and '30s. The result was the Third Reich.

of everyone else. If these "economic" matters are at the forefront of concern, the tendency to overthrow such a polity and set up one in its place where the common interest is secured by broad participation in the magistracy, is intensified.<sup>35</sup>

An interesting thing happens in this revolution. Subsistence and other pre-political issues are broadly provocative of political change, but they never become common to all in the same way that the body-politic and magistracy become shared objects in a common world. Subsistence is, after all, variable to a great degree, from household to household. Quite suddenly, the focus of the revolution becomes the freedom to act together in strictly political ways.

In the event government does not involve a substantial part of the body-politic, the constitution itself is a limiting factor. It defines the grounds for holding the monarch or oligarchs respectable, if they would retain authority as the pre-ratified power to act for the common good. Transgress the constitution, and the polity collapses; the constitution defines the conditions of a perduring polity.

In its turn, the constitution is limited—most notably by the strength of feeling which is part of the private, personal interpretation of nature as world. I have focused on the common world, but clearly there is a prior development that is utterly idiosyncratic. Each person experiences the world for her- or himself.<sup>37</sup> This personal experience is always in tension with the common world created in discourse with others, upon which the constitution depends.

While there is a tension, it is also true, as Royce makes clear, that the private, personal construction of a world is incomplete. It is the complex social entity (all its members taken together and acting together in discourse) who build a complete conception.<sup>38</sup> The constitution, in turn, is constrained by the peculiarities of the citizens it constitutes as a body-

<sup>35</sup>Arendt, op. cit., p. 150

<sup>36</sup>Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1958; p. 69 Quite heartwarming examples of this show up in places where oligarchic factions across the political spectrum have disputed who shall have the largest share of power and goods (inevitably, each faction claiming the best interests of those to be governed). When something happens to allow those disenfranchised folks the chance to seize the franchise, they do so with alacrity, even at personal risk. Almost inevitably, this appears to have the effect of shocking the sponsors of this enfranchisement, who usually step back from it. I have in mind, especially, the series of elections which the U. S. has sponsored in Central American countries under its sway, the regime established by the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and various changes of polity sanctioned by the governments of the Indian subcontinent.

<sup>37</sup>Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*: Chicago (U. Chicago), 1968; p. 237 38*ibid.*, p. 238f

politic, and the requirement that the image of the world erected by the body-politic must accommodate all those individual images, in order to facilitate willing cooperation.

When the constitution fails to do that—becoming "deviant"—the body-politic is in decay. Its institutions no longer operate to effect a space in which a common world can be built, and merely modifying the laws is not sufficient to halt or reverse the decay. Crime, hitherto merely a deviation from the norm, now becomes endemic; the root cause is that the worlds created by citizens, and which guide their choice of activities, bear no resemblance to that which is institutionalized in the body-politic.

Clearly, a more flexible constitution, that can adapt to changing circumstances, without changing its fundamental character, creates institutions that can support a perduring body-politic. This is more often effected in a polity where many people participate in the ongoing interpretation of that constitution; they *feel* the place they have in the body-politic—both the empowerment and limitation that involves. They can reason from that felt sense of place.

C

Thinking through the constitution as limiting and limited, deviant and effective, it seems that when a constitution, and the body-politic it constitutes, fails, it is because some aspect of reality essential to that body-politic's continuing existence has been negated. A general notion of political limitation comes out of this consideration.

First, the social relationship can have two different characters:

A social relationship will be called "communal" if and so far as the orientation of social action ... is based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that the belong together. A social relationship will ... be called "associative" if and in so far as the orientation of social action within it rests on a rationally

<sup>39</sup>Machiavelli, op. cit., p. 161

<sup>40</sup>Western political philosophy distinguishes between civil (generally, private) and criminal violations (the latter generally being understood as contrary to the common good); cf.: Hannah Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*: New York (HarBrace), 1972; p. 63. This excludes some kinds of violation from careful consideration in political thinking. In societies where the distinction is absent, the case is clearer. For example, the civil/criminal distinction is not as sharp in classical, imperial Chinese law, and the whole purpose of the legal apparatus is intended to restore a ruptured common world to harmony.

<sup>41</sup>Cf.: Machiavelli, op. cit., p. 192f

motivated adjustment of interests of similarly motivated agreement....<sup>42</sup>

I think neither of these two characters can subsist independently. The subjective feeling of communality is derived from the sacralized bond by which the civic space is created. The civic constitution affords the reasoned understanding through which the civic space becomes more than a locus of mere subsistence; it is Weber's "associative" element. The sacred act of founding imposes a cosmogony on nature; a cosmogony is a reasoned interpretation. They interpenetrate, so that the totality of civic space belongs together in thought with the limitation on that space imposed by the civic constitution. They come together to define something that is perdurable, not an occasional, or even completely voluntary association.<sup>43</sup>

What is delimited by the constitution? It is, as the German language puts it so perfectly, a "basic law" (*Grundgesetz*). It expresses what Montesquieu called the *spirit* of the laws, that which all particular laws aim at making explicit, which are already implicit in the original act of legislation, antedating the body-politic itself.<sup>44</sup> This spirit is about what is possible in the civic space. That which is not expressly forbidden is possible; that which is affirmed as real, in some sense, is necessary to the body-politic's continued existence.

D

How does this apply to the modern city, which is rarely an independent political entity? Most cities are governed by charters granted by some higher echelon of government, which itself may be formally constituted.

I believe the application lies in the interpenetration of civic space and civic constitution. One would expect that in a city with a well-defined civic space there will be evidence of a real civic constitution, even if it is not formally expressed as a code; a city with less-well-defined space will not. This expectation is fulfilled in the cities used as examples.

<sup>42</sup>Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, p. 136; cf.: Thomas Hobbes, *Man and Citizen*: Garden City (Doubleday) 1972; p. 110

<sup>43</sup>Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 95, but cf.: Weber, The City, p. 109f It might be argued that there is a need to renew the constitutional bond, and that this means it is not perduring and entirely voluntary. But it seems to me that the renewal of the bond is one which allows the constitution to be revised, a process more readily effected through the election of new magistrates and legislators. Machiavelli takes this up in The Discourses (op. cit.), passim., especially pp. 194, 111, 114.

<sup>44</sup>In addition to the comments in the previous chapter, see Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 85

In San Francisco, which has a well-defined civic space, a former civic official who took the life of another civic official could not be safely returned to his city after release from jail, despite previous popularity. His act was too great a violation of the civic constitution, even though there is no *formal* document. Moreover, San Franciscans clearly consider themselves different from other Californians—even those living in close-by communities. This self-perception, a greater sense of civic identity as opposed to identity with a nominally superior governmental entity suggests that, while the city may be chartered by that higher echelon, the actual locus of the constitution is civic. The very impressive San Francisco civic center mirrors this independence; it is arguably more impressive than that of many state capitals, including that of California.

In sharp contrast, Los Angeles, which has no sharply defined civic space, lacks a well-defined civic constitution as well. In Los Angeles, county and city services exist competitively, in part because of the existence of independently chartered bodies-politic wholly within the urban territory of Los Angeles. The attempt to create a viable civic center must be deemed at best only a partial success; it is not readily accessible to all citizens, and represents the interests of only a few. Nor is there any evidence of the kind of outrage against violators of the civic constitution like that in San Francisco. Indeed, the attitude is more like, if the peace is violated, let each person who can get a gun and protect his own space. Finally, "Angelenos" don't identify with their city; more often, the identification is with "southern California"—a vague, geographic and never political identity.

New York, despite a less sharply defined urbanity, is more like San Francisco than Los Angeles. This may be due in part to the incredible complexity of New York, and the politics this encompasses. It is commonly believed that, after the presidency of the United States, the mayoralty of New York is the most complex executive magistracy in the nation.

In any event, it must be admitted that the citizens of New York are more tolerant of offenses against the civic constitution than is the case elsewhere; such an abuse must be gross before a public outrage will result in the violator being actually forced into nominal exile. On the other hand, New Yorkers are not overly tolerant of external meddling by higher political echelons in the way things are done in the city. Federal disapproval of city redistricting met with general disgruntlement, not on the ground that the disapproval lacked merit, but because it prevented the city government from getting on with its civic business in an orderly way.

The sense of civic identity is strong in New York. There is a mild contempt for residents of other parts of the state ("Apple knockers," "hayseeds"—that most typical of New Yorkers, George Washington

Plunkett, even applies this term to people from Brooklyn, then just recently incorporated into greater New York). There is pronounced contempt directed toward New Jersey—across the sharpest of city boundaries, the Hudson River. This contempt includes inhabitants of suburban areas—part of the metropolitan region—who spend their working hours in the city, but have no significant civic role.

This is only a partial answer to the question, how does the civic constitution manifest in the modern city?

#### Ш

Civic action, and by extension, purpose, depends upon determining what is essential and what is merely accidental, what causes certain desirable effects, and the community of agent and patient.

### A

There is an ancient prejudice that politics, the science of relations among human beings in community, and ethics, the science of an individual's doing what is right and proper, are two parts of the same inquiry. These sciences have a common topic in justice and equity,  $^{45}$  and are, as Hobbes suggests,  $a\ priori$ , "because we ourselves make the principles

—that is, the causes of justice (namely laws and covenants)—whereby it is known that justice and equity, and their opposites injustice and inequity, are. For before covenants and laws were drawn up, neither justice nor injustice, neither public good nor public evil, was natural among men any more than it was among beasts.<sup>46</sup>

This is an expression of the civic theology,<sup>47</sup> expertise in which is properly attributed to Hobbes. The assertion mirrors the necessity of the principles of action within bounds which the civic constitution institutionalizes.

<sup>45</sup>Hobbes, op. cit., p. 43

<sup>46</sup>*ibid.* Professor Büsser, at the April, 1984 meeting in New York, of the Conference for the Study of Political Thought, presented a paper on the Zürich reformers; one of the agendae he mentioned both in that paper and in passing conversation (but left open as not yet researched) was the probably influence of the Zürich doctrine, especially of covenant, on Hobbes and Knox. This is intriguing, since these reformers were influenced by their civic experience (and by extension, that of the cantons centered on those cities), as Büsser shows.

<sup>47</sup>For a concise definition of this expression, Võgelin, op. cit., p. 81; Rousseau offers a longer discussion under the heading, "civil religion," in Book IV of *The Social Contract*.

In order for their to be covenants (or constitutions), which in turn establish institutions of justice and equity, and define the duty of human beings to themselves and others (Kant's language in the *Tugendlehre*), two things seem essential, to which other things stand as accidents, and even dependents. The first is freedom, and the other is virtue.

Freedom as related to politics is not a phenomenon of the We deal here not with the liberum arbitrium, a freedom of choice that arbitrates and decides between two given things, one good and one evil, and whose choice is predetermined by motive which has only to be argued to start its operation—"And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover,/To entertain these fair and well-spoken days,/I am determined to prove a villain, And hate the idle pleasure of these days." Rather it is, to remain with Shakespeare, the freedom of Brutus: "That this shall be or we will fall for it," that is, the freedom to call something into being which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known. Action, to be free, must be free from motive on the one side, from its intended goal as a predictable effect on the other.48

Arendt is being very subtle, and there is a potential for misunder-standing. Clearly, there is an element of will in this kind of freedom. But freedom has, as she suggests, different aspects. It is of a piece with Kant's distinction between the problematic willing of a deed according to desired ends, and the apodictic willing of a deed because of its inherent rectitude. Deeds done from duty are of the latter sort; they are done because one can do nothing else—always assuming one is a rational human being. That last bit, though, brings will—with reason, a decidedly human trait (bracketing, for the moment, the question of its attribution to other creatures)—into play.

The formation of the covenant is not truly something that any society of human beings can bypass; it is a necessary expression of human nature, to fabricate such a civil society. That seems to be a contradiction (that which is the ultimate human artifice arises from nature...). What is really at work is an ever-present tension between a *liberum arbitrium* and the prior freedom to innovate in response to the spontaneity of nature appearing in the world. The former aspect of freedom presupposes and is conditioned by the latter, when they exist together. It is possible, at least

<sup>48</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 151: Arendt displays her decidedly Kantian bent in thinking, and is reacting to it.

in thought, to have a free will of the former sort as purely private; that is the condition of human beings engaged in a war of all against all, a completely solipsistic universe, and one which—fortunately—seems less likely to be real than one in which some kind of covenant is at work.<sup>49</sup> But an interplay seems more common. One does indeed will the covenant and constitution of civil society and its habitat, and that is a political will; one is nevertheless compelled to do so. This is free will in a rather Leibnizian sense....

To be able to innovate involves the ability to judge what kind of innovation is possible, and legitimate. Those whose entire being is caught up in day-to-day activities are not, in this case, free. Policy planners, for example, are tied to assumptions about the nature and perduring character of the world by the technologies of their basic professions. This precludes even being aware of a spontaneity in nature which might demand a new and different interpretation. Reflective (as opposed to determinative) judgment, and the critical thinking to which this gives rise, is largely closed to them. This is as true for the academic and scientific establishment which undergirds this social-engineering mindset, as it is for those who embrace the latter mindset itself.

On the other hand, the genuinely political establishment, seeking to establish a practical perpetuum mobile, is sensitive to changes in the world within which it must operate. New York's Tammany Hall presents a good example of this sensitivity. It may be argued that Riordan's image in Plunkett of Tammany Hall<sup>50</sup> is overly rosy. Current assessments of Tammany tend to rehabilitate the organization in its heyday, however. Tammany was successful precisely because it understood its constituents and their needs, as well as their culture. It was as successful in addressing the needs of nominal rivals as it was those of Democrats. While milking patronage to the nth degree, its masters nevertheless tended to hold a fairly high standard of public service, to which the party faithful holding jobs had to hew, and to which those reliant on city government could look with some degree of reliance. As political situations and opportunities changed, Tammany changed. When Tammany failed to be responsive, it collapsed.

<sup>49</sup>There is an interesting historical parallel between Hobbes's bellum omnium... and an origin myth featured at the beginning of Section 11 of the Mo Tzu. This parallel has been noted by many scholars, but only briefly discussed in the commonly available literature (e. g., in Fung's histories of Chinese philosophy). It is not as strong as first it seems; ancient China and the early-Modern West are very different cultures. Nevertheless, the fundamental observation about the "original" state of natural human being is remarkably similar, even as the conclusions drawn are remarkably different. See my paper, "Mo Tzu and Hobbes: Remarks on Chinese and Western Political Thought," in COGITO, March 1984.

<sup>50</sup>William L. Riordan, Plunkett of Tammany Hall: New York (Dutton), 1963

The Regular Democrat establishment has never really recovered from the collapse.

*Political* virtue is free in this sense, to face and respond to spontaneously arising circumstance.

The *virtú* ... which according to Machiavelli is the specifically political human quality, has neither the connotation of moral character as does the Roman *virtus*, nor that of a morally neutral excellence like the Greek *arete*. *Virtú* is the response, summoned up by man, to the world, or rather the constellation of *fortuna* in which the world opens up, presents and offers itself to him, to his *virtú*. There is no *virtú* without *fortuna* and no *fortuna* without *virtú*; the interplay between them indicates a harmony between many and world—playing with each other and succeeding together.....<sup>51</sup>

Without freedom, political virtue—this responsiveness—is not possible; the absence of political virtue (an absence of responsiveness, or ineptitude in responsiveness—which are not all that different in practice) is a sign of freedom's failure.

R

Political virtue works under the limitation of the civic constitution to determine what effects may properly be sought, and what causes can be used to such effect. Notice that political virtue, unlike the freedom which makes it possible and which is expressed in the civic constitution, is entirely practical, and problematic. The absolute character of the latter form is absent, and free will, in the usual sense, is at work.

Understand political causes and effects—means and ends—is a social problem. A political leader can lead by being representative; such a leader embodies what is true, or at least, normal for those who are his constituents; the political leader is "one of them." Or, the body-politic as a whole is lead through discourse and common reflection to take a common action. <sup>52</sup> In either case, "cause" must be publicly perceived. A public leader must be able to justify his acts to his constituency; a body-politic must be able to justify its acts both to itself and to succeeding generations.

The model for this justification, put forth in the last chapter, is the judgment of taste; that is not as silly as it might seem, taken in the light of

<sup>51</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 137

<sup>52</sup>Vögelin, op. cit., p. 75

this understanding of freedom and political virtue. The judgment of taste is not relative; at least, it claims to be absolute and universal. "This is beautiful" is a claim made for all observers at all times. We would like political judgments to have the same general form: "This is the proper action." The person making a claim about beauty "woos" a consensus from others, according to Kant;<sup>53</sup> the politician lays out before his constituents the actions he has taken along with his claim for their rectitude.

A person making a judgment of beauty perceives a feeling of pleasure in himself; he seeks the origin of that pleasure and finds it in the experience of something he calls beautiful (the circularity in that expression is only apparent). The experience is a cause; the observer is faced with the problem of presenting that cause to others.

To make such a presentation, the person has to abstract from his judgment the purely personal elements of his interest, in order to present the beautiful as an objective cause, available as an experience to others as well. The beautiful is an object which has appeared spontaneously—more than just the thing bearing the distinction, more than the sum of its parts, as it were. Presented to others, it is available to be coopted into a common world. Coopted, it changes the world; the eruptive innovation of the beautiful is a mutation; what is changed is also a cause and therein the complex of causes—those from without which are spontaneous, natural and demanding, and those within (that which has been and which is traditionally accepted) which resist change)—produce a powerful tension.

Political thinking is very much like this. An excellent example has been the persistent decision of recent governors of the state of New York to sign death penalty legislation. Rejecting such legislation is right, they have said. Immediately, as part of this, there is a citation of their personal beliefs, but this is discounted as the presentation of their action proceeds. But the inappropriateness of a death penalty is also never left to a means-to-an-end relative judgment either. Rather, a—fairly new—sensibility about human existence is brought to the surface and incorporated into the common understanding. Again, there is a tension between what is innovative—the new understanding— and what is traditional. The tension itself seems to be the foundation of political action. 55

<sup>53</sup>See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment: New York (Hafner), 1951; p. 139

<sup>54</sup>Edward C. Moore (ed.), *Charles S. Peirce: The Essential Writings*: New York (HarRow), 1972; p. 146

<sup>55</sup>Arendt, Crises of the Republic, p. 5

C

Political virtue, revealing the causes which bring about a given effect, determines the way action takes place in cities. A judgment, taken by an individual in the first instance, but stripped of personal interest, becomes a common judgment in its ratification by fellow-citizens, or in common action under a leader. Once the judgment has been adopted as ordinary prudence, it becomes a common interest of the body-politic and of all its members.<sup>56</sup>

The relationship between the judging actor and those acting with him, and the action they take together or severally, is unified in commonly-held and expressible purposiveness. It is a moment of shared experience, as Kant suggests in another context. Sharing a common tradition, linked by a common constitution in a common space, it is possible to *feel* the common interest in a course of action responding to a new presentation of that which is interpreted as a common world. Only after the initial *feeling*, the intellect reconciles the innovative elements involved with the tradition, moving from what is understood in experience to an acceptable explanation. This is a moment of reflection, as what is felt and understood doesn't fit with the already-accepted tradition and cannot be dealt with dogmatically. Something new has surfaced. The special mark of the politician is the ability to judge those feelings and how they will "play;" the model of taste remains applicable:

Taste is ... the faculty of judging *a priori* of the communicability of feelings that are bound up with a given representation (without the mediation of a concept).<sup>59</sup>

The initial reaction to a political deed which is manifestly *im* proper is one of distaste. Quite literally, the common sense is revolted by such a lack of propriety in judgment. It is not fundamentally different from the disapproval directed toward a person whose lack of taste in dress or

<sup>56</sup>This is an interpretation and application of Kant's view in the *Critique of Judgment* (op. cit., p. 142f), where he addresses the manner in which a purely personal perception of the beautiful becomes commonplace. Incidentally, this judgment of what is appropriate and right changes its character, and becomes an argument in favor of some ends over others in problematic judgments of the *liberum arbitrium*; when this happens, the topic changes from strictly political judgment, to moral judgment.

<sup>57</sup>*ibid.*, p. 132

<sup>58</sup>ibid., p. 138 I have described this "movement" in political consciousness in the terms of Heidegger's "hermeneutic circle." The two seem to fit well together—not surprising, given Heidegger's acknowledged Kantian foundation. Note that the explanation of what is understood to be common comes after the an event and its response; it is not an argument for a course of action to be taken, but an explanation of a "done deal." See *ibid.*, p. 133, also Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 130f.

<sup>59</sup>ibid., p. 138

manner puts one off. It is precisely for this reason that, in ancient times, a person from foreign or rural parts was considered boorish, and that the first steps in political and ethical theory focus on inculcating "good manners." The successful politician puts across his sense of the propriety and rectitude—the *tastefulness*—of his acts, and those in which he leads others. In that very communication, there is a constitution of community between actor(s) and the object of action.

### IV

A *philosophical* examination of civic constituence—the citizens comprising the body-politic, elements of which were described in the third chapter—is a study of what is possible and impossible, what exists and what does not, and what is necessary, as opposed to merely contingent. To the extent there is a "constant" in politics, citizens are it, the known controlling factor. <sup>61</sup> Laws, perceptions, *et cetera*, change.

### A

That which is both denoted and connoted in the word "culture" is helpful in perceiving the possibilities established in the body-politic; this fits with the notion that "æsthetic judgment" is the model of political judgment.

The clue to this fit is simple: While the decorative arts arise in precivic societies, high arts and the culture they at once embody and further seem connected with cities. High art develops from the pre-civic decorative arts; so the city comes out of pre-civic society. Roman history and culture

<sup>60</sup>Both ancient Greece and ancient China begin ethics and politics with a concern for manners. Confucian teaching rests upon properly understand *li*—ritual propriety and etiquette; we are told the Master was angered at violations of good manners in court society, and would go away angrily shaking his sleeves. Aristophanes—always a good mirror of late-Archaic Greek thinking, to my mind—is dismayed by the shift from a concern with good manners expressed as αρετη in *The Clouds*' "Old Philosophy" to the mere scholarship and eristic of the new philosophy and Sophistry.

<sup>61</sup>This is not a restatement of "man is the measure." It is just that human activity occurs within known limits, more so than other elements in the political "equation." We have direct access to what is human, simply by being human; this is fraught with problems, because we are interested in things, and the interests can obscure what is more or less universal. Having acknowledged that problem, it is not impossible to correct for it.

is a good example of how this happens. <sup>62</sup> Modern cities show the same range of possible relationships between high art and civic culture.

San Francisco is a fairly small city, with limited resources. It supports superior artistic communities in both plastic and performing arts. ballet has frequently been judged to be world-class; its legitimate theatre is active and occasionally innovative; its musical performances are well beyond the usual provincial or "regional" level and have been so for decades. Galleries of fine art abound—both public and private exhibitions This means there is a great deal of opdraw substantial attention. portunity, not just for artists, but also for those who support artistic endeavor—apparently a substantial number. Ordinary folks get to benefit from this; a great deal of San Francisco's is public-architectural masterpieces complementing well-designed civic spaces, adorned with plastic art and serving as a setting for public performances. While some of the grandest accomplishments in the arts are monuments to private enterprise in the city, even those fit into the creation of a wholly public space. The "high culture" in San Francisco is something in which a large number of San Franciscans share.

Los Angeles is much larger than San Francisco; it has much greater resources and wealth; it is a center of the motion picture industry, which generates wealth and attracts artistic talent across the board. Yet Los Angeles supports an artistic community which is neither so broad nor so excellent as other places. For years, Los Angeles has tried to field a ballet company; the attempt is not considered successful. The city's orchestras have improved over the years, but have not risen to the kind of prominence one would call "world-class." In the plastic arts, the Los Angeles County Museum houses a truly great collection; it stands out because it is not matched by those of competing institutions; the private collections open to public view (e. g., the Getty collection) tend to be regarded as a hodge-podge

<sup>62</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 212 Arendt's may take this too far. A good corrective is to review the archæological reports about other ancient societies, especially those other than Western. The advance and decline of arts in the development of Chinese culture is particularly interesting. For example, as Chinese society develops, some arts decline and others rise in their place. Shang ritual bronzes are generally of finer quality than Chou ritual bronzes. But the ritual community has changed as well; in the Shang period, there is general scholarly consensus that ritual activity was something confined to the royal house and a few other exhalted families, while as Chou society develops and matures, this is extended "downward." As the culture develops, and more people participate, the demand for artistic production changes so that more people can participate in the "high culture." Also, the understanding of what these ritual vessels are for changes. The skill is transferred to a less costly material, and the more costly elements become more properly decorative. This is a very complex matter, well beyond the scope of this study; it is also one that needs more careful consideration than merely anthropological and historical accounts—all there is on the subject thus far—can afford.

built more as a matter of competition than a serious contribution to the understanding and appreciation of art. Legitimate theatre exists only as an occasional adjunct to the motion picture industry. What artistic achievements and artifacts of an authentic high culture exist, seem to mirror the concern of small, isolated elements of the urban population, or even of private individuals. Seldom, it seems, is art ever a public matter, in which a large number of citizens is caught up.

B

A city's location, and the way it chooses to expand (or contract) in response to changing circumstances, is another way of gauging its ability to innovate. In some cases, this is a matter of security, or convenience for trade. In other cases, a site commends itself on more obviously civic grounds. City-limit expansion in times of prosperity is also a measure of how a city understands itself as such. For example, Los Angeles was expanded in a haphazard way and the pieces added in were incorporated only superficially; Angeleno sprawl tells of a poor sense of civicity.

Without doubt, though, the criterion of citizenship is the sharpest determinant of civic possibilities. Traditionally, citizenship has not been something that every inhabitant of the city could claim. It was something that only those who had time for devote to civic enterprises— or were obligated to find the time for them—possessed.

The citizen's virtue must not be said to belong to every citizen, nor merely be defined as the virtue of a free man, but will only belong to those who are released from menial occupations. 65

Aristotle had his prejudices, but the civic sense that not all people living in the city were fit to exercise citizenship has been a common one.

<sup>63</sup>Machiavelli, op. cit., p. 102

<sup>64</sup>In the *Ten Books...*, Vitruvius makes the selection of a decent location the architect's first and most important task when planning a city. It seems likely Vitruvius's views on the matter reflected the general opinion of his time (his work is not considered particularly novel); they were probably influential in later times (Italy never entirely lost contact with its roots in antiquity, and the revival of classical learning in the 14th-16th century led to renewed interest in his work). The *Ten Books...* covers deliberate civic foundation, as in the creation of a colony, and civic expansion. Most civic foundations are in this category, rather than the most authentic kind of foundation described in the last chapter. The relationship between the two kinds of foundation seems to be that while the most authentic foundation is accomplished with a somewhat "ad hoc" element involved, the "architected" version has a more deliberate plan. There still needs to be a sacralized civic space, with a civic limit and a civic center.

Different cities set different criteria. In 16th century Geneva, the citizen class was restricted to those born in the city, having sufficient where withal to allow some freedom from day-to-day labor, and possessed of a "respectable" occupation. Immigrants possessed of the latter two qualifications might, either by purchase or by vote of the civic corporation, be admitted to *bourgeois* status, with limited civil rights, but could never become citizens.<sup>66</sup>

In most cities—merely local administrative units, as they are commonly understood—all citizens of the larger state are equals in the city. In fact, in some cities, purely civic elections and other civic activities are opened to inhabitants who are not citizens in the strict sense. <sup>67</sup> In short, in some modern cities, the criteria of *city* citizenship is extraordinarily inclusive. Part of this is the spirit of the times, undoubtedly; part of it is that *city* citizenship is seen as relatively meaningless.

There is a peculiar change that happens in many civil societies as they develop over time. So far as their governments tend to become "imperial" and less dependent on citizen participation (in some sense), and citizen responsibilities are thus reduced, civil rights come to be understood not as obligations laid on citizens, but entitlements and protections owed by the civil society to its constituents. The citizen class is usually expanded, but the significance of citizenship is reduced. The ultimate result is the extension of all or almost all civil rights—as entitlements—to people who would not normally be classed as citizens.

When that happens, the possibilities afforded for civic action are reduced. Cooperative action by citizens is minimal and nominally "civic" activity comes to be the province of civil servants deemed technically qualified to operate the civil society. Chapter three showed some of the social-science and history demonstrating this in modern times.

When this comes to pass, the identity of one's own welfare with that of the civic society is no longer clear.<sup>68</sup> Two things happen:

 There is a break in the transmission of tradition. The solipsistic urban inhabitant has no need to find his place in the civic tradition, and may even be insulted if one suggests that such a sol-

<sup>66</sup>For example, Jean Calvin—a mover and shaker, and powerful enough to drive born citizens from the city—nevertheless could never become a Genevan citizen. He remained merely a *bourgeois*, a "resident alien," as we might put it today.

<sup>67</sup>In New York, for example, school board elections are open to city residents who are not citizens, and even to illegal aliens. Most city "patronage" jobs (there are some) can be held by non-citizens.

<sup>68</sup>Arendt discusses this at length in Crises of the Republic (op. cit.), p. 61 and passim.

ipsistic perception of individual freedom should be circumscribed by civic tradition.  $^{\mbox{\tiny 69}}$ 

• Equality of civic status is not in terms of an identity of different individuals cooperating in the city, but a matter of differentiating apparently identical individuals. What makes civic society interesting is many different people of entirely different capabilities and perceptions; if they are all identical, there is little possibility of that innovation which is the most authentic political event.<sup>70</sup>

C

Human—and therefore, civic—existence is mortal.

Men are "the mortals," the only mortal things there are, for animals exist only as members of their species and not as individuals. The mortality of man lies in the fact that individual life, a *bios* with a recognizable life-story from birth to death, rises out of a biological life, *zoe*. This individual life is distinguished from all other things by the rectilinear course of its movement, which, so to speak, cuts through the circular movements of biological life. This is mortality, to move along a rectilinear line in a universe where everything, if it moves at all, moves in a cyclical order. Whenever men pursue their purposes, tilling the effortless earth, crossing the ever-rolling waves, they cut across a movement which is purposeless and turning within itself."

The movement of mortality, from life to death, is the basic fact upon which everything human—world, city, whatever—is founded. Part of that human movement is a shift from living to living well; that is the reason for cities. This human mortality makes it possible to conceive as desirable taking thought for the future, and acting so as to impart some degree of regularity to it. The idea is to impose the human dimension on the seemingly chaotic manifestation of nature. That is what the interpretation of nature as world is about.

<sup>69</sup>On the breakdown of tradition, see Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 35.

<sup>70</sup>See *ibid.*, p. 22 The Marxist definition of human beings in terms of undifferentiated units of labor is an excellent example of the latter interpretation; totalitarian regimes (for entirely other reasons) offer another. In general, *any* society in which human beings are reinterpreted as masses admitting of statistical treatment must be understood as tending in this direction.

<sup>71</sup>*ibid.*, p. 42

The sense of mortality we have as human beings incites a desire to overcome it, to become immortal. That happens by securing a place for oneself in history—not understood as a natural process, but as a tradition of deeds, through which the world has been elaborated and regulated. This is the most fundamental characteristic of human existence, and it is the essential character of the citizen.

The good citizen is one who finds his place in the company of citizens, and participates in the virtue of the company.

... It is possible that the many, though not individually good men, yet when the come together may be better, not individually but collectively, than those who are so. ... Where there are many, each individual, it may be argued, has some portion of virtue and wisdom, and when they have come together, just as the multitude becomes a single man with many feet and many hands and many senses, so it also becomes one personality as regards the moral and intellectual faculties.<sup>72</sup>

This citizen is one who can act in cooperation with others, in the way described elsewhere, to create and secure the city at the outset, but also to further its ongoing enterprises above all others. In the event he should be a leader among citizens, his mark is the approbation of his fellows in what he does; in the event he is not in an office of leadership, his mark is an active concern with the affairs of the city, so identifying with them that he cannot perceive his interests as distinct from them.<sup>73</sup>

This is an ideal case, certainly. There are problems of distortion and levels of commitment. The distortion arises from changes in meaning over time and cultural change. For example, when Aristotle used his Greek equivalent of "distributive justice," he was explicitly limiting that to honors and perquisites within the framework of civic society—the *cursus honorem* of the Romans was precisely analogous. <sup>74</sup> Now this expression is applied to pre-civic, private matters of mere subsistence.

Despite the distortion, in a well-ordered, healthy modern city, there is just the same concern with reward in the "coin" of civic honors and office. An obvious example: Mayors in many cities can call on prominent people to set aside their private interests for some period of time—and the substantial emoluments connected with those interests—to serve for modest sums (even token amounts) in city government. The principal

<sup>72</sup>Aristotle, op, cit. 1281bff

<sup>73</sup>*ibid.*, 1276b28

<sup>74</sup>Aristotle, Nicomachæan Ethics, passim.

reward is the position of trust and recognition—the honor of serving. This is *explicitly* understood by those involved—both the elected officials making the appointment, and the private person elevated to leadership honor. There is a corollary: If the appointed person is offended by official misbehavior, he or she leaves public office, usually with substantial publicity. This kind of leadership role is a very good model of good citizenship.

D

A citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as by the right to participate in the judicial functions and in office.<sup>75</sup>

That definition follows from what was just said about the good citizen. What is necessary for civic life has to be consistent with that definition of being-a-citizen. The most necessary element, then, is not something material—those things have to be supplied prior to entry into civic life, but are not part of civic life *per se*. On the other hand, education in those activities required for civic life are both necessary and part of civic life.

The very notion of a *cursus honorem* appears to have rapidly taken on this redefinition. Children passing through the various ritual roles in latearchaic Greek and republican Roman society had ingrained in them the kinds of behavior that were consistent with public action. Roles in family and clan taught how to forge from individuals gathering together "a partnership and a unity" which made possible a common world, in turn the condition of common action.

Education for citizenship contrasts with vocational training and the rudiments of social interaction intended to make it possible to earn a living. Vocational training teaches certain skills which are supposed to be valuable in "the job market." It teaches the social skills of teamwork, aimed at getting a job done. These are useful, no doubt, but are not aimed at producing leaders who can create a consensus among their fellows and secure approbation for acts. This distinction has become muddied; the result has been a deterioration of both kinds of education, it seems.

However that may be, civic education is entirely a matter of induction into an understanding of the body-politic and its tradition.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup>Aristotle, Politics, 1275a22f; cf.: 1275b18ff

<sup>76</sup>ibid., 1263b41

<sup>77</sup>Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 119: John Jay's comments in Federalist #2 (paragraph 5) are interesting. He sets forth in fairly precise terms the civic tradition of the United States and New York as they were in his time. There is a substantial "revision" of

This chapter synthesizes the analyses of the previous chapters. should be possible to assay a kind of formulary definition:

> A city is a place, defined by common agreement of that place's dwellers, with certain purposes such as ascendancy over those outside that place, protection from the ascendancy of others in that place and the fostering oflargely intangible —goods which make the place and living in it more pleasant and more completely human.

Since of necessity each place varies from every other, no city can be like any other. At the same time, each will be recognizable as a city by incarnating a certain conceptual structure a certain way; the incarnation "fills" otherwise empty categories in the way defined above.

history in his description. New York was originally a Dutch foundation; that element was still strong in immediately-post-revolution New York, to judge from the institutions of the time and their interactions. Having become a colony of the United Kingdom, the town and state quickly became polyglot and multicultural. Forming its civic character depended upon establishing a degree of uniformity in the public sphere. Schools and churches (they were closely linked) provided many of the unifying institutions, as Morgan Dix's history of Trinity Church reveals: in the colonial period, ecclesiastical corporations had broad authority in many civic matters, some of which continued in fact (though not in law) even after disestablishment.

Schools can still have this role, though it is not so common as before, and it is now more often a "hidden agenda." Dean Jean Murphy, then assistant dean of Fordham University's School of Continuing Education, noted that many adult-education students sought to learn the taste and polish manner associated with university education. That is, there was a tradition of judgment as a requisite to a full life operative in some of these students. What is different, of course, is the fact that this is no longer an open agenda; this represents a failure in late-Modernity.

# **AFTERWORD: Modern Cities**

The basic project is complete; at least in a purely formal and universal way, the city is defined.

An agency of change imposes form on "matter" in accordance with its categories inherent in a purpose. That purpose is proximally that of the city itself; it is ultimately the purposiveness of the agency which conceives it from its understanding of itself. The imperfections of cities are as much a matter of the way in which what is understood comes to consciousness, and then is expressed in more than intellectual form in the construction of the city.<sup>1</sup>

After all this excruciating inquiry into what a city is and how it is possible—what is measurable or observable in some sense, and what can be adduced as principles—the question remains: What about the city *now* and going forward? Are there such things—or have they become obsolete? Are they lost in regional urbanity?

None of this is made any easier in what seems to be a time of (at least) intellectual transition, a time when, if people like Apel and Habermas and Derrida and Lyotard, and all the other lionized leaders of the intellectual avant garde, are right, a new paradigm of thinking how things are is emerging.<sup>2</sup> It's hard to think through matters of social significance, when what is meant by "society" is no longer clear. Yet that is what a question about cities is; cities are at least an archetype of human society.

<sup>1</sup>Along the way, just about every way of thinking about cities has come into play. There are really only a half-dozen such perspectives: They are quantitative and qualitative social-scientific approaches, architectural approaches (which include most city-planning discussions) and a sort of social-engineering line, most evident in "regional planning" thinking about cities; each of these four ways of thinking about cities can be developed historically ("diachronically") or in a more universal, non-historical way ("synchronically"). The last two approaches—call them, perhaps, the "classicist" and "journalistic" views—tend to be more single-minded; the former is inevitably informed by a view toward what has happened long ago, while the latter is more determined by what is currently the case. It is striking how much is written about cities—in general, and about particular cities—without getting beyond one or two of these general perspectives.

<sup>2</sup>The seminal work, at least where I studied, is Karl-Otto Apel's *Transformation der Philosophie*: Frankfurt (Suhrkamp), 1973.

In this afterword, I can explore the possibilities as they appear to obtain for the moment. I am willing to sketch it, without much attention to developing the arguments for the views I am presenting (most of which are just extensions of the material laid out in the previous chapters, anyway).

I

Clearly, the Modern period—arbitrarily, 1600 to 1950 or thereabouts—has not been kindly to cities. Certainly, they grew larger, but they lost pride of place as political entities. We have Hobbes stealing the very term civitas to describe the emerging nation-state. Nation-building kings and patriots made it a key article of policy to reduce cities to mere localities within the state. The tendency seems to be, to the extent one's society has become "advanced," to identify oneself first with the larger nation-state, then with some vague notion of "Volk," and only last with the city from which one comes (assuming one is a city-dweller, of course). This is the obvious message of the great political events of the late-1980s and 1990s.

If that reflects a real change, and if the city is an archetype of human society, then the change is alarming. After all, not all change is for the better.

If the change is real, then cities are no longer possible. Part of the "natural history" of cities is a movement to transcend limits of clan and nation. That most clannish of people, the Greeks, succeeded in this;³ the Romans made it a matter of policy, to enroll new citizens in very specific ways. Cities *have* been like restricted clubs, limiting the people who belong; at the same time, most cities developed mechanisms for bringing in new folks, and merging them with little regard to tribal affiliation.

The new nationalism works just the other way. There is no mechanism for assimilating new members to the *Volk*. Even where the grounds for distinguishing between members of the *Volk* and others are clearly so arbitrary as to be absurd (what *real* difference obtains between a Serb and a Bosnian, who have been neighbors for centuries; what *real* difference distinguishes Ukrainians from Russians; what is *inherently* different in the tribes of Rwanda?), it is, apparently, easy to find grounds for this kind of determination, and to foist them on one's co-nationals.

Inevitably, when the *Volk* has decided to expel those in its midst of other "nationalities," the claim that is made links *Volk* to *Land*—without

<sup>3</sup>The Cleisthenian reforms in Athens merged "new" inhabitants into the "tribal" structure. Pre-Lycurgan Sparta could welcome so very un-Spartan a figure as Alcman. The Greek cities of Asia Minor were, by virtue of location, cosmopolitan from an early date.

### Modern Cities

regard to cities. Where civic life is strong, the picture inevitably seems to be of a core of citizens holding together the city, besieged by a Volk whose ties are to some kind of pre-civic notion of a Land.

Even where actual bloody warfare between those for whom the city and its meaning are paramount, and those from without is not the case, this tension—between "Stadtteil" and "Landschaft"?—appears.

New York, e. g., is a great city, and a very close match to the ideal which can be derived from the categories set out above. Since early on in the 19th century, the city and its eponymous state have had—well, *strained* relations is not far off. City-dwellers call folks from the rest of the state (even from "urban areas") "apple knockers" and "hayseeds." People outside the city regard it as a center of iniquity and a drain on the state fisc.

These are the best cases; there are places where cities seem to disappear. Los Angeles has been offered of an example of a merely urban area, which does not manifest as a city. Based on common reports, many cities and possible-cities have succumbed to this condition: They are densely populated, but they lack center and boundary, and the folks living in them, for the most part, do not assimilate to the place, becoming thereby citizens.<sup>5</sup>

Looking at things this way, cities are a thing of the past. Where they existed, merely-urban areas are forming; where cities did not exist, modern states have established urban areas as convenient to commercial and governmental needs, and for reasons of policy or otherwise, these urban areas have not become cities.

If human beings need more than merely-urban areas in which to express the fullness of their special being, then that is a very gloomy point of view.

<sup>4</sup>George Washington Plunkett, in Riordan's classic account, *Plunkett of Tammany Hall*, extends the latter term even to the people of Brooklyn. It is clear that city politicians, serving in the state legislature, have commonly considered it a large part of their duties, to assert the prior claims of the city against those of the rest of the state. It is equally clear that representatives of other parts of the state have considered appropriate to deprive the city where possible, and to villify it, almost as a matter of course. It is not at all clear this is mere posturing for the folks back home; even if it were, that would still reveal common attitudes.

<sup>5&</sup>quot;Third World" urban areas offer some obvious examples. Descriptions of conditions in Calcutta and Rio de Janeiro—as diverse, culturally, as can be—suggest that in both cases a city existed, but was lost in merely urban sprawl. In both cases, the obvious "culprit" has been massive in-migration, and one is inclined to think that this is the proximate cause of the problem. I am inclined to think that is not entirely so. Historically, cities have incorporated substantial numbers of new citizens; the truly vast numbers today should not, of themselves, be unmanageable. Other, more complex answers seem more accurate.

П

There is another way to look at things, based on the notion that a new paradigm for thinking is developing. Under this view, the fundamental assumption, generally unquestioned even in critical thinking, is changing. A number of opinions, as to *what* the new paradigm may be, have been advanced; none of these views is entirely satisfactory—if only because, if there is a new paradigm emerging, it has yet to do so completely. By the very nature of the thing, it can't be described until *after* it is altogether worked out.<sup>6</sup>

Insubstantial as this new foundation and its new metaphysical epoch may be, there are some things that can be said about it. The heart of the discussion centers around language, and the "vectors" of the discussion appear to be integration, communication and liberation.

Without exploring all the ramifications of that very blithe statement, nevertheless it seems that most of what has been said about cities in the earlier chapters fits very nicely under these headings.<sup>7</sup>

Cities have tended to be integrative from earliest times. In recent history, cities (in the larger sense, including merely urban areas) have been the principal places where people come together. But only in cities proper (not including merely urban areas) do they integrate.

Comparing New York and Los Angeles is instructive. Both are sprawling, almost borderless urban agglomerations. Both have polyglot populations segregated to a great extent into both cultural and economic enclaves. In both cities, tensions between enclaves can erupt into conflict.

In Los Angeles, this conflict becomes open rioting and general class warfare.

<sup>6</sup>Of course, those folks—some of the names are listed above—who set out candidates for the new paradigm will probably turn out to have been contributors to its final form. But the result will hopefully surprise even them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Part of the change from old paradigm to new, from Modernity to Post-Modernity, seems to be a tendency away from supervening individualism toward some kind of communalism. An important element of the Modern consensus has been that the only absolute certainty I have is my own existence; social groupings are validated for me, because they are my society. Social pluralism becomes nationalism writ large, and so on. The dominance of Western European thinking throughout a world conquered by Western imperialism, has left this a largely unchallenged point of view in the world. However, there is a countervailing and more primitive possibility, which stresses the validity of the individual through participation in the community. This can be extended—theoretically—to encompass communities which cross merely cultural and national limitations. Both possibilities exists in tension; the current fashion in thinking favors communalism. The question remains, is this just a current fashion, or is it something more fundamental?

### **Modern Cities**

In New York, conflict tends to be limited, and specific to events, and rarely becomes generalized.

Integration of highly diverse communities makes communication possible.

Again, New York is instructive. The Crown Heights section of the city has a long heritage as an African American community; recent decades have seen an influx of Orthodox Jewish sectaries, whose religious practices require a particularly segregated communal structure. The two communities have not blended well, and conflict has been common, erupting into street violence.

Interestingly enough, the conflict has called forth some intriguing forms of dialogue. All the usual community-leadership cadres have, naturally, engaged in both confrontational and constructive conversations. But the dialogue has also spawned theatre; an African American actress developed a one-woman show in which she presented major figures in the communities, both in their hostility and in their striving for accommodation. In a couple hours, the elements of real difference are shown to be themselves a possible ground of identity—symbolized in the actress herself.

This very fundamental level of communication is infinitely more powerful than mere dialogical encounter among community leaders. It is possible, it seems to me, only where a kind of structural integration already exists, which supersedes the pluralism that normally is part of late-Modern society. That is, the common fact of living in New York affords a level of identity which can balance the separating factors of neighborhood identification.<sup>8</sup>

Communication of this kind is liberating. It sets one free of the limits of one's own neighborhood. The 'hood may be the basic building block of the city, but a citizen is not limited to its confines. People in cities cross neighborhood boundaries all the time, and *most* of the time find that they like what they find.

<sup>8</sup>In a recent examination, one of the elements posed for comment by my students in the essay section was that New York was doomed to lose its preeminence to Los Angeles. My students—New Yorkers all, but pretty hip kids—rejected this. Admitting that Los Angeles might well be a larger city, with a quantitatively larger economy and so on, the common view was that New York was a more lively place. This view was more empirical than theoretical, certainly—but the class was composed of people from a number of very different cultural enclaves in the city (African Americans, various Hispanic communities, West Indians of several sorts, and a number of Asian American immigrants; I was the only Northern European in the room). I am not sure what to make of that, but I do find it interesting.

Great cities have always boasted of this liberation. Aristophanes (no fan of cosmopolite fashion) makes it a virtue when the women of Greece gather together in Athens to end warfare, in Lysistrata. Commentators in mediæval China boast of the greatness of Sung dynasty Kaifeng, praising the wide variety of cultures presenting their options to a civilized society. New York is no less liberated in this.

Moreover, it seems to me a case can be made that the mark of a city's becoming great is just this kind of liberation. Sleepy Taipei was a secondary city when Taiwan was a colonial outpost, first of Ching dynasty China and later of imperial Japan. Under the relocated government of the Republic of China, it became a national government center. But as Taiwan has become wealthy, Taipei has been losing its exclusively Chinese character; as a part of that change, taste is changing as well. Parochialism (a problem for Chinese since the Ming dynasty) is out of fashion, and eclectic mixing is "in." The result is quite astonishing—especially, it seems, to the Chinese.

In short, under this—"post-Modern"—view, cities are viable and ongoing habitats for the best kind of human living.

### Ш

Neither of these views is convincing. Each excludes the other, to a great extent. That very fact suggests that all the elements for determining the way cities show themselves at the present and toward the future are not yet on the table.

Principle among these, of course, is the extent to which other social and (especially) governmental actors will allow cities to continue.

Late-Modern government has not been kindly to cities, as has been noted. Moreover, late-Modern government does not particularly favor the post-Modern agenda in the way it develops in cities.

Late-Modern government favors integration only when it affords the integrating infrastructure. This substitutes a socially-engineered and deliberate ædifice for one that is, in a sense, "natural."

Late-Modern government favors only that communication which it controls. Communication is a tool of governance in late-Modernity. "Spin" is the name of the game—and the best "spin doctors" manage what data is available, the limits within which that data can be interpreted as information, and the media through which it is purveyed.

### Modern Cities

Cities in late-Modern times are media centers, through which information is disseminated. The amount of information made available to citizens is truly vast, through such a complex of media that government cannot hope to completely control it. Consequently, governments are leery of cities; where they can decentralize the city, and crush its limits (making it merely urban), government can minimize the threat of uncontrolled media.

Finally, of course, late-Modern governments have not favored liberation. In the early part of the century, especially between the World Wars, nationalism and socialism were not political positions espoused by "fascist" governments only. National agendæ were the commonplaces of what passed for political discourse; social programs were much touted as a response to world-wide depression. National leaders sought to maintain a fever pitch of public sentiment, for a variety of reasons.

This has continued, through the cold war and in its wake. What develops is a species of coercion. Issues are *kept* vast, so that ordinary citizens cannot possibly grasp their implications and what ordinary folks' interests are. It is not possible to freely interact.<sup>9</sup>

In short, it is possible to know what a city is—to define it quite precisely, in fact—but to be still limited to saying simply that cities are merely possible.

<sup>9</sup>An awful lot of this is said at great length by Hannah Arendt, in *Crises of the Republic* (op. cit. supra), among other places. She is not alone in the criticism.